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Abstract
MORAL MOTIVATION AND THE AUTHORITY OF MORALITY: A DEFENSE OF
NATURALIST MORAL REALISM
by
Lily Eva Frank
Adviser: Professor Steven Cahn
Moral realism has been continuously accused of positing the existence of queer
properties, facts, judgments, and beliefs. One of these queer features is supposed to
be the normative force of morality-that is the way in which morality guides our actions.
Critics of moral realism argue that nothing else in the world has this feature. This is a
reason to doubt that moral facts and properties exist at all. This objection can be
interpreted in at least two ways. One way to interpret it has to do with moral motivation,
this is the internalism objection. The other has to do with the authority of morality. In
this essay I defend naturalist moral realism against these two objections, the internalism
objection and the authority objection.
I argue that the internalism objection and the authority objection are independent
of each other. Whether and how morality motivates us to act does not bear on the
place that morality should have in our lives and decision-making. We may have no
motivation to do things that we should do, and we may be extremely motivated to do
things we should not do. The conflation of these two objections is widespread in the
literature and is the source of some of their apparent persuasiveness.
The internalism objection is an attack on the realist commitment to cognitivismthe view that moral judgments are beliefs. The objection claims that there is a
necessary, essential, or inherent connection between making a moral judgment, and
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being motivated to some extent to act on that moral judgment. This claim is internalism.
But, the objection claims, beliefs, by themselves, cannot motivate an agent to act. This
means that moral judgments cannot be beliefs. So cognitivism is false. The objection
concludes that since moral realism is wedded to cognitivism, moral realism is also false.
I respond to this objection in two ways. First, I argue against the view that moral
judgments necessarily, inherently, or essentially motivate. I argue against it based in
part on the phenomena of amoralism and other forms of moral indifference, including
mundane, everyday cases of occasional amoralism and diversity in the level of moral
motivation. The morally indifferent seem to be able to make the same moral judgments
that morally deferential people do, without having any corresponding motivation to act
on those judgments. Thus they present a central counter-example to the internalist’s
claim that there is a necessary, essential, or inherent connection between moral
judgment and motivation. I stress that moral indifference should not be understood as
an exotic phenomenon found only in psychopathic serial killers or suicidally depressed.
Instead, it is commonplace. Moral indifference might actually be the majority of our
moral experience, rather than the exceptional case. I also argue against the internalist
method of a priori conceptual analysis.
At the same time, I make a case for the opposite view, externalism, which is the
view that moral judgments do not necessarily or inherently motivate, nor can they
motivate by themselves. Instead moral judgments are only contingently connected with
motivation. The specific form of externalism that I argue for is a pluralistic externalism,
which I argue can meet the objections that are usually made against externalism better
than any alternative form of externalism.

v

The authority objection to naturalist moral realism is that morality has a certain
kind of authority over us and that naturalist moral realism precludes this kind of
authority. Therefore, naturalist moral realism must be false. The authority of morality
can be understood in a variety of ways. For example, the importance that moral
demands have in directing our lives or the way in which moral reasons seem to override
other reasons for action. The authority of morality is supposed to be a problem for
naturalist moral realism because the realist identifies moral facts and properties with
complex natural facts and properties. The authority objection asks: why should any set
of natural facts or properties have authority over our behavior? In other words, the
naturalist moral realist seems to lack a convincing response to this kind of moral
skeptic. One particularly influential form of this argument is found in the work of
Christine Korsgaard, who argues that as a metaphysical position, moral realism is ill
equipped to account for the normativity of morality. The other is found in Derek Parfit,
who argues that naturalist forms of realism cannot explain normativity.
I respond to the authority objection by defending a limited account of authority.
Second, I argue that once properly understood, the authority of morality is no more a
problem for naturalist moral realism as a metaethical theory than any other meta-ethical
theory. Every metaethical position is faced with the difficult task of explaining this
aspect of normativity and we have no reason to think this is a special problem for
realism. Finally, I put forward a defensible version of naturalist moral realism, spelling
out the commitment to objectivity and to naturalism.
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Introduction
Our days are filled with evaluative judgments. We might wake up and notice that
the coffee is good today, think that the person who gave up his seat to the elderly
woman on the bus is kind, notice that the neighbors grow beautiful roses, evaluate a
student’s paper as deserving a ‘C+’ but decide to give them a ‘B-’ anyway, or conclude
that the President’s proposed military intervention somewhere is justified. We might
think about whether or not we should keep a date with a friend, even though we are
tired and just want to go home and watch our favorite television show, where we
sympathize with the fictional villain, while at the same time judging his behavior to be
reprehensible. These judgments are sometimes kept to ourselves, but are often
discussed with others, who may agree or disagree. Many of the countless evaluative
judgments that we constantly make are also specifically moral judgments.
Moral realism is the view that moral judgments either succeed or fail in
corresponding to a mind independent moral reality. The moral facts about people,
actions, states of affairs, and so on and the moral properties of these people, actions,
states of affairs, exist regardless of what we think of them or whether or not we are even
aware of them. This vague characterization of moral realism immediately presents
several puzzles. First, if we are committed to naturalism, whether methodological,
epistemological, or metaphysical, it might seem puzzling how such moral facts and
properties could be accommodated without embracing a realm of sui generis or
mysterious moral facts and properties into our ontology and a corresponding faculty with
which to perceive them.

The position I defend, naturalist moral realism, is a variety of Cornell realism.
Cornell realism gets its name from the view’s three most well know proponents: Richard
Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, and David Brink. Boyd and Sturgeon were both professors at
Cornell University and Boyd received his Ph.D. from Cornell. The version of Cornell
realism that I defend claims that moral properties and facts exist objectively; this means
that they are not dependent on or constituted by what we think about them. At the same
time, these moral properties and facts are constituted by basic physical properties and
facts.
This version of realism explicitly addresses worries about the incompatibility of
moral facts and properties with natural facts and properties by characterizing moral
facts and properties as being constituted by or supervening on basic physical facts and
properties, in an analogous way to the relationship between the psychological,
sociological, or historical facts and properties and basic physical facts and properties.
On this view the psychological, sociological, or historical properties and facts can be
understood as natural, without being characterized as physical properties and facts.
The relationship of supervenience is notoriously difficult to define. When one
property A, supervenes on another property or set of properties B, there cannot be a
change in A without a corresponding change in B. In the case of moral properties, the
supervenience claim is just that something (an act, person, situation, etc.) cannot differ
in its moral properties without simultaneously differing in its underlying physical
properties. It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the supervenience relation in
depth, for this reason, I will often characterize the relationship between the moral
properties and facts and natural properties and facts as a relation of constitution.
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Cornell realism is also the most promising candidate for a plausible version of
realism because it suggests that there are non-analytic identities between moral
properties and natural properties. These identities do not have to do with truths of
meaning. Instead they are to be understood along the same lines as the property
identities that we have discovered between things like water and H20.
At the same time, Cornell realism leaves open the possibility that the identities
between moral properties and facts and natural properties and facts may be reductive
or nonreductive. Nonreducutive realism says that that moral properties and facts are
constituted by natural properties and facts, rather than being reduced to natural
properties and facts. Saying that the relationship between the moral and the natural is
non-analytic is different from saying that it is nonreductive. A non-analytic version of
naturalist moral realism does not involve a claim about equivalent meaning between
moral terms and natural terms (or sets of terms). Nonreductive realism in contrast,
rejects the claim that moral properties and facts are reducible to natural properties and
facts. On such a view, the moral properties and facts can be both constituted by natural
properties and facts but distinct from them in the way that the property of being a table
is a distinct property from the properties of the microphysical constituents of the table. I
favor nonreductive realism, but I have left that debate fairly untouched in this essay.
Even if realism can be understood in a way that is satisfactorily compatible with
the commitments of naturalism, it still faces a host of objections. A set of persistent
challenges to realism are articulated in J.L. Mackie’s Ethics Inventing Right and Wrong,
specifically in his section on the queerness objection to objective values. Mackie’s set of
queerness objections to the existence of objective values continue to be cited and
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contemporary challenges to realism grounded in the queerness or moral facts and
properties abound. I defend Cornell realism against two sets of persistent objections,
objections based on moral motivation (the internalism objection) and objections based
on the authority or normativity of morality.
In Chapter 1, I introduce Mackie’s classic queerness objections to the existence
of objective values. Mackie’s central point, very roughly, is that is if objective values
were to exist, they would be a kind of thing like nothing else that exists. Part of the force
of Mackie’s argument comes from an assumption that moral properties and facts
(objective values, in Mackie’s language) could not be reconciled with a world of natural
properties and facts. Cornell realism purports to be able to do just that. But even if it
can, Mackie’s queerness objections still pose a set of challenges to naturalistic moral
realism in general.
Mackie’s argument from queerness contains several sub-arguments, as he and
others have noted. I present some of the central ways that queerness can be
understood and concentrate on the strain of the argument having to do with
metaphysical queerness. Metaphysical queerness can be further understood to have to
do with the supervenience of the moral on the natural, the causal efficacy of objective
values, or the normative force of objective values. I focus on the normative force strain
of Mackie’s argument. I further parse that objection into an objection having to do with
the nature of moral motivation and an objection having to do with the authority of
morality.
The objection based on the nature of moral motivation says that because realism
is committed to cognitivism it has to construe moral judgments, either the sentences we
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utter with moral content or the mental states we have with moral content, primarily as
beliefs. The objection claims that problem with that is that beliefs cannot motivate us to
act on them all by themselves. But this is inconsistent with the data, the objection
claims, moral judgments do motivate us to act, all by themselves. This view is
motivational judgment internalism (internalism for short). The objection concludes that
realism is less likely to be the correct view because the cognitivism it is committed to is
incompatible with internalism. The correct metaethical view, the argument continues,
can allow for motivation to be built into moral judgments themselves, candidates include
expressivism, projectivism, emotivism, and so on.
The objection based on the authority of morality says that realism cannot
capture, or is incompatible with, the unique way that morality has authority over us.
Morality is not the sort of thing one can opt out of; it binds us all regardless of our
wishes to the contrary. This objection claims that realism somehow eliminates the
“ought-ness” of morality, sometimes called its normativity. Christine Korsgaard’s
formulation of this objection identifies realism itself as the problem, whereas Derek
Parfit’s formulation of the objection identifies naturalism as the source of the problem.
I argue that although often conflated, objections to realism based on concerns
about the nature of moral motivation are distinct from objections to realism based on the
worry that it cannot capture the authority of morality. Both objections claim that there is
something about realism (natural or non-natural) that is unable to easily accommodate
or is inconsistent with an important belief that we have about the way morality works or
an important fact about morality. One of the central projects of the essay is to
distinguish the objection from motivation and the authority objection from each other,
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understand them, explain how they are taken to pose a challenge to realism, and to
defend naturalist realism.
Chapter 1 also considers two historically significant objections to moral
naturalism: David Hume’s alleged is-ought gap and G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. I
explain these arguments and why they are not a problem for Cornell realism. I address
these objections because versions of them continue to appear in the contemporary
metaethical literature on naturalism. For example, Parfit’s objection to non-analytical
naturalism raised in Chapter 4, mirrors the open question argument.
Chapter 1 ends with a brief discussion of a final argument that Mackie makes
against objective values, the objection from disagreement. Mackie distinguishes it from
the queerness objection, but the objection is often raised against realism in conjunction
with the queerness objections, so it merits addressing.
Chapter 2 focuses on the objection to realism based on motivation, which I call
the internalism objection. Internalism is the view that moral judgments necessarily,
inherently, or essentially motivate the agents who make them to act on them. Whereas
externalism is the view that moral judgments do not necessarily, inherently, or
essentially motivate the agents who make them to act on them. Instead, the connection
between making a moral judgment and having a moral motivation is a contingent one.
First, I explain the case for internalism and some of the important distinctions between
various types of internalism.
I then defend a pluralistic externalist account of moral motivation. On this view, at
times, we are motivated to act on our moral judgments by sources like compassion and
sympathy. We are also motivated to act on our moral judgments by conative states like
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desires, which have content related to the moral judgment we make. For example, I
might desire to do the right thing. Another person or at another time, someone may
desire that their friend be happy. Another time a person may act out of a mostly or
purely non-cognitive affective state like sympathy for the suffering person.
I argue that pluralistic externalism meets three important conditions that any
theory of moral motivation should meet. First it should be consistent with the existing
psychological and neuroscientific evidence about how the human motivational system
works in general (the empirical evidence condition). Pluralistic externalism is an a
posteriori theory and so is open to being amended based on scientific evidence, unlike
many competing internalist theories, which posit an a priori necessary connection
between moral judgment and motivation.
Second, a theory of moral motivation should be flexible enough to be compatible
with the wide range of variability that we find in moral motivation between individuals
and within a single individual across times and situations (the flexibility condition).
Pluralistic externalism can embrace a wide range of types of motivation and can thus
also easily explain a wide range of ways in which one can fail to be motivated as well.
Pluralistic externalism is also the view that is most compatible with the phenomenon of
moral indifference.
Third, it should be impartial with respect to ethical theories about what kind of
motivation is morally praiseworthy; it should be as normatively neutral as possible (the
neutrality condition). Normative neutrality is a traditional criterion for a successful
metaethical theory. Pluralistic externalism is agnostic on which type of motivation
represents the most morally, or the only morally praiseworthy type of motivation.

7

Further, it is neutral about whether or not motivation is something that can be morally
assessed at all or whether it is rather the action that comes out of our deliberative
process that truly matters morally. Although I do not embrace a strict division between
metaethical and normative theories, I take neutrality on this issue to be important
because I take the truth and nature of motivational externalism to be an empirical theory
of moral psychology. So while how our motivational system actually works is relevant to
what should be counted as morally praiseworthy or worthwhile, moral psychology
should try to limit the extent to which it builds those kinds of views in.
Chapter 3 considers the phenomenon of moral indifference in detail, outlining
some of the most important and widely discussed forms of moral indifference and
amoralism. Those who are morally indifferent, like amoralists, are people who appear
to be able to make moral judgments without being motivated to act on those moral
judgments. If such people are conceivable then that is a serious counterexample to a
priori internalism. If such people actually exist then the counter example touches a
posterior forms of internalism as well.
I press the view that moral indifference is a far more commonplace phenomenon
than may be currently recognized, especially when we consider the variability in levels
of moral motivation between individuals and across an individual over time. I consider
various internalist responses to moral indifference, especially the internalist strategy of
reinterpreting what the morally indifferent person says to show that they do not really
make a moral judgment at all. I show the internalist responses to be lacking and I also
explain why pluralistic externalism can best make sense of moral indifference.
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Chapter 4 addresses the authority objection to realism. The authority that
morality has over us is very hard to pin down or define (for an important historical
source on the authority of morality see Butler 1726). It is described variously as
morality’s normativity, the to-be-doneness of moral facts, the categoricity of morality, its
overridingness, and its reason giving force, to name a few. The chapter first canvasses
some of the ways the objection has been made and considering how we can
understand what is meant by this mysterious power morality has over us. In surveying
these various formulations, I argue that there is no reason to think that any one of them
is necessarily incompatible with naturalist moral realism.
The authority objection to naturalist moral realism is motivated by several distinct
metaethical positions. On some versions of the objection, the problem that the objection
focuses on is that when thinking about moral properties as mind independent features
of the world, we misplace the central connection they have to guiding our decision
making. This is meant to be understood in something stronger than in a motivational
sense. Korsgaard’s version of the authority objection makes something like this claim;
realism can never answer what she calls the “normativity question.” But the authority
objection also comes from nonnaturalist realists like Parfit. On this version of the
objection, the problem of authority only arises when we consider versions of realism that
also aim to be descriptive or natural.
Chapter 4 explains that, for Korsgaard, every metaethical theory must be able to
explain, in a first person context, why someone should do what is morally required of
them. Realism, she claims, cannot answer it sufficiently, while her Kantian
constructivism can. I argue that Korsgaard’s authority objection can be overcome and
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respond to it in four related ways. Realism has stronger answers to the normative
question than Korsgaard considers. At the same time, it seems that some of the force of
the normative question may be stemming from a subtle conflation of justification and
motivation. I also argue that Korsgaard’s alternative to realism, Kantian constructivism,
cannot adequately answer the challenge she poses. In fact, all metaethical theories
have difficulty answering her normative question. This is an issue that I revisit at the end
of the chapter. Realism, however, fares better than many others on the grounds that it
captures objectivity in a unique way.
The second half of the chapter discusses Parfit’s version of the authority
objection. He thinks that morality will lose its normativity in the reason giving sense, if
we construe moral facts as constituted by natural facts. Parfit’s arguments against nonanalytical naturalism, “the normativity objection,” “the triviality objection,” and “the factstating argument,” all aim to show that natural facts by themselves cannot be normative.
Instead, only a sui generis realm of nonnatural normative facts is consistent with
normativity. Parfit’s arguments against non-analytical naturalism do not succeed in
showing that the normativity of reasons is lost in naturalist moral realism. The
arguments that he takes to be strongest are only persuasive if one is already convinced
that normativity must to be non-natural.
Having argued that neither paradigmatic cases of the authority objection to
naturalist moral realism succeed, Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the kind of
authority that naturalist moral realism does have. I introduce an account of minimal
authority through a discussion of Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism. I draw a contrast
between the kind of objectivity that moral realism can secure and the kind of pseudo-
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objectivity that non-realist theories can secure. I chose Blackburn’s view because it
comes as close as an antirealist theory can come in successfully capturing many of the
features of morality that we hope a metaethical theory can capture while remaining
ontologically parsimonious.
The authority of morality is not the same as objectivity. But looking closely at one
part of Blackburn’s view, it becomes easier to see the kind of authority that realism can
capture that non-realist views, like constructivism or quasi-realist expressivism cannot. I
end the chapter by discussing what kind of authority is the best we can hope for, that is
objectivity. This is something the realist can secure. This is a particular success for
naturalist moral realism if at the same time it is able to do all of this without positing the
existence of sui generis moral properties or facts.
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Chapter 1: The Queerness of (Naturalist) Moral Realism
1. Naturalist Moral Realism
“Moral realism” describes a range of metaethical views. Most moral realists
defend some or all of the following five claims:
1) the mind independence of morality: the claim that moral facts or properties
exist objectively, regardless of what agents happen to believe about their existence or
content;
2) ontological realism: the claim that moral facts or properties exist;
3) psychological cognitivism: the claim that moral judgments are beliefs;
4) semantic cognitivism: the claim that sentences that contain moral predicates
can be true or false, that moral sentences express propositions, or that moral terms
refer to moral properties; and
5) the rejection of error theory: the claim that sometimes our beliefs accurately
represent the world and that sometimes our moral propositions are literally true.
Various formulations of moral realism emphasize different sets of these five conditions
(Sayre-McCord 1986 p. 6; FitzPatrick 2009 p. 747). My emphasis is on defending the
mind independence of morality, ontological realism, and psychological cognitivism.
There is no easy way to settle upon a definition of naturalism or of what makes a
particular domain of inquiry a naturalistic one. One competing conception of naturalism
which I will not rely on says that only those areas are natural which “are the proper
object of natural scientific study” (Shafer-Landau and Cuneo 2006 p. 211). In the
present context, naturalism can be understood, first, as an epistemological position that
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rules out a priori knowledge about morality (Devitt 2010 p. 188). Second, moral
naturalism is a metaphysical claim, that the “ethical facts and properties are
exhaustively constituted by natural ones” (FitzPatrick 2009 p. 750). Another way of
putting this is that everything that exists is natural. Together, moral realism and
naturalism constitute naturalist moral realism.
The type of moral realism that I will defend is often referred to as Cornell Realism
(Sturgeon 1985; Railton 1986; Boyd 1988; Brink 1989). This type of moral realism says
that moral claims "purport to describe the moral properties of people, actions, and
institutions," and that some moral claims are true (Brink 1989 p. 7).
Cornell realism does not look for analytic identities or synonymy between moral
terms and natural terms. Instead, it contends that although moral terms and natural
terms “have…different meaning[s], these terms refer to the same (natural) propert[ies]”
(Tännsjö 2010 p. 64). This view makes the primary focus of the metaethical theory
metaphysical and psychological rather than semantic. The naturalist element of Cornell
realism has to do with the relationship between moral properties and facts and natural
properties and facts, not moral sentences or predicates and natural or descriptive
sentences and predicates.1
This view can be contrasted with analytical naturalism, for example, Frank
Jackson’s analytical descriptivism, which says that “moral predicates and sentences
could be replaced without significant loss by purely descriptive predicates and
sentences” (Nuccetelli and Seay 2013 p. 133). Jackson describes the contrast; “we say,
and the Cornell position denies, that, at the end of the day, we can say all there is to say
1

While there is a difference between properties and facts, I use them interchangeably throughout and do
not think that very much hangs metaphysically on whether what is real are moral properties or moral
facts. I tend to think it is both, understanding facts as states of affairs.
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about ethical nature in descriptive terms” (Jackson 2000 p. 146). I have chosen not to
defend analytical naturalism, first, because it has the drawback of primarily focusing on
moral language and grappling with a range of open question style arguments. Analytical
naturalism and the debate surrounding it focuses extensively on mining linguistic
intuitions which I do not think are particularly helpful in discovering what the correct
picture of moral reality is. Our linguistic intuitions can only tell us about how we use
moral words and form moral sentences; they can give us very limited insight into moral
ontology or even moral psychology (Zimmerman 1980 p. 641). Second, I am skeptical
about the notion of analyticity entirely and Cornell realism is not committed to defending
the analytic/synthetic distinction in the way that analytical naturalists are.
Realism that is naturalist and non-analytic can come in either reductive or
nonreductive forms. This distinction between reductive and nonreductive captures a
metaphysical question about the relationship between the natural properties and facts
and the moral properties and facts. There are Cornell realists on both sides of this
divide.2
The kind of Cornell realism that I favor is nonreductive, in that moral properties
and facts are constituted by, or supervene on natural properties and facts. Thus moral
properties and facts are both irreducible in a sense, and natural at the same time. The
distinction between reductive and nonreductive realism requires some unpacking. Brink
characterizes his position as a nonreductive one. The important difference between a
reductive position and a nonreductive position is that on a reductive position, moral
properties and facts are identical to natural properties and facts. Whereas on the
nonreductive view, moral properties and facts are constituted by natural properties and
2

David Brink is a nonreductive naturalist. Richard Boyd is a reductive naturalist as is Peter Railton.
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facts (Brink 1989 p. 9).Brink provides the following characterization of his nonreductive
position:
Moral properties can be natural properties, though, even if they are not identical
with natural properties. F can be G even if the property (or properties) designated
by ‘F’ is not (or are not) the same as that (or those) designated by ‘G’. If G
actually composes or realizes F, but F can be, or could have been, realized
differently, then G constitutes, but is not identical with F…a table is constituted
by, but not identical with, a particular arrangement of microphysical particles,
since the table could survive certain changes in its particles or their arrangement
(Brink 1989 p. 157-158).
One reason for favoring nonreductive realism and the constitution relation rather than
reductive realism and the identity relation is that nonreductive realism leaves room for
the plausible claim that moral properties are multiply realizable (Brink 1989 p. 158).
That is, the same moral facts and properties could be constituted by more than one set
of natural facts and properties.
Alternatively, a reductive realist would say that there is an identity between moral
properties or facts and natural properties or facts that should be understood “on the
model of other common scientific identity claims, such as water =H20,
temperature=mean kinetic energy…” (Brink 1989 p. 157). The possibility of these kinds
of identities between moral properties and natural properties has relied heavily on work
on identity in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, especially the work of Saul Kripke
and Hilary Putnam (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1992).
Even though I favor nonreductive naturalism, I address arguments that target
both reductive naturalism and nonreductive naturalism, in part because there is so
much variability in how this distinction is understood. For example, Russ Shafer-Landau
self identifies as a nonnaturalist realist, but is characterized by many others as a
nonreductive naturalist (Bedke 2012 p. 111fn). At the same time, someone like Brink
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who presents his view as nonreductive says that moral properties are “nothing over and
above” natural properties and so is sometimes characterized as a reductive naturalist
(Bedke 2012 p. 111fn). It seems that if one is a nonreductive naturalist, nearly all of the
same objections apply, or are posed against one’s view, as when one is a reductive
naturalist, and visa versa.
The realist position that I defend is often accompanied by the claim that moral
properties and facts can play a causal and explanatory role. “[M]oral properties make a
genuine and ineliminable contribution to the best explanation of experience (in
particular, of moral belief)” and “moral truths […] pull their weight in naturalistic
explanations”(Hooker 2008 p. 587). The causal explanatory role of moral properties is
sometimes used as evidence that moral properties exist and used as evidence that
these properties are natural properties, since if they were not natural or constituted by
natural properties it would be very hard to understand how they could interact with
natural properties and cause things to happen in the natural world. (See sections 2.3
and 2.4).
1.1. Why Moral Realism?
There is strong prima facie evidence to support moral realism; it is the position
most consistent with several elements of our everyday moral thinking and language
(Smith 1995; Blackburn 1984; Brink 1989; Mackie 1977; Shafer-Landau 2003). For
example, cognitivism, one important element of moral realism, captures the way we
think about our moral judgments. When we assess whether an action is right or wrong,
a person’s character is virtuous or vicious, or a state of affairs is good or bad, we take
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ourselves to be aiming at representing the way things really are, the moral facts or
properties of the action, person, or state of affairs. We also tend to think that we can
engage in genuine moral disagreements with other people. If I claim that ‘eating meat is
morally wrong’ and you claim that ‘eating meat is morally permissible,’ we take
ourselves to be asserting conflicting claims and we assume that we cannot both be
correct (See Ross 1939 p. 30-41).
Nor do we think that if everyone in a society, or even everyone in the world,
came to believe that deliberate cruelty to children is morally permissible that it would
actually become morally permissible. There is no dependence relation between what we
think about morality and what morality actually requires of us. This is not to say that if
we were psychologically constituted in a radically different way morality would not be
different. For example, if we weren’t the sort of beings that could feel pain, then it may
no longer be the case that pinching another person for fun would be wrong, holding
everything else equal.
We also tend to think that it is possible that an individual agent or a large group
of agents could be in moral error about one of their moral judgments or about a whole
host of them. Entire societies can be swept up in morally abhorrent ideologies. Even if
every single person thinks they are right, they are still wrong.
Finally, we believe that it is possible to make moral progress. For example, we
tend to believe that a country which has overcome racial segregation is morally better
than the state it was in when segregation was standard.
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These are just examples, meant to suggest the way that realism is embedded in
ordinary moral thinking and practice. Thus, consistent with other moral realists, I claim
that the burden of proof falls on those who would deny moral realism.
Debate about burden of proof, discussed most commonly in epistemology and
legal scholarship, focuses on what it is constituted by, whether it exists at all, and how
to determine who it falls on in an argument. The burden of proof is often assumed to be
on the position that denies a claim that counts by itself as common sense or is
consistent with common sense in the way the opposing position is not.
A possible preliminary objection to realism at this point, is that our everyday
moral thought, language, and practice do not support moral realism, thus attempting to
undermine the claim that antirealism carries the burden of proof. One form of this
challenge is that folk morality is not truly realist, instead it has a cultural relativist streak
in it (Sarkissian et al. 2011; Björnsson 2012). Sarkissian et al. acknowledge that several
studies suggest that people do generally take morality to be objective and that they
understand moral disagreements to be about something other than the interlocutors
opinions or feelings (Nichols 2004; Goodwin and Darley 2008). However, Sarkissian et
al. argue that recent studies that frame the questions respondents are asked in a
different way, they produce different results. They claim that when participants consider
the moral judgments of people who are radically different from them (either in terms of
their culture or their “values or ways of life”) “their intuitions move steadily toward a kind
of relativism” (Sarkissian et al. 2011 p. 486). That is, they tend to judge that it is possible
for their own moral judgments to be correct and at the same time for the person who
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holds conflicting moral judgments to be correct, or they hold that there is no objective
fact of the matter at all in such cases.
Ideally, realist should have ways to respond to these results and be able to
defend their contention that folk morality supports objectivism and thus puts the burden
of proof on those who would deny it, but this debate is not the focus on this essay. One
plausible avenue for a realist response is to scrutinize the way that the experiment
questions that generated the relativist responses were framed. For example, people
have a strong impulse not to want to seem judgmental or culturally imperialist. At the
same time, they may have been taking the descriptions of alternative value systems
which are built into the questions as clues that in order to “get the answer right” they
should take note of these facts and respond accordingly. Another second possible
objection to the idea that antirealism carries the burden of proof in the debate it to argue
that the ethical appearances of everyday moral discourse and thought should not carry
the weight that realists give to them (Singer 2005; Björnsson 2012). There are problems
with this dismissal however (Sandberg and Juth 2011).
2. Objections to Moral Realism
Realism faces several pressing objections that suggest that despite appearances to
the contrary, there are no moral facts or properties in the world at all. In the past twenty
five years, objections to realism and alternative theories, like Simon Blackburn’s quasirealism, Gilbert Harman’s relativism, Allan Gibbard’s expressivism, or Christine
Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism, have become increasingly sophisticated, and hold
the promise of being able to explain the moral appearances and give us a satisfying
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sense of objectivity without any of the metaphysical baggage of realism (Gibbard 1992;
Blackburn 1993; Harman and Thomson 1996; Korsgaard 1996).
But Cornell realism remains the most persuasive version of realism and more
persuasive than the closely related antirealist metaethical alternatives, like quasirealism, error-theory, and constructivism, because it can avoid two major sets, very
broadly construed, of objections to which realism has been traditionally vulnerable.
The first set of objections comes from the charge that objective values (moral
facts and properties) are “queer” (“queerness objections”). This objection can be
understood in many different ways. Several of these readings will be discussed in the
following sections. But the strain of the objection I will centrally focus on in this essay is
the metaphysical queerness of the normativity of objective values. I argue that this
objection to moral realism can be broken down into two distinct sub-types, the
motivation objection and the authority objection. These objections will be discussed in
section 2.5.
The second set of objections are directed at naturalism specifically, these
arguments are rooted in G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy and the purported “is-ought”
gap. These objections will be discussed in sections 5 and 6.
The first set of objections that moral realism needs to contend with is J.L
Mackie’s (and other’s) queerness objections. These are objections that claim that if
objective moral values did exist in a mind independent way, they would be unacceptably
different from anything else that exists (Mackie 1977). Many contemporary challenges
to moral realism are a species of Mackie’s classic argument from queerness.

20

Part of Mackie’s set of objections to moral realism come from the charge that
moral realism is inconsistent with a naturalist picture of the world. Cornell realism is
most capable of diffusing this objection by espousing naturalism compatible with
realism. Naturalist moral realism can avoid the charge of being inconsistent with
science by arguing that moral facts and properties are realized or constituted by
physical facts and properties. Moral facts and properties merely operate at a different
level of description than the basic sciences, in much the same way the special sciences,
history, economics, and sociology do. While moral facts must depend on physical facts,
they need not reduce to physical facts (Brink 1989; Sturgeon 1985; Boyd 1988). So why
should moral properties and facts be thought to be queer if they are really just natural
properties and facts, rather than sui generis or mysterious properties and facts?
The objection cannot be diffused that easily. Queerness objections capture a
mystery about the normativity of objective values (moral properties or facts) that realism
must address. Not only do queerness objections challenge the compatibility of objective
values with a naturalist worldview, they also challenge the compatibility of objective
moral values with the normative force of morality. How to understand this objection will
be discussed in section 2.5.
At the same time, espousing naturalism is often thought to leave realists open to
a second set of objections, the charge that they violate Hume’s law, attempting to bridge
the gap between is and ought, or commit Moore’s naturalistic fallacy (see sections 5
and 6). Contemporary naturalist moral realists respond to these objections by explaining
that they do not intend to provide analytic identifications of moral terms with natural
terms or a priori reductions of moral language to non-moral language. Instead, they
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suggest that moral facts and properties are constituted by or supervene on more basic
physical facts and properties. This makes moral facts and properties no less real, and
no less natural, than the facts of history, psychology, or biology (Brink 1989). Beyond
this chapter I will not directly address the naturalistic fallacy or the is-ought gap again. I
address them in this chapter because of their historical importance for naturalist moral
realism and because of their ubiquity in the metaethical literature.
I argue that none of these objections succeed in disproving naturalist moral
realism, or even shifting the burden of proof from antirealism, non-cognitivism, or
relativism, to realism. I will start with Mackie’s queerness objections. Then discuss two
other important challenges to realism, the naturalistic fallacy and arguments based on
an is-ought gap. I end the chapter with a brief digression on arguments from moral
disagreement to relativism.
2.1 Queerness Objections to Moral Realism
Objections to moral realism often involve disputes about the existence of moral
properties, facts, beliefs, or judgments. Ever since Mackie’s argument for error theory
and against objective values, this broad class of objections is usually referred to as
arguments from “queerness” (Mackie 1977 p. 38).3 Mackie, however, was by no means
the first to raise these objections against objective values or moral realism. These
arguments can be found before him in Moritz Schlick, C.L. Stevenson, and A.J. Ayer
(Schlick 1939; Stevenson 1937; Ayer 1936/2012).

3

Not everyone who has made these objections to realism was influenced by Mackie by any means. But
his oft cited and vague objection contains the seeds of a long standing, complex, and difficult set of
problems at the intersection of moral philosophy, metaphysics, and moral psychology.
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Queerness objections depend on undermining the likelihood of the existence of
objective values (moral properties or facts). Usually, that is done by highlighting just
how strange moral properties, facts, beliefs, or judgments would have to be when
contrasted with other types of properties, facts, beliefs, or judgments. Critics of moral
realism argue that such moral entities, if they existed in the sense that realists says they
do, would be very strange things and this is taken as a reason to doubt that they exist at
all (Finlay 2007 p. 6). Mackie’s argument contains several different sub-arguments, not
all of which are fully fleshed out. In fact, there may be nothing distinctive about the
argument from queerness at all (Shepski 2008 p. 374-375). Instead, it may just be a
vague and colorful way of repackaging several old objections to realism having to do
with authority, normativity, and motivation. Mark Platts writes about Mackie’s argument;
“[t]he queerest thing about this as it stands is the claim that it is an argument…The
world is a queer place (Platts 1980 p. 72).4
What is Mackie actually accusing the existence of objective values of when he
calls them “queer” or “of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the
universe”(Mackie 1977 p. 38)? First it could be that queerness simply means
unnecessary in terms of explaining our moral practices. This is similar to Harman’s
arguments that our behavior could be explained just as well without positing the
existence of any moral facts and instead just citing the beliefs that we have about
morality and our dispositions and emotional reactions, etc. (Shepski 2008 p. 375;
Harman 1977). See section 2.4.
Second, it could be that by “queer,” Mackie means “nonsensical” (Shepski 2008
p. 375-376). This interpretation is doubtful, however, since Mackie rejects this point
4

See also Judith Jarvis Thomson “The Legacy of Principia” (Thomson 2003).
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when considering what Hare says about moral language that aims at “express[ing] a
statement of fact, and yet we have no idea what would be the case if it were true, the
sentence then that sentence is (to us) meaningless” (Hare 1952 Sec. 1.4). Embracing
such an argument would be inconsistent with the way that Mackie sets up his
queerness objection. Mackie “is asking us to conceive the entities in question and to
reﬂect on just how queer they would be if they existed” (Shepski 2008 p. 376). So surely
he does not think that objective values are like round squares in this way, that is,
inconceivable (Shepski 2008 p. 376).
A related interpretation of queerness is that Mackie thinks objective values, were
they to exist, would be incomprehensible (Shepski 2008, p. 376). This is a weaker claim
than saying that objective values are nonsensical. Instead the claim is that they are
beyond the grasp of human understanding. But as Lee Shepski points out, this is hardly
a good reason to reject the existence of something. Surely there could be things that
exist that our beyond the ken of our limited minds (Shepski 2008 p. 376).
A fourth way to understand queerness may be that the objective values are
mysterious in the sense of being unexplainable. Of course, not being able to currently
explain something, such as is the case in physics, cannot rule out its existence or make
it “in principle inexplicable” (Shepski 2008 p. 376).
Fifth, and finally, perhaps queerness means that objective values would have to
be sui generis, unique. That is, they either have or lack some property that everything
that exists has or they have some property that nothing else that exists has. This is the
most likely explanation for what Mackie means by queerness. But this claim will also
require some unpacking. In what sense does Mackie take these values to be unique
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(Shepski 2008 p. 377)? The property that objective values would have or either lack
could be one that has to do with the way in which we have knowledge about them, their
epistemic status, or what they fundamentally are, their metaphysical status.
Mackie famously claims:
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations
of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.
Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special
faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from out ordinary ways of
knowing everything else (Mackie 1977 p. 95-6).
In the first sentence, the claim being made is that moral facts or properties are
metaphysically different from everything else in the natural world. Whereas, the second
sentence makes an epistemological point, that given the characteristics he assumes
that moral facts or properties would have to have, they are not the sorts of things we
could find out about in the ordinary empirical ways. Instead, we would have to posit the
existence of a special way of getting access to them. Thus at base, the two strains of
the argument are metaphysical and epistemological (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007; Shepski
2008; Sinnott-Armstrong 2010).
2.2 Epistemological Queerness
Mackie argues that if objective values existed our only way of knowing about
them would be through a special faculty of intuition. Unfortunately, we have no evidence
that we have this sort of faculty.
When we ask the awkward question, how can we be aware of this authoritative
prescriptivity, of the truth of these distinctively ethical premises or of the cogency
of this distinctively ethical pattern of reasoning, none of our ordinary accounts of
sensory perception or introspection or the framing and confirming of explanatory
hypothesis or inference or logical construction or conceptual analysis, or any
combination of these will provide a satisfactory answer; ‘a special kind of
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intuition; is the lame answer…to which the clear headed objectivist is compelled
to resort (Mackie 1977 p. 39).
So it seems that the criteria that Mackie is establishing here for an entity to be able to
escape a charge of queerness is that it can be investigated empirically. But, according
to Mackie, “objective values cannot be the sort of things that are accessible to empirical
investigation” (Shepski 2008 p. 379).
The first kind of response that will be obvious for a naturalist to make here is that
what Mackie calls objective values, what might be more easily called moral facts or
properties, are constituted by or identical to natural facts and properties. Because of this
there is no need to posit a special faculty of intuition with which to discover them.
Instead, objective values are discoverable through the reputable means of empirical
investigation or perhaps some kind of Rawlsian reflective equilibrium (Schmidt 2012 p.
124-125; Brink 1989; Sturgeon 1985; Devitt 2002). Nor does the use of intuitions in
ethics commit one to the existence of a mysterious faculty of intuition. For example,
…reflective equilibrium is the method of the sciences as well as ethics. In both
cases, use of this method in critically evaluating our beliefs is seen as inevitably
involving some appeal both to the evidence of experience and to currently held
substantive theory-for example, application of a principle of inference to the best
explanation requires recourse to our going theory as well as experience in
assessing the plausibility of competing explanatory claims. Thus, the fact that
moral epistemology cannot dispense with an appeal to existing moral judgments
or "intuitions," and can subject such judgments to criticism and revision only in
broadly coherentist ways, does not show a fundamental difference or
discontinuity between moral and scientific epistemology (Darwall, Gibbard, and
Railton 1992 p. 169).
The use of intuitions seems only to become mysterious and queer in philosophy if we
assume that intuitions are giving us access to the pure a priori realm. This is not the
case, if instead, we think about intuitions as a kind of a posteriori, “empirically based
expertise” (Devitt 1996 p. 76).
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Mackie anticipates the second kind of response that the realist might give and
calls it the “companions in guilt” strategy (Mackie 1977 p. 39). The strategy is to point
out that there are other kinds of things that we do not think can be discovered
empirically, like the findings of mathematics, but this does not make us doubt their
existence (Shepski 2008 p. 380; Sinnott-Armstrong 2007 p. 46). Mackie’s reply to
companions in guilt is skepticism that there are truly other things that can be discovered
non-empirically. If we think there are entities that are truly not amenable to empirical
explanation “then they too should be included, along with objective values, among the
targets if the arguments from queerness” (Mackie 1977 p. 39).
The third response to Mackie’s charge of epistemic queerness is that even if one
grants his claim that the only way to gain knowledge of moral facts is through a faculty
of moral intuition, which does not exist, this does not establish the conclusion that
objective values do not exist. “The only way to get from ‘no knowledge’ to ‘no fact’ is via
a premise that we would be able to know moral facts if there were any. But Mackie
gives us no reason to accept such a premise”(Sinnott-Armstrong 2007 p. 46). There
may be moral facts to which we have no access (Enoch 2009).
2.3 Metaphysical Queerness: Supervenience
Another way that Mackie characterizes the strange features of objective values is
by questioning the kind of relationship that they could have with natural facts and
properties. If one is a naturalist realist, then again, the reply here comes easily. Moral
properties are constituted by natural properties and so in this way are no different from
what exists in the rest of the world. This response will run into a related metaphysical
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worry that Mackie has about supervenience and that several other later opponents of
realism have taken up (Blackburn 1988, 1971). 5 What kind of relationship would
natural facts have to have with moral facts? Mackie asks, for example,
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of
deliberate cruelty—say, causing pain just for fun—and the moral fact that it is
wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity…The
wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient’; it is wrong
because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified
by this ‘because’ (Mackie 1977 p. 41)?
As several philosophers have pointed out, Mackie asks these questions and seems to
assume that there will be no ready answers (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007 p. 50). Mackie’s
questions here do not aim to straightforwardly defend the claim that the relationship
between natural facts and moral facts must be “queer.” Instead he is merely attempting
to shift the burden of proof onto naturalist realists who suggest that this is what the
relationship is like. So responses to this objection would have to come in the form of
substantive explanations of the nature of the constitutive or supervenient relationship
between natural and moral facts or properties (Brink 1984; Shafer-Landau 1994; Railton
1986).
2.4 Metaphysical Queerness: Causal Efficacy and Explanatory Power
A related kind of metaphysical queerness has to do with the causal role that
moral properties play in the natural world. This is an objection that Mackie hints at when
he asks, of “anything that is supposed to have some objective moral quality, how this is
linked with its natural features?” (Mackie 1977 p. 41) Harman has taken up this

5

Blackburn’s version of this argument against naturalist realism depends in part on a revamped version
of the open question argument and in part on a principle he calls the “ban on mixed worlds” (Blackburn
1988).
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argument, defending the position that moral facts and properties, do not play a causal
role in our forming the moral beliefs or judgments that we come to have and make
(Harman 1977, 1977, 1986).6 Nor do moral facts and properties explain anything that
happens in the natural world. Harman asks, what do moral facts add to any explanation
of an event that cannot be captured by our moral beliefs?
Although there is a superficial similarity between the way that we evaluate
scientific theories and the way we evaluate moral theories, Harman claims that moral
theories, unlike scientific theories, cannot be observationally tested. In the scientific
case, we test our theories against observations, while in the moral case we test our
theories against our judgments about specific cases. However, this is not the same
kind of testing. We must suppose facts about protons and other entities postulated by
science, in order to best explain our observations of phenomena in the world.
Harman’s widely discussed example asks us to imagine a physicist in a lab, who
sees a vapor trail and makes the judgment “there goes a proton” (Harman 1986, 1977).
In the contrasting ethical case, someone walks down and ally and sees some kids
lighting a cat on fire and makes the judgment “that’s wrong.” Harman claims that in
order to explain the physicist’s judgment we need to cite the existence of the proton,
that is, to suppose that there really was a proton. Reference merely to the physicist’s
psychology, beliefs, etc. will not explain her observation. In contrast, the judgment in
the cat burning case, of “that’s wrong,” can be explained solely by reference to the
observer’s psychology or moral sensibility. We need not suppose that the burning of
the cat is actually wrong because the wrongness does not need to be cited in the
explanation of the observation.
6

This debate has also recently been take up by Brian Leiter (Leiter 2001).
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It would seem that all we need assume is that you have certain more or less well
articulated moral principles that are reflected in the judgments you make, based
on your moral sensibility. It seems to be completely irrelevant to our explanation
whether your intuitive immediate judgment is true or false (Harman 1977 p. 7).
In the physics case, the scientific theory that the physicist holds, which predicts that we
will observe a proton under certain circumstances, explains the physicist’s observation
“there goes a proton.” The observation counts as evidence in favor of whatever
scientific theory best explains that observation, but this is not the case in morality.
The observation of an event can provide observational evidence for or against a
scientific theory in the sense that the truth of that observation can be relevant to
a reasonable explanation of why that observation was made. A moral
observation does not seem, in the same sense, to be observational evidence for
or against any moral theory, since the truth or falsity of the moral observation
seems to be completely irrelevant to any reasonable explanation of why that
observation was made (Harman 1977 p. 7).
Nicholas Sturgeon has several forceful realist responses to Harman’s claim that
moral facts or properties lack a causal and explanatory role (Sturgeon 1985). 7
Essentially, Sturgeon argues that Harman is begging the question against the realist in
at least two ways.
First, Cornell realists argue that moral facts do play an obviously explanatory role
in the best explanation of moral judgments and other non-moral facts.8 For example,
Hitler’s depravity, his immoral character, helps explain the Holocaust. In part, it was
Hitler’s moral depravity that caused the deaths of six million Jews (Sturgeon 1985).

7

A different way of responding to Harman’s challenge, that Sturgeon does not pursue, would be to argue
that although moral facts do not play an explanatory role, we still have reason to believe that they exist.
This is David Enoch’s strategy in “An Outline for an Argument for Robust Metanormative Realism” (Enoch
2007). Shafer-Landau also makes the argument that being able to play a causal explanatory role is not
the test for whether something exists or not (Shafer-Landau 2003).
8
Many naturalists also think that the fact that moral properties play a causal role in the natural world gives
us a good reason to think that they are also natural properties. When we make an identity between heat
and molecular motion we are in large part relying on the identity of causal roles. Even if we cannot make
a reductive identity between moral and natural properties, locating the causal roles of moral properties
shows us something about the kinds of properties that they are.
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Ethical properties often play a causal role in our lives; we are regularly helped by other
people’s good character and harmed by their bad characters. Revolutions and regime
change can be explained in part by the injustices of the government or the system itself
(Railton 1986 p. 190-193).
Brink points out that sometimes injustice, bad character, etc., can have a causal
effect before the agents that are being harmed are even aware of it, and before they
have formed moral beliefs that their system of government is economically unjust, with
great inequalities between the rich and poor, for example. Even if a person believes
that their society is just, they may begin to feel “unreflective resentment about [their]
own social positions” and “begin to sympathize with other disadvantaged members of
[their] class” (Brink 1989 p. 189). Eventually these feelings lead the person to reflect,
form moral judgments, and take political action. Cornell realists argue that unless you
make antirealist assumptions to begin with, these will sound like plausible explanations.
Second, Harman does not deny the naturalist moral realists claim that moral
properties supervene on or are constituted by natural properties, in Harman’s example,
“[t]he badness of the cat burning supervenes on other natural properties”(Sturgeon
1985). Harman claims that the fact that we judge the action of setting the cat on fire to
be wrong can be explained without reference to any moral properties or facts, all we
need to reference are our own psychologies.
But if the wrongness supervenes on natural properties, or is constituted by those
natural properties, then if the property of wrongness would not have been there, then
the physical properties of the situation would have to be different as well. If the physical
properties were different, for example, setting a cat on fire did not cause the cat pain or
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death, we probably would not make the judgment that it was wrong. In other words, if
the kids’ act had not been wrong it would have lacked the features that made it wrong
such as being an act of deliberate, intense and pointless cruelty. But, if as Harman
contends, the moral wrongness of the situation is completely irrelevant to the
explanation of the judgment, then the judgment would have obtained even if there had
been no fact of wrongness. It is strange for Harman to claim that the fact that the
children’s act was wrong is completely irrelevant to our judgment that it was wrong.
Sturgeon asks the question, would we have still made the judgment “that’s
wrong,” if the act hadn’t actually been wrong? Sturgeon makes the assumption that
having the property of being a deliberate, intense, pointless act of cruelty makes an act
wrong. So, relying on this assumption Sturgeon asks, if the act had not been a
deliberate act of pointless cruelty, would we have still thought it was wrong? Harman
argues that we do not need to suppose the existence of moral facts in our explanations
of our moral beliefs. Natural (non-moral) properties alone are enough to explain our
judgments. Harman is asking ‘if the act had been exactly the same in all of its natural
properties (and all other facts had been the same) and yet the moral facts had been
different (the act had not been morally wrong) would we still have thought that their act
was wrong?’ But for a naturalist moral realist, it is hard to even imagine the moral facts
and all of the other facts coming apart in the way that Harman supposes they can. While
Sturgeon recognizes that Harman would not allow for his interpretation of the question,
his interpretation remains plausible.
If we allow Harman’s interpretation of the question, then he is faced with a third
and final objection. Harman’s skeptical argument can apply just as well to other
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theoretical entities (such as protons), the external world, or other minds, as to moral
facts and properties. There is no reason to see Harman’s argument as posing a special
problem for moral facts or properties and their explanatory or causal roles. To be able
to imagine that an act was an act of intense, pointless, cruelty, and yet was not morally
wrong, has to involve accepting that our whole moral theory is completely wrong.
Harman admits that, “[o]bservations are ‘theory laden.’ What you perceive depends to
some extent on what theory you hold, consciously or unconsciously” (Harman 1977 p.
4). But Harman excludes the possibility of relying on any background moral theory when
we think about whether or not we would have still thought the children’s act was wrong
(Loeb 1998). To be consistent, Harman cannot allow any background scientific theory
to enter into the question “would the physicist still have thought there was a proton there
even if there was not?” If we cannot rely on background microphysical theory then we
must suppose that there could have been a vapor trail in the cloud chamber and yet no
proton. That means that the physicist, relying on her observations, could have made
the judgment that there is a proton there, even if there was no proton there.
Third, the moral realist can argue, as Shafer-Landau does that moral facts and
properties do not need to meet Harman’s standard of having causal power in order to
be counted as real facts and properties (Shafer-Landau and Cuneo 2006 p. 224-225).
2.5 Metaphysical Queerness: The Normativity of Moral facts
A preliminary type of the queerness of objective values I have considered is
queerness understood as explanatory redundancy, as Harman has argued. The next
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section will focus on the queerness of objective values understood in terms of their
normative force.
One of the queer features that moral properties, facts, judgments, and beliefs are
said to have is their normative force; broadly speaking this is their action-guiding
nature.9
Plato’s Forms give a dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be.
The Form of the Good is such that knowledge of it provides the knower with both
a direction and an overriding motive; something’s being good both tells the
person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it. An objective good
would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any
contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires
this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it.
Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong
(possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it.
Or we should have something like Clarke’s necessary relations of fitness
between situations and actions, so that a situation would have a demand for
such-and such an action somehow built into it (Mackie 1977 p. 40) [italics added].
Nothing besides moral beliefs, judgments, properties, or facts seems to have this kind of
normative force. The objection to moral realism based on the claim that moral
properties, facts, beliefs, or judgments have normative force can also be interpreted in
several ways (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010 p. 56-57).
So far as ethics is concerned, my thesis that there are no objective values is
specifically the denial that any such categorically imperative element is
objectively valid. The objective values which I am denying would be action
directing absolutely, not contingently (in the way indicated) upon the agent’s
desires and inclinations (Mackie 1977 p. 29).
The quote above characterizes objective values as having the “categorical imperative
element” and as being “action directing absolutely.” Categorical imperatives are rules
that we must follow regardless of our contingent desires or goals. They command

9

Other kinds of judgments such as, economic, mechanical, & prudential judgments may also seem to
have normative force, depending on how normative force is interpreted. Here I will restrict normative force
to moral judgments.
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absolutely and apply to us because we have the capacity to reason. Categorical
imperatives do not have to do with an agent’s motivation for acting. This suggests that
an important target of the normative force part of the queerness objection is the
authoritativeness of objective values. In other words, Mackie is puzzled by the existence
of an “objectively binding ought” (Bedke 2010 p. 43).
On the other hand, when Mackie writes about action-guidingness as having to do
with an agent’s desires and inclinations this seems to have to do with the connection
between objective values and our motivations to act on those objective values. The
above cited passage shows that Mackie has both of these elements in mind, although
he does not explicitly distinguish between them.
As mentioned above, one way to understand the normative force objection is in
terms of motivation and the other is in terms of the authority of morality.10 Later Mackie
makes a claim that targets naturalism specifically, including a comment on both the
motivational power of morality and the authority of morality.
On a naturalist’s analysis, moral judgments can be practical, but their practicality
is wholly relative to desires or possible satisfactions of the person or persons
whose actions are to be guided; but moral judgments seem to say more than
this. This view leaves out the categorical quality of moral requirements…both
naturalist and non-cognitive analysis leave out the apparent authority of ethics
(Mackie 1977 p. 33).
On the motivation focused view, the normative force of moral judgments, for
example, motivates us to perform the acts we take to be moral. Critics of moral realism
charge that the realist picture of morality is inconsistent with the way moral judgments
seem related to moral action. Thus Mackie is critiquing what anyone proposing the
existence of objective values must be suggesting; that something exists which
10

Sinnott Armstrong takes the two relevant interpretations to be between “reasons internalism” and
“motivational internalism” (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010 p. 57).

35

necessarily motivates and that is also mind independent. This strain in the argument
can be seen when Mackie writes: “…values differ from natural objects precisely, in their
power, when known, automatically to influence the will” (Mackie 1977 p. 40).
The second way of understanding the normative force objection has to do with
the authority of morality.11 This latter objection I will call the authority objection.12 On
this view, the normative force of moral judgments or properties explains why we should
be moral or how objective values provide authoritative reasons for action. The authority
of morality can be understood as the categorical nature of moral demands, the
importance that moral demands have in directing our lives, or the way in which moral
considerations override all others, among other interpretations. On Mackie’s view,
although our ordinary ways of thinking and speaking about morality assume that
morality is both objective and prescriptive in the authoritative sense, no such thing could
exist.13 Of course, Mackie’s position would be stronger here if he presented an
independent justification for thinking that nothing objectively prescriptive could exist
(Shepski 2008 p. 378).
Critics of moral realism argue that realist accounts cannot capture the way that
we experience moral demands as demands on action. In part this is because critics see

11

A similar distinction is also made in David Brink’s discussion of Kant’s categorical imperative between
“inescapability, authority and supremacy” (Brink 1997). Finlay makes a similar distinction between
“motivational queerness” and “normative queerness” (Finlay 2007 p. 15). Also see Richard Joyce’s
discussion of Mackie’s queerness argument for a similar distinction (Joyce 2007).
12
One of the earliest sources on the authority of morality is Joseph Butler, (Fifteen Sermons, Sermon II,
III “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience” 1726/1749).
13
Here it seems like Mackie must be assuming that only internal reasons exist, rather than external
reasons as well. This is not a point that I think that realists should necessarily use to rebut Mackie, but it
is still important to recognize. He is assuming that to be a reason for me to act it has to in some way help
me realize my subjective set of desires. On the opposite view, reasons can be of this sort, or they can be
of another sort, there can be categorical reasons for action, for example, that are completely independent
of one’s subjective desires. I don’t think that naturalist moral realists have to rely on defending the idea of
external reasons to defend the position that values can be both objective and prescriptive in the sense of
being authoritative.
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moral facts or properties (especially if they are natural facts or properties) as just sitting
there in the world, unable to connect in the right way with human reason and action.
And so it is always possible to wonder why such facts or properties are relevant to us or
our lives, why should we care about them or pay attention to them at all (Korsgaard
2003). In the same way that it is optional for us to pay attention to or care about other
kinds of facts (the gaseous composition of the sun, for example).
The motivation objection and the authority objection are two distinct objections.
Moral motivation has to do with psychological questions about how moral facts,
properties, and judgments influence our actions. This is distinct from the authority of
morality, which has to do with the metaphysical status of morality. The difference
between these two objections is similar to a distinction that is sometimes made between
motivating reasons and normative reasons.14 Motivating reasons have to do with an
agent’s goals or desires, they psychologically explain an agent’s actions (Smith 1995 p.
96). Whereas normative reasons have to do with moral requirements and justification
(Smith 1995 p. 95).
Out of the normative force strain of the queerness objection, I will focus on these
two objections to objective values, the motivation objection (the internalism objection)
and the authority objection.
3. The Internalism Objection
The objection from motivation starts by pointing out that most versions of moral
realism involve a commitment to psychological cognitivism. This is the view that moral
judgments express beliefs and that moral thoughts purport to represent the world.
14

There are also explanatory reasons which help us understand why people do what they do.
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Opponents of moral realism often argue against moral realism by arguing that
cognitivism is false. If cognitivism is false, then realism has to be false, too.
In order to show that cognitivism is false, opponents of realism argue that it is
incompatible with the combination of two other claims about how moral judgment and
motivation interact. The first of these claims is the view that in order for someone to
have a motivation to act, they must have a desire or attitude, not just a belief. For
example, just believing that the object in front of me is a cookie will not get me to eat the
cookie. I must also desire or want to eat the cookie.
The second claim in the argument against cognitivism is that when we make a
moral judgment it necessarily or inherently gives us a motivation to act on it. When I
judge that sending money to Oxfam is the right thing to do, I am necessarily motivated
to send money to Oxfam. So, moral judgments cannot be beliefs, because moral
judgments motivate us to act. Therefore, cognitivism is false, and realism, which is
assumed to be inseparable from cognitivism, is also false.15
Someone hoping to defend naturalist moral realism has three ways to proceed in
responding to this objection based on motivation. To defend naturalist moral realism
she can reject (a) cognitivism, the view that moral judgments express beliefs and moral
thoughts purport to represent the world, reject (b) the view that moral judgments
necessarily or inherently motivate, also called internalism, or reject (c) the view that in
order for someone to have a motivation to act they must have both a belief and an
attitude or desire, also called the Humean theory of motivation (Brink 1997 p. 6).
15

Rowland Strout argues that this type of objection is a kind of “extension of Moore’s open question
argument”. If one takes Hume’s purported claim that “motivation is internal to judgment” then “you cannot
truly judge something to be right or good without thereby having some motivation to act or feel
accordingly. If that is right there should be no room for the following version of an open question: ‘I can
see that this is good, but why should I care?’” (Strout 2010 p. 854).
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The moral realist may reject (a) and instead argue for a version of realism that
includes a different theory of moral thought and language, either a non-cognitivist or
hybrid view. This route has not been popular, but a growing number of versions of
realist emotivism and realist expressivism have recently been defended.16
The moral realist can also reject (c), the view that motivation requires a
belief/desire pair. To make a case for this, the realist must argue that when properly
understood, some beliefs do provide motivation in themselves. The rejection of (c) is an
option pursued by rationalists, but not often by naturalist moral realists.17
Finally, the moral realist may reject (b) the view that moral judgments necessarily
or inherently motivate. That is, they can reject internalism. In this way it is possible for
the moral realist to capture both the admittedly central role that moral judgments play in
our decision-making and the appearance of the motivational pull of moral judgments.
This is the view I will defend.
The first part of my strategy in defending naturalist moral realism is to undermine
the internalism objection. In order to clarify, the internalism objection (the argument from
motivation), I introduce some terminology. The opponents of realism argue that the
following three positions are inconsistent: (a) Cognitivism, (b) Internalism, and (c) The
Humean theory of motivation (Miller 2003 p. 219). I will briefly explain each one of these
three positions in order to show why opponents of realism claim that there is an
inconsistency between the three positions.18

16

See e.g. (Brown 2008; Copp 1995).
See e.g. (Nagel 1970; McDowell 1988; McNaughton 1988; Dancy 1993; Wiggins 1990). An exception is
Smith (1994) who is a rationalist, realist, and a naturalist.
18
Michael Smith calls the conflict between these three positions The Moral Problem (Smith 1994). Smith’s
own solution however, is to reinterpret internalism and the Humean theory of motivation so as to make
the set of three positions consistent.
17
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(a) Cognitivism is a view about both moral psychology and about moral
language. As a view about moral psychology, cognitivism is the position that moral
judgments are primarily beliefs and not conative states, such as pro-attitudes or desires.
As a view about language, cognitivism is the position that moral language is truth apt.
Here, truth aptness can be characterized in various ways, as, for example, that moral
sentences express propositions that can be evaluated as true or false or that moral
terms refer to moral properties.
Cognitivism is usually defined in contrast to non-cognitivism. Non-cognitivism is
the view that moral judgments are conative states such as desires, emotions, or proattitudes, and not beliefs. On semantic non-cognitivism, moral language is not truth apt.
Moral language expresses conative states, which do not assert that something is the
case. According to semantic non-cognitivism, moral terms, such as ‘good’ and ‘right’ do
not refer to moral properties.
(b) Internalism, in its most general form, is the view that moral judgment is
necessarily, essentially, or inherently tied to motivation.19 Types of internalism and
arguments for them will be distinguished in Chapter 2. For now, the kind of internalism
that I will focus on is motivational judgment internalism. Motivational judgment
internalism is the view that moral judgments by themselves, (that is, without the help of
other mental states), necessarily, essentially, or inherently provide the agent making the
judgment with a motive to act on them. This view is contrasted with motivational
judgment externalism, the view that moral judgments are only contingently connected

19

W.D. Falk is credited with first making the distinction between internalism and externalism (Falk 1947).
The roots of this distinction can also be found in Harold Arthur Prichard in Duty and Interest (1928).
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with motivation to act morally and that moral judgments are not necessarily, essentially,
or inherently motivational.
(c) The Humean theory of motivation says that beliefs by themselves are
motivationally inert; desires are required to move people to act.20 This theory is widely
accepted among moral philosophers, including most naturalist moral realists, and often
taken to be a piece of common sense. The view is that beliefs alone are incapable of
getting an agent to act. Only a belief that is hooked up the appropriate way with a
desire can move an agent to action. As applied to ethics, it follows that the belief that
‘giving to charity is the right thing to do’, cannot in itself cause me to give to charity. I
must also have a desire; one obvious candidate for the corresponding desire is the
desire to do the right thing. Sometimes the Humean distinction between beliefs and
desires is explained in terms of the metaphor of “direction of fit.” Whereas beliefs are
supposed to “fit” with the world, the role of a desire is to get the world to “fit” with it.
The distinction between directions of fit is originally made in John Searle’s
discussion of intentionality and can be applied to both speech acts and mental states.
Beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit (Searle 1979/1985). This means that the
intentional content of the mental state “is supposed to fit, match or correspond to, etc.
the world” (Fotion 2000 p. 40). For example, the belief that “The sky is blue” has a
mind-to-world direction of fit because it is a state of the world, that is, the sky being blue
that makes that belief true. The belief aims to fit with the way the world is. Desires,
hopes, wishes, etc. have a world-to-mind direction of fit, in that these mental states aim
to change the world in a way that fits with the mental state. When the world changes to
fit with a desire, for example, that desire is satisfied. We can also understand this by
20

Whether or not this is a good characterization of Hume’s own view is not at issue here.
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saying that beliefs and wishes or desires have different “conditions of satisfaction;”
“[b]eliefs are satisfied when what is believed is true, intentions satisfied when what is
intended is done, wishes satisfied when they are fulfilled” (Fotion 2000 p. 102).
The objection to moral realism based on moral motivation exploits the fact that
these three positions, cognitivism, internalism, and the Humean theory of motivation,
seem to be mutually exclusive. This is because, the cognitivist attests, moral judgments
are beliefs. Beliefs, by themselves, cannot motivate an agent to act. However, there is
an inherent connection between making a moral judgment and having a motivation to
act. This must mean that moral judgments cannot be beliefs.
The objections to naturalist moral realism based on the role of moral motivation
all share questionable assumptions, so I will treat them as roughly one class of
objections. And from now on, when I use the term “internalism objection,” I will thereby
refer to all of the relevant objections to naturalist moral realism based on motivational
reading of normative force. I will defend moral realism in two main ways. I do this first
by attacking some of the arguments for or considerations that are supposed to weigh in
favor of internalism. Second, I defend it by arguing for the alternative view, externalism,
which is in short, the view that moral judgments need not intrinsically or necessarily
motivate an agent to act on them (See Chapters 2 and 3).
4. The Authority Objection
According to the authority objection, moral realism wants to have its cake and
eat it too. The objection is used against moral realism generally and also used
specifically against naturalist moral realism. According to moral realism, obligations and
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duties exist, regardless of the beliefs people have about them. The authority objection
questions the authority that any set of facts or properties, natural or not, could have over
our behavior. In other words, the moral realist seems to lack a convincing response to
the moral skeptic who asks, ‘why should I be moral?’ 21 The puzzling upshot of this
objection is that, while the realist may be able to secure the objectivity of moral rules
and the truth of moral facts, they cannot secure its authority.
The authority objection comes up in several specific forms against naturalist
moral realism. This is because, naturalist versions of moral realism insist that the
objective moral facts and properties that they contend exist, do not introduce anything
mysterious that we should worry about into our ontology, nor do they commit us to
anything epistemologically troubling, like a special faculty of intuition with which to
detect them. Instead, moral properties and facts are just like historical, sociological, or
psychological facts. We have access to them in the ordinary way, through observation.
And they are constituted by or supervene on more basic physical facts and properties.
But, the objector protests, morality is not like history or psychology. The facts of
history and psychology are not facts that have any authority over us. They don’t have to
matter to us in the way morality does. They are not action guiding or practical. I can
shrug and walk away from them in a way I cannot shrug and walk away from moral facts
and properties. In Parfit’s version of the authority objection against naturalism the
charge is that when we understand moral facts as natural facts we lose their normativity
entirely; normativity drops out of our picture of the world. While many facts that have
normative relevance remain, for example, facts about human suffering and happiness,
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One of the earliest sources on the authority of morality is Joseph Butler (Fifteen Sermons, Sermon II,
III “Upon the Natural Supremacy of Conscience”);(Butler 1726).
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what disappears is the sui generis fact that something is what I have most reason to do.
Surely the realist cannot deny this prescriptive element in moral thought and discourse.
The idea of authority is still vague at this point; it might mean the inescapability of moral
requirements, the normativity of morality, the special level of importance that morality
has in directing our decision making and life choices, the way in which moral
considerations seem to override all others, or the categorical nature of moral reasons.22
Without narrowing down authority at all, the following is the basic argument from
authority:
(1) Morality has a certain kind of authority over us.
(2) (Naturalist) Moral realism either precludes this kind of authority or moral realism
cannot adequately explain this kind of authority.
Therefore, (naturalist) moral realism must be false.
Two obvious strategies emerge for responding to this argument. First, the realist
can deny premise one, arguing that, in fact, morality does not have the kind of authority
that critics claim it has. Second, the realist can give an account of the authority that
comports with naturalist moral realism.
My strategy will employ both of these responses. Premise one is true, given a
certain, limited account of authority. The first step here is to consider what critic might
mean by the authority of morality. I consider two plausible accounts of morality’s
authority. The first type of authority I consider is authority as “normative force,” as given
in Korsgaard’s rationalist neo-Kantian constructivism. I present her normativity based
objection to moral realism and respond to it.

22

Sometimes the authority of morality is also explained in terms of the notion that “moral requirements
provide reasons for acting which override other kinds of reasons”(McNaughton 1988 p. 115).
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The second objection I consider focuses specifically on naturalist moral realism.
I examine Parfit’s objection to naturalism which says that when we understand moral
properties and facts as natural properties and facts they lose their ultimate reason
giving force.
Third, I examine Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism, which is a position that claims
that projectivism combined with a minimalist theory of truth can capture everything we
want from a realist metaethics, without the metaphysical baggage that realism brings
with it. I argue that without the metaphysical baggage, Blackburn’s theory cannot secure
the authoritativeness of morality.
Contrary to prominent accounts of authority, I argue for a minimal authority for
morality based in objectivity. Given the minimal account of authority, premise two is
false, this minimal kind of authority is no more a problem for naturalist moral realism as
a metaethical theory than any other metaethical theory.
Before continuing in the next chapters to focus on the internalism objection and
the authority objection, it is important to canvass four other objections to naturalist moral
realism. There are broader ways to interpret the argument from queerness or to argue
against moral realism, naturalist or not, that have not yet been discussed. In the
following three sections I will discuss objections to realism based on the alleged isought gap, Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, and moral disagreement.
5. Hume’s Law and Deriving ‘Ought from Is’
The gap between is and ought that Hume is said to have pointed out is used as
evidence in a wide range of arguments for non-cognitivism and antirealism. It is used to
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support the claim that there is an insurmountable gap between descriptive and
evaluative domains, thus specifically targeting naturalist versions of moral realism.
However, as we will see, the existence of this gap does not provide evidence against
realism whether it is of a naturalist or nonnaturalist stripe. Hume famously wrote:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always
remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations
concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of
the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is
imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought,
or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation,’ tis necessary that it
shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be
given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a
deduction from others, which are entirely different from it … (Hume 1739-40/2000
Bk. 3, Pt. 1, Sec. 1).
This brief passage contains what many refer to as the fact/value gap, the no ought from
an is rule, or Hume’s Law. R.M. Hare is largely responsible for giving this passage in
Hume a central place in modern and contemporary metaethics (Hare 1954). A great
deal of work has gone into interpreting this brief passage.
The simplest interpretation of Hume’s passage is that he is making the logical
point that a conclusion containing an ought (an evaluative premise) cannot be validly
derived from premises that do not contain an ought (evaluative premise), premises that
are merely descriptive (Frankena 1939 p. 467).23
It is useful to employ a distinction made by Charles Pigden on the difference
between at least two different interpretations of Hume’s famous passage, one, that the
passage supports the “logical autonomy of ethics” and two, that the passage supports
the “semantic autonomy of ethics” (Pigden 1989 p. 128).
23

Descriptive and evaluative language comes from (Searle 1964).

46

The logical autonomy of ethics means that “moral conclusions cannot be derived
from non-moral premises”(Pigden 1989 p. 128). This is the simple logical point about
the nature of deductive logic; “you cannot get out more than you put in” in order for an
argument to be valid (Hattiangadi 2007 p. 40). It is important to note that, if Hume’s
Law shows that no more than this, that moral conclusions can be deduced from entirely
non-moral premises, this does not rule out the possibility of other forms of inference,
“some nondeductive mode of inference, perhaps inductively” (Timmons 1998 p. 761).
But the logical point is not the only way that the passage has been understood.
The semantic autonomy of ethics is the claim that there is “…a realm of sui generis nonnatural predicates which do not mean the same as any natural counterparts” (Pigden
1989 p. 128). In other words, semantic autonomy is the idea that “you cannot decide
moral conclusions of any kind (such as conclusions concerning virtue or featuring the
right and the good) from entirely non-moral premises…” even “with the aid of analytic
bridge principles” (Pigden 2010 p. 7). Analytic bridge principles are “truths of meaning”
(Pigden 2013 p. 2). However, for nonreductive naturalist moral realists, the bridge
principles in question would not have to be truths of meaning, instead they would be
synthetic identities between moral facts and natural facts (Timmons 1998 p. 761).
The logical autonomy of ethics is a weaker position than the semantic autonomy
of ethics. While the semantic autonomy implies the logical autonomy, logical autonomy
does not imply semantic autonomy (Pigden 1989 p. 128). In response, cognitivists
argue that non-cognitivism is unnecessary to explain the logical autonomy of ethics.
Many kinds of talk are autonomous in this same way. As Pigden points out, we cannot
conclude anything about hedgehogs from premises that do not include hedgehogs
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(Pigden 1989 p. 132). Ethics is logically autonomous in same sense. When understood
as a point about logic, Hume’s law “does not imply that there is any fundamental
difference between the moral and the nonmoral” (Pigden 2013 p. 3).
Arthur Prior challenged even this more trivial logical point, giving several
influential counter-examples to the logical autonomy of ethics (Prior 1960). If the
logically autonomy of ethics is false, then the semantic autonomy of ethics must be false
as well.
(1) Tea-drinking is common in England.
(2) Therefore either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders
ought to be shot (Prior 1960 p. 210).24
Prior’s argument shows that ethical conclusions can be deduced from premises with no
ethical content. The response to this argument has been to point out the triviality of the
types of ethical conclusions that can be drawn. Prior admits that there is something odd
about all of these examples, but after seeing them (and modified versions of them), one
can no longer deny that it is impossible to validly deduce conclusions about morality
(“ought” conclusions) from non-moral (“is”) premises alone.
However, non-cognitivists like Hare, take Hume’s point to suggest the stronger
position, the semantic autonomy of ethics that moral claims differ fundamentally from
other types of claims (Pigden 2013 p. 3). Hare writes:
No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set of premises which does
not contain at least one imperative….In this logical rule, again, is to be found the
basis of Hume's celebrated observation on the impossibility of deducing an
24

Prior’s other examples include:
(1) Anyone who does what is not common in England ought to be shot.
(2) All New Zealanders drink tea;
(2) Therefore either tea-drinking is common in England or all New Zealanders ought to be shot.(Prior
1960 p. 201-2) .
As well as: (1) There is no man over 20 feet high
(2) Therefore there is no man over 20 feet high who is allowed to sit in an ordinary chair (Prior 1960 p.
202).
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'ought'-proposition from a series of 'is'-propositions -- an observation which, as
he rightly says, 'would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality', and not only
those which had already appeared in his day (Hare 1952 p. 28).
For Hare, for example, moral judgments are not descriptive, instead they are commands
(Hare 1952).
John Searle directly criticized the semantic autonomy of ethics, focusing on the
case of promise making (Searle 1964).25 His example is as follows:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five
dollars."
Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars.
Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith five
dollars.
Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars.
Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars.(Searle 1964 p. 44).

In this counter-example, Searle is not attempting to show, strictly speaking, that a nonevaluative premise can entail an evaluative conclusion, but that there is “more than a
contingent relation” between the non-evaluative and the evaluative (Searle 1964 p. 44).
He focuses on a distinction between two different kinds of “objective facts,” introducing
“institutional facts” (Searle p. 55). Statements of fact like, ‘this apple is red,’ or ‘the earth
rotates around the sun,’ are distinct from statements of fact that “contain[] words such
as married,’ ‘promise,’ ‘home run,’ and ‘five dollars.’ The latter, are facts that only exist
as fact due to the existence of sets of institutions (Searle 1964 p. 54-5). Thus these are
“institutional facts,” which contrast with “brute facts” (Searle 1964 p. 55).26
…a man gets married or makes a promise only within the institutions of marriage
and promising. Without them, all he does is utter words or make gestures (Searle
1964 p. 55).

25

Hare challenges Searle’s analysis in The Promising Game (Hare 1964).
So the brute fact would be that a man has a green piece of paper, but the institutional fact is that he
has $50.
26
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The institutions of promise making, marriage, baseball, and money, are all constituted
by a set of rules. These are rules that, “do not merely regulate but create or define new
forms of behavior… they, as it were, create the possibility of or define that activity”
(Searle 1964 p. 55). Promising is an “institutionalized form of obligation” regulated by a
particular set of rules. While it is not a “brute fact” that “Jones ought to pay Smith $5” it
is an institutional fact. And this is how Searle proposes to violate Hume’s law and get
from ‘is’ premise to an ‘ought’ conclusion.
I started with a brute fact, that a man uttered certain words, and then invoked the
institution in such a way as to generate institutional facts by which we arrived at
the institutional fact that the man ought to pay another man five dollars. The
whole proof rests on an appeal to the constitutive rule that to make a promise is
to undertake an obligation (Searle 1964 p. 56).
Whether or not Searle is correct that ethics is not semantically autonomous on these
grounds, there is no independent reason to think that the ethics is semantically
autonomous.27
For the purposes of defending moral realism, it is important to see why noncognitivists think that Hume’s Law supports their position (Hare 1952; Stevenson 1937;
Nowell-Smith 1952; Flew 1986). There is no straightforward argument from Hume’s
Law to the truth of non-cognitivism. Instead, as Francis Snare has argued, noncognitivists actually have to assume the truth of their theory in order to espouse Hume’s
law at all (Snare 2002).
Pigden suggests that non-cognitivists’ best strategy is a kind of inference to the
best explanation, which he calls the “Generic Argument.” (Pigden 2010). It runs as
follows:

27

Hare and others have challenges Searle’s arguments and conception of institutional facts (Hare 1964).
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1) You can’t derive an Ought from an Is, moral conclusions from non-moral
premises.
2) The best explanation of 1) is
(a) that logic is conservative: in a valid inference you can’t get out a new relation
or affirmation that you haven’t put in;
and
(b) that since moral judgments are fundamentally different from non-moral
propositions [insert non-cognitivist theory of choice] moral words represent a
‘new relation or affirmation’
Therefore, probably:
3) Moral judgments are fundamentally different from non-moral propositions
[insert non-cognitivist theory of choice] (Pigden 2010).
But as Pigden points out, the conservativeness of logic alone, premise (a), can explain
the No-Ought-from-Is principle, and thus the non-cognitivist inference to the best
explanation fails (Pigden 2010). This is because premise (b) is unnecessary. And so the
conclusion that moral judgments are fundamentally different is unsupported.
It is also important to notice the genealogical connection between Hume’s Law
and the internalism objection to moral realism. In Hume, one of the important
distinctions between moral judgments and other kinds of judgments is the connection
that moral judgments have to the emotions and to action; “[m]orals excite passions, and
produce or prevent actions” (Hume 1739-40/2000; Hattiangadi 2007 p. 41). It is, of
course, a matter of historical debate whether or not Hume himself was an internalist
about motivation (Brown 1988; Darwall 1992; Mele 1989).
Many philosophers wrongly assume that Hume’s Law, is the same thing as
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy.28 The next section will briefly present and dismiss the
naturalistic fallacy as a serious threat to naturalist moral realism.
6. The Naturalistic Fallacy

28

For an explanation of why they are not the same see (Frankena 1939).
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A distinct argument against naturalist realism is Moore’s naturalistic fallacy and
open question argument. The naturalistic fallacy is committed when any definition of
good is given that is non-normative. “The naturalistic fallacy occurs only when one
confuses good…with any natural object whatever” (Moore 1903/1993 p. 14). It is not
only naturalistic definitions of good that the naturalistic fallacy targets, it also targets
what Moore called “metaphysical” definitions of good, for example, a definition offered
by divine command theory that says that good is whatever God commands, Moore
would say has committed the same fallacy as a definition of good that identifies
goodness with being most evolved (Moore 1903/1993 p. 58). So the “fallacy is the same
if one confuses any object with any other which it is not” (Baumrin 1968 p. 85). Moore
writes:
Yet a mistake of this simple kind has commonly been made about good. It may
be true that all things which are good are also something else, just as it is true
that all things which are yellow produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And
it is a fact, that Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties
belonging to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have
thought that when they named those other properties they were actually defining
good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not other, but absolutely and
entirely the same with goodness. This view I propose to call the naturalistic
fallacy and of it I shall now endeavor to dispose (Moore 1903/1993 Chpt. 10, Par.
3).
Although Moore was a realist, he was a nonnaturalist realist. He proposed that good is
simple and indefinable, just like the color yellow is. Moore argues for the simplicity and
indefinability of good by a process of elimination. If good is not simple and indefinable
then it must be “either …a complex, a given whole, about the correct analysis of which
there may be disagreement; or else it means nothing at all” (Moore 1903/1993, Chpt. 1,
Par. 13). The open question argument is then meant to rule out these other two
options, that good is complex or that good is meaningless (Baumrin 1968 p. 86).
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The hypothesis that disagreement about the meaning of good is disagreement
with regard to the correct analysis of a given whole, may be most plainly seen to
be incorrect by consideration of the fact that, whatever definition be offered, it
may always be asked with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is
itself good…[one of] such proposed definitions, it may be easily thought, at first
sight, that to be good may mean to be that which we desire to desire, Thus if we
apply this definition to a particular instance and say ‘When we think A is good, we
are thinking that A is one of the things which we desire to desire,’ our proposition
may seem quite plausible. But if we carry the investigation further and ask
ourselves ‘Is it good to desire to desire A?’ it is apparent, on a little reflection that
this question is itself as intelligible, as the original question “Is A good? (Moore
1903/1993 Chpt. 1, Par. 13)
Moore concludes: ‘what we desire to desire’ cannot be the definition of good. This same
pattern will inevitably hold for every complex that is suggested to provide a definition of
good, whether it is utilitarian, based on individual emotions, evolutionary ethics, cultural
norms or agreements, or the will and commands of a deity (Strout 2010 p. 855).
The naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument have been used against
a wide range of views that Moore did not necessarily have in mind when he took this
position originally (Baumrin 1968 p. 88). Naturalists must respond to these objections
for at least two reasons. First, the most obvious reason is that they are open to being
accused of having committed the naturalistic fallacy. Second, many non-cognitivists and
other antirealists accept the naturalistic fallacy and use it as part of the evidence that
their alternative theories better capture the nature of ethical judgments and language
(Hare 1952; Stevenson 1937; Ayer 1936/2012). For example, early emotivists often
accepted Moore’s analysis of attempt to find definitions of “good.” However, they
rejected the notion that this must mean that good is sui generis and accessible only
through the faculty of moral intuition. They offered their alternative analysis of how we
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use moral language to express emotion or attitudes and to prescribe and command
behavior rather than to describe the moral part of the world.
There are at least four major responses to the open question argument, first that
it does not capture the correct criterion for what makes something a good definition of
something else, second, that it begs the question against naturalism, third, is the no
interesting analysis objection, and fourth, it confuses sense and reference, leaving room
for naturalist moral realism to offer a promising account of identities or constitution
relations between natural facts and properties and moral facts and properties.
The first immediate problems with Moore’s open question test for any definition of
good is that it is far too strong of a criterion for deciding whether a definition is accurate
or not.29 First we have no reason to think that having “doubts” about a definition being
the correct one tells us that the definition is in fact incorrect (Baumrin 1968 p. 86). If this
were the appropriate test for definitions, then people’s doubts about “[m]any of the
definitions of logic, mathematics, physics, psychoanalysis, etc., are dubious to the plain
man (and even to those not so plain), but they are not on that account rendered
inadequate” (Baumrin 1968 p. 86). When a definition of good is presented, for example,
‘good is what we desire to desire,’ it may always be coherent to ask, whether what we
desire to desire is actually good. But just because the definition fails the open question
test, we cannot on these grounds alone reject the definition.
The proper conclusion may be that we are quite confused…we may have ‘two
different notions before our minds’ because we don’t understand one or both
halves of the definition, or because we misuse one or both halves, or because
29

Baumrin offers this helpful reconstruction of the first two premises of the open question argument:
(1) Of every definiens in every definition it can be significantly asked whether what it refers to is or is not
the thing, or has the property that we think is referred to by the definiendum.
(2) If we doubt that it is or does then the definiens does not render (for us) what the definiendum does
(render to us) (Baumrin 1968).
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we do not know how to separate the connotative overtones attaching to every
word in the ordinary vocabulary of every natural language from their denotative
application…but none of these, at any rate, show that we aren’t now staring at
the correct definition of good! (Baumrin 1968 p. 87)
The second general objection to the open question argument is that it begs the
question against the naturalist realist (Frankena 1939). Frankena’s discussion of the
naturalistic fallacy is particularly helpful.
The charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy can be made, if at all, only as a
conclusion from the discussion and not as an instrument of deciding it (Frankena
1939 p. 465).
A better way to understand the naturalistic fallacy is to understand the “generic fallacy
which underlies it,” which he calls the definist fallacy (Frankena 1939 p. 471). Frankena
says the “definist fallacy is the process of confusing or identifying two properties, of
defining one property by another, or of substituting one property for another” (Frankena
1939 p. 471). The fallacy is not specific to non-natural, natural, or ethical properties. The
fallacy is committed anytime someone gives an account of two distinct properties as if
they were one and the same property (Frankena 1939, p. 471). Strictly speaking, it does
not really make sense to call the definist fallacy a fallacy either; rather it is a simply a
“mistake” (Frankena 1939, p. 472). If the definist fallacy is a better way to understand
what the naturalistic fallacy is really about, then the question becomes: “do those who
define ethical notions in non-ethical terms make this mistake” (Frankena 1939, p. 472)?
Those who attempt to give analytic definitions of good will contend that there are
not two properties involved at all, so they aren’t making this mistake. Instead, “what they
are saying is that two words or sets of words stand for or mean one and the same
property” (Frankena 1939, p. 472). The definist fallacy is the mistake of treating two
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different properties as if they were the same property. Frankena argues that while
Moore may be right that the property of “goodness is not identifiable with any ‘other’
characteristic (if it is a characteristic at all)…the question is: which characteristics are
other than goodness, which names stand for characteristics other than goodness?”
(Frankena 1939, p. 472).The problem is that Moore prejudges the question of whether
or not good is indefinable and names any attempt to do so a fallacy (Frankena 1939, p.
473).
Specifically, Moore assumes that any identification of good with a natural
property will fall to the open question test. These definitions or identities will always
intuitively feel open. Further if the naturalist has found the correct definition then to be
able to continue to ask, ‘yes X is N, but is it good?’ would reveal a “conceptual
confusion” (Miller 2003 p. 15.). So the openness of the question is based on a
preexisting assumption about nonnaturalism being correct and not offering an
independent argument.
A related objection asks why so much weight should be given to the imaginary
intuitions of Moore’s competent users. Moore or his defenders can claim that the
doubts, or the openness of the questions Moore refers to, are not meant to give
“definitive proof” that the purposed definition is not the correct one (Strandberg 2004 p.
182). Instead, Moore’s defenders might argue that “competent language users’”
intuitions about definitions should carry some weight:
If some truths hold merely in virtue of language, and if the existence of such
truths is an essential feature of us being able to communicate, it seems
reasonable to assume that competent language users possess knowledge of
these truths … it seems reasonable to treat their responses of doubt to questions
such as "Is whatever is M also G?" as indications of "AT' not having the same
meaning as "G" (Strandberg 2004 p. 184).
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Thus on this response, the open question test is a legitimate test of meaning because
there is a purported “tight connection…between analyticity and linguistic competence,
and between linguistic competence and responses to the questions utilised in the
argument” (Strandberg 2004 p. 184). But, prima facie evidence against a naturalistic
definition was not was Moore was seeking, after all, he accused those of making the
naturalistic identifications of committing a fallacy, not making a less plausible inference
to the best explanation.
This brings us to the third, and related, major objection, which has been called
the “no interesting analysis objection” and by others the “paradox of analysis” objection
(Miller 2003 p. 16; Langford 1968). Moore’s open question test for any definition of good
supposes that it is a necessary condition of a definition being correct that the question
to be closed. But, paradoxically, if the question is closed, then the definition will be
uninformative, uninteresting, and/or trivial.
Moore’s conditions of analytic adequacy require all analyses to be either trivial or
false. An analysis states that an identity obtains between the object denoted by
the analysandum and the object denoted by the analysans. If the identity does
obtain then by the terms of Moore’s argument, the analysis is trivial, stating no
more than a tautology. But if the analysis is nontrivial, ‘significant,’ there is no
identity between the two and the analysis must be false (Hutchinson 2001 p. 31).
There are many counter-examples to this way of understanding what a correct definition
or conceptual analysis is like, from math, logic, and philosophy (Miller 2003 p. 16).
Smith points out that once we realize that [t]here “are unobvious and informative”
analysis of concepts, the openness of Moorean open questions looks less significant.
Perhaps some questions are closed by our concepts, but are nonetheless cognitively
open to us (Smith 1995 p. 39).
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One way of describing the way that Moore understands ‘good’ is that he
recognizes this paradox and thinks that in the case of good it cannot be resolved
(Umphrey 2002 p. 34). Soames suggests that Moore may have assumed the principle
of “The Transparency of Meaning”
If two expressions α and β, mean the same thing (e.g. express the same
property), and in addition, an individual x (fully) understands both α and β then (i)
x will know that α and β mean the same thing, and (ii), x will know that any two
sentences (of the sort Moore is considering) that differ only in the substitution of
one of these expressions for the other mean the same thing, and thereby
express the same proposition (in the case of declarative sentences or question
(in the vase of interrogatives) (Soames 2003 p. 46-7).
There are counter-examples to this principle however.30 Smith makes the point that this
can be illustrated through the distinction between knowledge how and knowledge that
(Smith 1995, p. 37-9). While someone might possess a skill, like being able to speak
English or drive a car, this is not the same thing as being able to state what the rules of
these activities are.
The fourth major objection is that Moore ignored the distinction made by Gottlob
Frege between “sense and reference” (Frege 1892/1948 p. 17; Miller 2003 p. 17). The
reference of a term is “the object for which it stands, either by having been assigned to
that object or by uniquely describing it” (Mendelsohn 2005 p. 33). The reference of a
term is something that we can discover empirically. Whereas the sense of a term, is
“that ‘wherein the mode of presentation is contained’ and it thus carries the burden of
introducing, presenting, or picking out a referent” (Mendelsohn 2005; Frege 1892/1948).
It is possible to understand the sense of a term without knowing its referent, for
example, the sense of the tallest building in Manhattan is clear to me, even though I am

30

For more on this, see Smith 1995 (Smith 1995 p. 37-39). To find the distinction between knowledge
how and knowledge that more generally, See: (Ryle 2009; Dummett 1996).
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not aware that the building is lower Manhattan’s Freedom Tower. In Frege’s example,
the terms Morning Star and Evening star had different senses, because people believed
they were different stars. However, in fact had the same reference, they were both
Venus.
Moore assumed that the open question test was a good test for the meaning of
terms, based on their synonymy (Pigden 1991). However, synonym is not a good guide
to telling whether two terms refer to the same property because their sense and
reference can come apart. So on this objection, what is going on with the open question
test is say that someone proposes a utilitarian analysis of the concept good- that good
is whatever maximizes happiness for all. We can coherently ask, but is it good to
maximize happiness for all? Because good and maximizing happiness for all may have
the same reference (if this was the correct identity) but not the same sense. In other
words, Moore assumes that any statement identifying two properties can be correct if
the two terms for the properties are synonyms.
This response is especially important for naturalist moral realism; it opens the
door for naturalists to argue that the identities between moral properties and natural
properties are like the empirically discoverable identities between two natural properties,
like the identity between water and H20 (Pigden 1991). This is the strategy taken by the
Cornell Realists. For example, Brink writes:
The naturalist can concede that there are neither synonymies nor meaning
implications between moral and non-moral, for instance, natural terms and still
maintain that moral facts and properties are identical with or constituted by,
natural and social scientific facts and properties. The naturalists’ identity or
constitution claims can be construed as expressing synthetic moral necessities
(Brink 1989 p. 166).
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Although there have been contemporary attempts to revitalize the open question
argument they often they fall victim to one of these same flaws. For neo-open question
arguments see: (Horgan and Timmons 1992, 1992). Otherwise they are guilty of simply
begging the question against the naturalist by mining for intuitions about the openness
of questions that are so abstract that they make the value of these intuitions highly
questionable.
7. Moral Disagreement and Relativism
Although Mackie does not include disagreement in the section in his book on the
queerness argument, it is an argument that Mackie makes against the objectivity of
values and can be construed as a kind of queerness. It would be ‘queer’ if morals were
objective, and yet such persistent disagreement about values between individuals,
societies, and cultures remained.
Arguments based in disagreement specifically challenge the objectivity that
realists’ theories claim morality has. These arguments are often inferences to the best
explanation to relativism, in Mackie’s case to error theory. The argument is as follows.
The phenomenon of widespread moral disagreement is something that a metaethical
theory should be able to explain. The best way of explaining it is that ethics is not
objective and that there are no ethical facts or properties for people to converge on. If
such properties or facts existed objectively, we would expect less intractable and
persistent disagreement than we currently have. Instead, disagreement can be best
explained with a skeptical metaethical view, such as relativism, quasi-realism,
subjectivism, non-cognitivism, or error theory. The argument is often made through a
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contrast in the level of convergence that exists in ethics with the level that exists in
sciences (taken to be the paradigmatic cases of objective areas of inquiry).
…the actual variations in moral codes are more readily explained by the
hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express
perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective
values (Mackie 1977 p. 37).
According to Gilbert Harman’s metaethical relativism “moral truth and justifiability, if
there are any such things, are in some way relative to factors that are culturally and
historically contingent…it is about the relativity of moral truth and justifiability” (Wong
1991 p. 442). He proposes relativism as the best explanation for persistent ethical
disagreement (Harman and Thomson 1996; Harman 1975).
The main reason to believe there is not a single true morality is that there are
major differences in the moralities that people accept and these differences to
not seem to rest of actual differences in situation or disagreements about the
facts. It is hard for me to believe that all moral disagreements rest on different
opinions about the facts or confusions of one or another sort…Differences in
attitude and practice about these issues occur among people within the same
larger society. There appears to me to be no objective way of settling these
disagreements. That yields an argument for moral relativism that is similar for
arguments for relativism about rest and motion, football, law, and language.
(Harman 2012 p. 5)
Harman restricts his relativism to a particular class of moral judgments he calls “inner
judgments.” An inner judgment, for example, is ‘she ought not to have stolen that
necklace’. Inner judgments are different from other types of moral judgments in that they
suppose a shared set of reasons and motivations between the person who is being
judged and the person making the judgment.
We make inner judgments about a person only if we suppose that he is capable
of being motivated by the relevant moral considerations. We make other sorts of
judgment about those who we suppose are not susceptible of such motivation
(Harman 1975 p. 4).
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The truth of inner moral judgments is relative to social conventions. These types of
moral facts are facts about subjective reasons; reasons that have their source in the
agent’s aims and goals. In his words, “conflicting judgments can be equally correct or
equally justified” (Harman 1982 p. 308). So for someone who holds a radically different
moral view than ours, we might say that they are a monster, evil, or that what they did
shouldn’t have happened. But we cannot say that such a person ought not to have done
what they did (Harman 1975, p. 5). This is because we cannot say that they have a
reason not to do what they did. In this way, the truth of moral judgments, or their
justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or
practices of a group of persons (Harman 1977 p. 133). Moral facts are mind dependent,
meaning, for Harman they are, facts that we create, in contrast to scientific facts, which
are mind-independent. Moral authority and normative force are relative to some social
group. Standards that are authoritative for a group or society are the one’s members of
that group have agreed to through negotiations or bargaining. Moral judgments are only
valid for groups of people who have made such agreements (Harman 1975).
The objection to the objectivity of morality based on disagreement has been
widely discussed; as a result realists and other objectivists have a number of persuasive
ways of responding to this argument.
One of the most well-trod responses to arguments from disagreement points out
that disagreement in belief cannot lead by itself lead us to conclude that there is no
objective fact of the matter in a particular domain (Rachels 2007). The fact that people
have different moral beliefs or attitudes does not itself tell us whether or not there is an
objective fact of the matter in ethics, just as it does not in any other subject matter.
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However, a sophisticated relativist can easily accommodate this objection by saying that
this is an inference to the best explanation, and so it is not making a deductive
argument from disagreement to a lack of objectivity.
The second common objectivist response is that arguments from disagreement
to relativism about values confuse epistemological questions with metaphysical ones.
Widespread disagreements on ethical issues may reveal an epistemological problem
about access to moral facts, but whether or not there are objective moral facts is a
metaphysical issue. It could be that objective moral facts exist, but we simply do not
have a very reliable or accurate way of accessing them (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 227).
A third response is that there is less disagreement than it might at first seem. In
fact, relativists have the burden on their theories of being able to explain all the
agreement on moral issues that do exist (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007 p. 162). Realists
have a ready-made explanation of moral agreement; people who agree may be
recognizing the same moral facts.
Fourth, realists can use “companions in guilt” (or “partners in crime”) arguments,
pointing out that in many other disciplines and areas of knowledge there is persistent
disagreement. Yet these do not lead us to question the objectivity of those areas of
inquiry, or the presence of facts in these areas. For example, in statistics, Bayesians
disagree with non-Bayesians and in theoretical physics, adherents of string theory
disagree with theorists of loop quantum gravity theory (Archard 2011 p. 121). In public
discourse about science, there is widespread and persistent disagreement between
proponents of intelligent design and evolution. In medicine, physicians often disagree
with each other about diagnosis or treatment plans (McConnell 1984). Finally, in the
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philosophy of mind disagreements remain between, for example, functionalism and
eliminative materialism. However, no one considers using this disagreement as support
for antirealism or relativism about statistics, physics, science, medicine, or the nature of
the mind.
Mackie anticipates this kind of response.
Disagreement on questions in history or biology or cosmology does not show that
there are no objective issues in these fields for investigators to disagree about.
But such scientific disagreement results from speculative inferences or
explanatory hypothesis based on inadequate evidence, and it is hardly plausible
to interpret moral disagreement in the same way (Mackie 1977 p. 36).
However, Mackie’s response here does not establish why moral disagreement cannot fit
the same model as scientific disagreement, other than suggesting that it is “hardly
plausible” (Mackie 1977 p. 36).
Despite examples of widespread agreement in ethics, no one would deny that
disagreements remain. Since the skeptical argument from disagreement is an inference
to the best explanation, realists and objectivists must offer alternative explanations of
the ethical disagreement that remains. First there has been a limited amount of time and
resources invested into thinking through ethical issues. Compared with sciences very
few people have worked full time on ethical issues and few resources have been put
into working out moral positions, developing theories, and looking at applied issues
(Parfit 1984 p. 453-454; Brink 1989 p. 207).31
Second, widespread moral disagreement may be the result of a variety of kinds
of distorting Influences. For example, failures of rationality may explain some remaining
moral disagreement. Self-interest, including preference for one’s own group and
31

For example, the National Institutes of Health’s Ethical, Legal and Social Implications project is the
largest bioethics initiative ever funded by government. Yet, its budget is only 5% of the total National
Human Genome Research Institute’s extramural budget.
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unwillingness to think that we or our friends are doing something morally wrong may
also be a significant barrier to moral agreement (Loeb 1998 p. 283). For example, Peter
Singer and others have offered powerful arguments for why we should eliminate the
suffering of animals in factory farms (Singer 1995). Yet few people have changed their
practices. This may be attributable to the distorting effects of self-interest in enjoying the
cheap consumption of these products. Cognitive distortions, such as status quo bias, an
unjustified preference for the current state of affairs may also provide an explanation for
why many find cognitive enhancement unethical (Bostrom and Ord 2006).
Third, in contrast to the sciences, few people who are not professionally involved
in ethics consider it necessary to get the input of experts when it comes to forming
ethical judgments (Brink 1989 p. 207). Thus there is an unwillingness to defer to
experts in ethics. This may help some intractable public disagreement. For example,
although much philosophical work has been done on the moral justification for a system
of universal health care, few non-academics consult this literature or consider these
arguments when forming their views on health care reform policies.
Fourth, many persistent disagreements in ethics stem from disagreement on the
non-moral facts; here I am construing non-moral facts in the broadest sense. Non-moral
facts that contribute to persistent ethical disagreement include, for example, religious
beliefs, the truth or falsity of naturalism in ethics, the consequences of various actions
and policies, and metaphysical and conceptual issues, such as the nature of
personhood (Loeb 1998 p. 283). For example, on the issue of the morality of abortion,
some persistent disagreement can be reduced to disagreement about the existence of a
deity or the health and psychological effects that abortion has on the woman.
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Finally, moral realists and objectivists can argue that there is some moral
indeterminacy. Intractable disagreements may be the result of “moral ties” and may not
be resolvable; these could be the result of incommensurable values or conceptual
vagueness, for example (Brink 1989 p. 202; Shafer-Landau 1994).
In counter-response to some of these responses to arguments from
disagreement, relativists and antirealists argue that they are not only talking about real
world disagreement. Rather than making an inference to the best explanation, relativist
or antirealist give an a priori argument (Shafer Landau and Cuneo, 2006 p. 219) .They
claim that even idealized agents who met all of the above mentioned constraints (free
from cognitive distortions, free from bias, agreed on all of the nonmoral facts, etc.) still
would not converge on answers to moral questions, even if they were perfectly
knowledgeable and rational. Realists have responded by pointing out that unless there
are independent grounds for thinking that agents who are idealized and under specific
constraints would still not agree on moral matters, this is begging the question against
objectivism.
In part, whether this objection is successful or not depends on what is built into
the concept of rationality that one is using. That is, if one grants that the agents under
the idealized conditions are fully rational, one might be using a substantive or
procedural version of rationality (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 226-227). A substantive
conception of rationality would mean that the agents in question “will be possessed of
all such truths” that is “truths about what reasons there are” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p.
226). A merely procedural conception of rationality on the other hand, involves
something like being able to “flawlessly identify best means to adopted ends, to infallibly

66

infer entailed conclusions from valid arguments” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 226). ShaferLandau points out that the argument from disagreement, in this case depends on being
able to rule out substantive rationality.
Another way of making the point about faulty reasoning is for the realist to
concede that it is possible, even given perfect reasoning that disagreement on some
moral issues may remain. But this is because “[t] there can be a gap between epistemic
accessibility and truth” (Shafer-Landau and Cuneo 2006 p. 218)
A related counter-response by relativists against objectivism is that there is no
established method for settling a moral dispute and there are such methods in science
(Bambrough 1969; Rachels 1998). However, objectivists also have ways to respond to
this worry. Even if we have no method of settling these disputes, this assumes that we
have to have a way of settling a dispute in order for there to be an objective matter of
fact. Second, realists can question whether in other areas where there is persistent
disagreement there is truly agreement on a method, for example, in the debate between
creationists and evolutionists.
8. Conclusions
This chapter presented several versions of the queerness argument against
moral realism and in favor of various kinds of moral skepticism and antirealism. The two
strains of the queerness objection that I will focus on in the following chapters have to
do with issues of the normative force of morality. The objection from normative force
can be broken down into objections having to do with a motivational sense of
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normativity (the internalism objection) and objections having to do with the authority of
morality.
In the following chapter, I will present the ways that non-cognitvists, and other
antirealists, rely on claims about the nature of moral motivation to underpin arguments
against cognitivism and moral realism. That is, I will focus on the internalism objection. I
will briefly outline several versions of internalism and the major objections to internalism.
I will defend moral realism by undermining the evidence for the kind of close relationship
between motivation and moral judgment that internalists contend exists. I will also
present the alternative position, externalism, and the general view I defend, a pluralistic
motivational judgment externalism, again, the view that moral judgment is not inherently
or necessarily tied to moral motivation.
In Chapter 3, I will focus on a key realist response to the motivation objection.
The counterexample is of the amoralist who simply does not care about morality, though
he is able to make moral judgments. Both realists and antirealists need to be able to
give a plausible interpretation of these agents, who are both imaginary, and seem to be
real.
Chapter four focuses on the strain of the queerness objection that has to do with
the authority of morality. I start by disentangling the internalism objection from the
authority objection and attempt to understand what this objection could amount to, as it
has been understood in several different ways. I focus on two formulations of the
objection, one made by Korsgaard, the other by Derek Parfit. There are independent
reasons to reject both of their positions and I provide those. But I also argue that the
authority objection does not pose a special problem for naturalist moral realism. In fact,
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it is just as much a problem, if not a greater problem for constructivism, non-naturalist
moral realism, or quasi-realism. Views other than moral naturalist realism, such as
constructivism and quasi-realism, claim to be able to capture the objectivity of ethics but
they have difficulty doing so. Although a view like Parfit’s can capture the objectivity of
morality, it leaves morality, specifically reasons, mysterious and sui generis. I suggest a
positive view of what naturalist moral realism can offer in terms of the authority of
morality, morality’s objectivity.
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Chapter 2: The Internalism Objection
Internalist theories of moral motivation claim that there is a necessary, essential,
or inherent connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated to act on
that moral judgment. This characterization of the relationship between moral judgment
and motivation is often taken to be a problem for moral realism. This is because
internalism is a premise in one prominent argument against moral realism, what I have
called the internalism objection to moral realism. (See Chapter 1, section 3)
According to the internalism objection, moral judgments (taken either as a certain
kind of mental state, or a verbal expression of that mental state) necessarily, essentially,
or inherently motivate an agent to act on them. Cognitivism, often thought to be a crucial
component of realism, claims that moral judgments are beliefs. The argument continues
that because beliefs cannot motivate by themselves (The Humean theory of motivation,
See Chapter 1), and moral judgments necessarily, essentially, or inherently motivate,
moral judgments cannot be beliefs. In sum, the internalism objection asserts that the
moral psychology that moral realists either do, or must embrace, is incompatible with a
widely accepted and plausible claim about the relationship between moral judgment and
moral motivation. Therefore, moral realism must be false.
Noncognitivists and expressivists use the internalism argument as support for
their rejection of cognitivism and realism (Ayer 1936/2012; Stevenson 1937; Hare 1952;
Gibbard 1992; Blackburn 1993). For these internalists, moral judgments are conative
states; they are mental states which are much closer to desires than to beliefs. Thus,
noncognitivists and expressivists are able to accept the idea that beliefs are
motivationally inert (the Humean theory of motivation) while claiming that moral
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judgments necessarily, essentially, or inherently, motivate. Since conative mental states
like desires have the power to motivate by themselves, noncognitivists and
expressivists present their theories as offering solutions to the internalism objection.
However, not all internalists are noncognitivists or expressivists. Many defenders
of internalism hold the view for independent reasons. Internalist positions have been
articulated that are said to be compatible with realism, including the positions of Thomas
Nagel, David Wiggins, John McDowell and David McNaughton. These internalists
resolve the conflict between realism, cognitivism and internalism by proposing
alternative theories of motivation, either by rejecting the the Humean theory of
motivation, or espousing internalism about reasons rather than about motivation
(Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 279-280). Michael Smith’s internalism is special in that it is part
of his wider project of reconciling the Humean theory of motivation and desires,
cognitivism, and internalism (Smith 1995),
A surprising feature of this debate is how little attention is paid in the literature to
explicitly defining what motivation is. The vague working definition that most writing on
internalism and externalism seem to be relying on is roughly, motivation is the mental
state that causes the agent to act; the mental state without which the agent would not
act.
In order to defend cognitivism and moral realism against the internalism
objection, I will employ two main strategies: undermining the considerations that are
generally taken to weigh in favor of internalism and presenting a version of externalism,
pluralistic externalism, which can meet all of the objections that are usually made
against externalism by its opponents.
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In order to employ these strategies, in this chapter I will first, canvass several
prominent internalist positions and discuss the four central arguments in favor of
internalism, the argument from phenomenology, the argument from oddness, the
argument from connection, and the empirical arguments. I will then show that none of
these arguments make a strong case for internalism. In responding to each of these
arguments or considerations in favor of internalism, I will be building the case for
pluralistic externalism, as each one of these responses shows a way in which
externalism can provide just as good, if not a better explanation of the phenomenon in
question than internalism can. Having established that the major considerations in favor
of internalism fail, I will discuss an independent argument against internalism, the moral
indifference argument in detail in Chapter 3.
In the final section of this chapter, I will set out three conditions which the best
version of externalism should meet, the flexibility condition, the empirical evidence
condition, and the neutrality condition. I will then present the two main versions of
externalism that have been articulated in the literature and explain why I take a
combination of two forms of externalism to be most persuasive. I will explain how
pluralistic externalism can meet the three conditions better than either one of the
independent versions of externalism alone.
1. Varieties of Internalism
As a naturalist moral realist, David Brink rejects internalism. However, he has
helpfully categorized the varying species of internalism. The most important distinction
to make between different kinds of internalism is between internalism about reasons
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and internalism about motivation (Brink 1989 p. 26). Internalism about reasons is the
view that making a moral judgment “necessarily provides the agent with a reason to
perform the moral action” while internalism about motivation is the view that making a
moral judgment necessarily or inherently provides the agent with a motivation for action
(Brink 1989 p. 26; Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 268). Because reasons and motivations can
come apart, there is no need to be both an externalist about motivation and about
reasons.32 These positions are independent and internalism about reasons will be only
minimally explored here.
Most versions of internalism share a commitment to some version of the
following three claims. One, morality is necessarily motivational. Brink specifically adds
that according to internalism, “it is the concept of morality which shows that moral
considerations necessarily motivate” (Brink 1989 p. 28). Two, not only do moral
judgments necessarily motivate, they essentially motivate (Zangwill 2008 p. 95). The
subtle difference between necessarily motivating and essentially motivating is clarified
by Zangwill:
Imagine that it were somehow necessary that everyone has moral desires. In that
case, all moral beliefs would necessarily be motivating, without that being the
essence of moral beliefs. However, if motivation is essential to moral beliefs, that
would explain why moral beliefs are necessarily motivating (Zangwill 2008, p.
95).
The third claim that many forms of internalism share is a commitment to a priori
justification for their claim about the necessary and essential connection between
morality and motivation:

32

Sometimes this distinction is made in terms of “motivating or explaining reasons” and “normative or
justifying reasons” (Darwall 1997 p. 307). Unless otherwise noted, I am using “reasons” to refer to
normative or justificatory kind, and motives to refer to what some would call motivational or explanatory
reasons.
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…this claim about the motivational power…of morality must be a priori. Since it is
the concept of morality itself which determines this fact, the…motivational power
of moral considerations cannot depend upon what the content of morality turns
out to be, [or] facts about agents… (Brink 1986 p. 28).
There are a few who call themselves internalists but would not agree with this a priori
characterization. For example, Jesse Prinz’s version of internalism is based on his
interpretation of empirical evidence and would thus likely reject all three of these claims
(Prinz 2007). Later in this chapter I discuss some objections to thinking of the debate
between internalism and externalism in terms of the a priori or conceptual analysis.
Claiming that morality necessarily motivates is still far too vague a
characterization of internalism. Brink distinguishes three kinds of internalism (Brink
1989 p. 37). Agent internalism is the view that it is a conceptual truth that moral
properties, facts, or obligations give the agent a motivation to act whether or not the
agent recognizes the moral properties, facts or obligations (Brink 1989 p. 40).33
Although agent internalism is seldom embraced, it is important to distinguish it from
other forms of internalism because anti-realists, like Mackie, vacillate between the
conceptions of internalism that they rely on to make the internalist objection against
realism (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010 p. 59; Mackie 1977). Appraiser internalism is the
position that it is a conceptual truth that a moral belief or moral judgment provides the
appraiser with motivation for action” consistent with that belief or judgment (Brink 1989
p. 40). Unlike agent internalism, appraiser internalism claims that an agent’s moral
judgments, whether correct or not, motivate the agent (Brink 1989 p. 40). Thus the
mental act of making a moral judgment is conceptually tied to having some motivation to
act (Brink 1989 p. 41). Appraiser internalism is most common and most plausible, and
33

Shafer-Landau calls this position “existence” internalism about motivation: “theories [that] claim that
moral obligations necessarily motivate…” (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 267).
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unless specified otherwise, this is the kind of internalism to be discussed in this chapter.
Finally, hybrid internalism says that it is a conceptual truth that when an agent makes a
“correct or justified” moral judgment she is motivated (Brink 1989 p. 41). Mistaken moral
judgments thus lack motivational power according to hybrid internalism.
There is a broad spectrum of strong and weak forms of internalism. Strong
internalism says that if an agent genuinely makes a moral judgment, she will act on it. A
second, weaker kind of internalism says that making a moral judgment provides the
agent with prima facie motivation to act on that judgment, which competes with the
agent’s other motivations. Weaker versions of internalism are more defensible and
unless otherwise noted, will be the focus of the internalism debate in this chapter.
Sigrún Svavarsdóttir makes another distinction between strong and weak
motivational judgment internalism (Svavarsdóttir 2005). For Svavarsdóttir, the defining
characteristic of internalism, strong or weak, is the claim that it necessary condition of
having made a moral judgment that one is motivated by it. Strong internalism makes
the claim that the moral judgment has motivational power on its own, without the aid of
any other mental state,34 while weak internalism claims that a “moral judgment is not
correctly ascribed to an agent unless he has the relevant motivation” (Svavarsdóttir
2005 p. 164).
Another way internalism can be strong or weak is by making restrictions on the
class of agents that internalism applies to. Christian Miller points out that on some
versions of internalism the connection between making a moral judgment and having a
motivation to act on it holds for all agents (Miller 2003). On weaker versions of
internalism, however, this connection only applies to a certain class of agents, those
34

See for example, Russ Shafer-Landau 2003.

75

who are not in altered psychological conditions like apathy, depression, or weakness of
will, or those who are rational, good, virtuous, or normal, for example (Miller 2003)
(Brink 1989; Stocker 1979; Björklund et al. 2012; Mele 1996)
This weaker version of internalism (sometimes called “conditional internalism”) is
easier to defend (Björklund et al. 2012 p. 126). Fredrik Bjorklund et al. have identified
three different kinds of conditionality. The first condition is that the agent must be
“psychologically normal,” this rules out “deviations from the normal functioning of
deliberation and action guidance” (Bjorklund et al. 2012 p. 127). The internalist views of
Blackburn (1984), Gibbard (2003) and Timmons (1999 p. 140) include this condition.
The second condition is “practical rational[ity],” that is internalism does not apply
to agents who are in “conditions of decreased rational control of their actions”
(Björklund et al. 2012 p. 127). This includes the internalist views of Korsgaard (1992)
and Smith (1995), which focus on practical rationality. The third condition is “moral
perceptiv[ness];” these internalisms only apply to agents that “really grasp the moral
properties of actions” (Bjorklund et al. 2012, p. 127). Other internalists who make use of
this condition are John McDowell (1978), David McNaughton (1988), Davis Wiggins
(1987), Thomas Nagel (1970), and Jonathan Dancy (1993).
The ways that a particular internalist theory restricts the range of agents that it
applies too is often connected to how the theory handles a forceful objection, the moral
indifference, or amoralism objection to internalism (See Chapter 3). The objection
suggests that it is either conceivable or actual that some people can make genuine
moral judgments but fail to be motivated by those judgments. Many internalists, as we
will see, respond to this objection by claiming that if such agents did exist, they would
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be eliminated by one of the conditions set on internalism. In other words, the internalist’
diagnosis of the morally indifferent, will often put them into an exclusionary category.
For example, the internalist might say that a morally indifferent agent is must not be
rational, and thus internalism does not apply. The practice of restricting the scope of
cases and kinds of agents that internalism applies to will be discussed in Chapter 3 on
the moral indifference objection to internalism. The most important version of
internalism in the overall argument of this project is a moderately weak version of
appraiser internalism.
2. The Case for Internalism
Although the debate about internalism and externalism is one of moral
psychology, much of the defense of internalism has been conducted on an a priori
basis, in terms of conceptual analysis (Bjorklund, et al. 2012, p. 126). Internalists aim at
establishing the necessary conditions for making a moral judgment. The necessary
condition that internalists focus on is the condition that the agent must be motivated to
some extent to act on the moral judgment. The central claim of internalism is that there
is a necessary connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated by it,
that this connection is built into our concept of moral judgment, and built into the way we
use of moral language. Thus this connection between moral judgment and motivation
should serve as a constraint on all of our metaethical theorizing (Smith 1995 p. 188).
A small number of both externalists and internalists are now also increasingly
discussing empirical or a posteriori support for and against the positions (Roskies 2003
p. 331-333; 2006, 2008; Prinz 2006 p. 38-39; Prinz 2007 p. 42; Cholbi 2011 p. 29-34;
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2006; Björklund et al. 2012; Björnsson 2012, 1998; Bjömsson 2002). The empirical
evidence that has been discussed comes largely from psychological literature on mental
disorders and disabilities, such as anti-social personality disorder, cases of injury to a
patient’s the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and autism. How one interprets this body of
research may depend largely on the position that one already holds on internalism or
externalism and sometimes opposing sides of the debate cite the same studies as
evidence for their position. Empirical evidence regarding moral indifference and
purported cases of real-life amoralists will not be discussed here, but will be discussed
briefly in Chapter 3.
Robert Lockie helpfully organizes the central arguments for internalism into three
categories: arguments from phenomenology, arguments from oddness, and arguments
from connection (Lockie 1998 p. 16). The arguments in those three categories tend to
be part of the mainstream, a priori, conceptual analysis wing of internalism. Here I will
outline examples of each of these three arguments for internalism and offer responses
to each.
2.1 Phenomenology Argument for Internalism and Response
The argument from phenomenology says “that by reflecting on our experience of
moral belief we will be led to realize that such is essentially motivating” (Lockie 1998 p.
16). Lockie cites the following argument from Mark Platts to illustrate this argument:
[W]hen we consider perception of moral value, I think it clear that, if introspective
phenomenology can be our guide, moral perceptions manifest a unity of such a
kind that potential motivation is indeed internal to them (Platts 1980 p. 81).

78

One way to respond to the argument from phenomenology is just to point out that
one’s own phenomenology does not support internalism. The fact that philosophers
seem to have intractably different intuitions about this very issue has led some to argue
that we actually possess different concepts of what a moral judgment is (Francén
2010).35 But, as Copp points out, if internalists and externalists are using different
concepts of moral obligation or moral judgment, then they are not actually disagreeing
with each other at all, instead “they would be making claims about different kinds of
obligation” or different kinds of moral judgments (Copp 1995 p. 191fn). 36 It may be the
case that internalists and externalists are talking past one another; but surely there can
be genuine disagreement about what the nature of moral judgments actually is, and
how moral judgments relate to motivation in our mental and moral lives. But if
externalists and internalists have clashing phenomenologies, we have no basis on
which to prioritize one set of introspective observations over the other, no criterion by
which to judge whose phenomenological reports should count as evidence and whose
should be dismissed as mistaken. If this is true, then we will need to appeal to other
sorts of evidence about the nature of moral judgments and their relationship to
motivation.
Since internalism claims that there is a necessary, inherent, or essential
connection between moral judgment and motivation, the kind of phenomenological
evidence that internalists would need to lend support to this view would be very hard to

At that point one option is to embrace pluralism about moral concepts: “the view that different internalist
and externalist theses correctly accounts for different people’s concepts of moral opinions, respectively”
(Francén 2010 p. 117).
36
Copp suggests that this is what Falk (1947) seems to take from the intractable clash of intuitions about
“moral obligation” between internalists and externalists, that is that they have “different concepts of moral
obligation” (Copp 1995a p. 191).
35
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come by. It is not clear what the internalist actually finds when they reflect on their own
mental life. How it is possible to discern a necessary connection between judgment and
motivation through introspection? Even if we all shared the same phenomenology,
reporting the same experience of motivation always following making a moral
judgment, this would still not lend support to the claim that there is a necessary
connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated. Hume’s discussion
of causality is applicable here; it may be that internalists merely observe a “constant
conjunction” between moral judgments and motivation, but not a necessary one (Hume
1739-40/2000). We could just as easily conclude that this connection is contingent, as
externalists contend it is.
Finally, the phenomenology argument is not persuasive because of the empirical
evidence suggesting the difficulties of using introspection as a way of finding out about
our own mental states, especially our own motivations (Nisbett and Bellows 1977;
Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wilson 2009; Pronin and Kugler 2007; Arcuri et al. 2008;
Wilson and Bar-Anan 2008).
Examples from psychology range from perceptual illusions, mistaken reports
about when we are experiencing a painful stimulus, to research on bias, choiceblindness, and confabulation. The studies that cast doubt on our ability to have accurate
introspective insight into our own mental states are diverse and wide ranging and
cannot be discussed in any detail here; a few brief examples suffice to make the point.
Nisbett and Wilson’s widely cited study asked participants to select from five
pairs of stockings which pair they thought was the best quality, although the stockings
were virtually all the same, participants consistently chose the stockings that were on
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the right side of the display. But when interviewed about why they chose the pair they
did, they were not aware of the influence of where on the rack the stockings were
placed and gave other reasons for their decision (Nisbett and Wilson 1977). From
these and other similar results, Nisbett and Wilson concluded that we are often not
aware of what causes us to behave or decide in one manner or another.
Choice blindness effects suggest that people confabulate to make sense of their
decisions, even when in cases when they are misled about what decisions they actually
made (Johansson et al. 2005; Johansson et al. 2006). In one experiment, participants
were shown photos of women and asked to decide which woman was most attractive.
In half of the cases, they were later shown the photo that they did not select and were
misleadingly asked to explain why they chose that photo. The deception was only
noticed in 28% of the participants (Johansson et al. 2006 p. 690). Even more
interesting, the deceived participants explained with the same specificity and conviction
as the non-deceived participants why they chose one woman instead of the other.
There is also evidence that even though people may report being undecided about a
particular political issue or decision, researchers can accurately predict the decisions
they will make based on a test of their “implicit attitudes” (Arcuri et al. 2008; Galdi,
Arcuri, and Gawronski 2008). Mentioning this research is meant to lessen the
confidence that we should have in internalists’ phenomenological arguments for the
necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. If it is as difficult as this
evidence suggests that it is for us to have transparent access to our own motivations
and reasons when it comes to selecting a more attractive image or pair of hosiery, we
likely have just as difficult a time, if not a more difficult time understanding our
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motivations when it comes to such complex phenomenon as moral judgment and
motivation.
2.2 Oddness Argument for Internalism and Responses
It seems strange if someone thinks or says that something is the right thing to do,
but then lacks all motivation to do it, or wonders why they should do it at all (Lockie
1998 p. 16). This observation is the oddness argument for internalism. This argument
can involve either the claim that the above mentioned scenario is linguistically odd or
that it is psychologically odd. Mackie, for one, in the context of discussing Hume’s
argument that morality is not based on reason writes:
… it is linguistically [italics added] odd to use words like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ with no
prescriptive force-to say, for example ‘x is right and Y is wrong, but of course it is
entirely up to you whether you prefer what is right to what is wrong’ (Mackie 1977
p. 55).
Linguistic oddness is often a precursor to the claim that such a person who speaks in
this way must not understand the concept of right and wrong, or the concept of morality,
because if they were using these terms correctly they would have to be motivated to
some extent by their moral judgments. In other words, it is part of our practice of using
moral terms that they carry “prescriptive force,” in Mackie’s language (Ibid). Similarly,
Mackie asserts that “objective moral values” have “a power when known, automatically
to influence the will” (Mackie 1977 p. 40).
An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not
because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted
that the desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness
somehow built into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and
wrong, and wrong (possible) course of actions would have not-to-be-doneness
somehow built into it (Mackie 1977 p. 96-97).
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Mackie uses this as part of his larger argument for error theory and the denial of moral
facts.
In his discussion of the meaning of the term ‘good,’ Stevenson sets out several
“requirements, which appeal strongly to our common sense” that a definition of ‘good’
must meet (Stevenson 1937 p. 16). One of these requirements is that the “magnetism”
of good must be captured in its definition: “A person who recognizes X to be ‘good’ must
ipso facto acquires a stronger tendency to act in its favor than he otherwise would have
had” (Stevenson 1937 p. 16). Blackburn makes a related, but weaker claim, when he
says that he takes it as a “conceptual truth [that] to regard something as good is to feel
a pull towards promoting or choosing it” (Blackburn 1984 p. 188).37 Horgan and
Timmons argue using a twin earth thought experiment, that we would not count a word
as translatable as “good” unless the users of the word are typically motivated by the
judgments they make about what is good and bad (Horgan and Timmons 1992, 1992).
The second type of oddness argument has to do with psychological oddness.
The idea of psychological oddness is that it strikes us as an odd psychological tendency
to be able to judge something morally right and then not be motivated to do it. For
example, Dancy explains that what supports his internalism is the “’practicality’ of
morality…it would be odd for someone to say ‘This action is wrong but I don’t see that
as at all relevant to my choice’” (Dancy 1993 p. 4). The phrase “relevant to my choice”
can be read in two ways here. It may be a claim about motivation, that the agent in
question is not motivated by his judgment that ‘this action is wrong.’ Or it may be a claim

37

As a result, it is prima facie implausible, according to Blackburn, that moral judgments are expressions
of beliefs.
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about the authority of morality, in other words the authoritative significance or normative
force of moral considerations.
One explanation for why Dancy and others take this agent’s utterance to be so
odd is this ambiguity between having no motivation and not recognizing the authoritative
significance of moral considerations. Some of the appeal of the oddness argument may
come from confusing the issue of moral motivation with the issue of authority. I have
argued in Chapter 1 that motivational power of morality and moral judgment is distinct
from the authority of morality and moral judgment. It is indeed odd to imagine someone
who does not experience the authority, the categorical force of their own moral
judgments in the way that most of us do. If we take the authoritativeness or morality to
be distinct from the way that our moral judgments motivate us, then the oddness of a
person or that person’s words when they explain that they recognize that something is
the right thing to do, but do not “see it as relevant to their choice” may only give us
evidence that some kind of authority is built into our concept of moral judgment not
necessarily that motivational power is built in. This issue will come up again when
discussing the moral indifference argument against internalism (See Chapter 3).
A related, response is found in Svavarsdóttir, who suggests several reasons why
internalists may have the intuitions that they have about such oddness (Svavarsdóttir
1999 p. 183). First, she suggests that internalists may simply have “a deep moral
commitment that makes it hard for the individual in question to imagine how anyone
could be motivationally unaffected by his moral judgments” (Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 183).
Their intuitions may also come from the “…optimism of the overzealous moralist that
moral motivation is somehow guaranteed if we get people to see moral matters aright”
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(Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 183). This is the same kind optimism found in Plato’s claim that
to know the good is to do the good. The oddness or “puzzlement,” that the internalist
detects, may be akin to the puzzlement one may experience when one encounters
someone who is “...not moved by the beauty of a landscape;” it may feel as if they are
not moved by it they could not possibly be seeing the same thing that you are
(Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 185).
Smith also relies on the oddness argument, claiming that we would be surprised
if someone (for Smith, a good and strong-willed agent) espouses a moral view that
forbids an action, and then performs that action (Smith 2004, p. 85). If a person
continuously makes moral judgments and then acts contrary to them, we might wonder
whether they are sincerely making the moral judgments at all (Smith 2004).
The observation of linguistic or psychological oddness is not one that the
externalist needs to deny. Although, an externalist might deny that any of these
situations strike them as odd. This is similar to the denial of the phenomenology of
moral judgment and motivation. This move, however, leaves us only with a conflict of
senses of oddness and won’t get the debate very far; rather it may lead to merely
endlessly shifting the burden of proof back and forth between the two sides. After all,
the charge of oddness (or queerness, for that matter) can only be the very beginning of
an argument; it cannot be the whole argument.
The question then becomes what we can make of this oddness. One strategy for
responding to the oddness argument is to point out, as Lockie does, that an unusual
connection between moral judgment and motivation, one in which an agent says that
she judges an action morally wrong and then repeatedly performs it, or says she has no
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accompanying motivation not to perform it (and in fact has no such motivation) is not the
same as a “logically odd” or “incoherent” (Lockie 1998, p. 18). Perhaps this kind of
relationship between moral judgment and motivation is merely statistically rare, and thus
odd in that sense.
The internalist may respond that while the oddness argument does not fully
support the claim that the very concept of a moral judgment involves motivation,
externalism will have a harder time explaining why the rare, morally indifferent agent
seems odd to us than internalism will. Internalists can claim that the reason such
agents with an unusual connection between moral judgments and motivation seem odd,
is that it is built into our concept of a moral judgment that it motivates to some extent.
But if the externalist can offer a simple and straightforward explanation of oddness, then
we do not yet have a reason to restrict the concept of moral judgment in this way.
If the internalists are claiming that it is logically odd or conceptually incoherent to
claim that someone may make a moral judgment and yet fail to be motivated by it, they
bear a very heavy burden of proof. One cannot simply assert that something is
conceptually incoherent, one must show how this is the case. Here I reiterate a general
criticism of the debate made by Nick Zangwill, who argues that while internalists often
characterize their position in terms of a conceptual truth about the nature of moral
judgment, questions about whether and the extent to which moral judgments motivate
are psychological and empirical (Zangwill 2008 p. 99). I agree with Zangwill when he
writes that his “view is that the issue between the various views of moral motivation is
primarily a causal-explanatory one; it turns on the causal origin of certain motivations
and actions” (Zangwill 2008 p. 99). Zangwill points out that even if we discovered that
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motivational judgment internalism is in fact a conceptual truth, it would still be an open
question whether or not people ever actually make the kind of judgments that our
conceptual analysis requires (Zangwill 2008 p. 100).
Further, the empirical evidence that does exist favors motivational externalism
(Zangwill 2008 p. 99). I side with Zangwill in rejecting the method of pure conceptual
analysis for understanding the relationship between judgment and motivation.
The externalist has several responses available to the oddness argument for
internalism. If we should interpret the oddness argument to be about the odd
psychological makeup that a person would have to have in order to be able to make a
moral judgment and fail to be motivated by it, the externalist can simply deny that this
strikes her as oddness altogether. A more promising externalist strategy is to offer an
explanation of why this is an odd (perhaps in reality, rare) but conceptually possible way
for a moral judgment to function in one’s mental economy. Finally, the externalist can
point out the ways in which oddness is deflated when we remove moral authority and
moral optimism from the observation.
2.3 The Connection Argument and Responses
The strongest and most widely discussed argument for internalism is the
argument from connection. The argument from connection says that “we must explain
the fact, so obvious that it is easily taken for granted, that moral beliefs are commonly
and non-coincidentally connected with moral action” (Lockie 1998 p. 17). This
predictable and regular relationship between moral judgments, motivation, and actions
is what Smith thinks only internalism can explain and he has given one of the most
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sustained presentations and defenses of this argument for internalism (Lockie, 1998 p.
16). The idea is that the common sense observation that there is a regular and reliable
connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated by that judgment is
easily explained by internalism, but for various reasons is difficult or impossible for
externalism to adequately explain. Smith’s connection argument is one that aims to
shift an explanatory burden onto externalism.
Rather than looking at connection arguments in general, it makes more sense to
focus on Smith’s connection argument in detail, since his is the most widely discussed
and since he offers a restricted version of internalism it is most plausible. In order to
explain Smith’s argument for internalism and related objection to externalism, I will have
to provide a summary of part of Smith’s project in the Moral Problem. Smith makes the
following supposedly intuitive observation about the nature of our moral lives:
[b]y all accounts, it is a striking fact about moral motivation that a change in
motivation follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral judgment, at least in
the good and strong-willed person (Smith 2004 p. 71).
Smith’s discussion of internalism is restricted to a particular type of agent, one who is
good (sometimes virtuous) and strong-willed (thus it is a weaker conditional form of
appraiser internalism). When such a person changes their moral judgment from the
judgment that ‘x is right,’ to the judgment that ‘x is wrong,’ his or her motivation and
tendency to act in accordance with his or her judgment also changes in a predictable
way (Smith 2004 p. 74). For example, if I begin by judging that giving to charity is not
morally required, I will have no motivation to give to charity, barring motivation to do so
from some other source, like the desire to get a tax break. If, after reading Peter
Singer’s “Famine Affluence and Morality” I come to make a different judgment, namely
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that it is morally required that I give to charity, I will be motivated to give. He argues that
this reliable connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated by it
can be explained in one of three ways:
On the one hand we can say that the reliable connection between judgment and
motivation is to be explained internally: it follows directly from the content of the
moral judgment itself. The idea will then be either that the belief that an act is
right produces a corresponding motivation (this is the rationalists alternative), or
perhaps that the attitude of accepting that an act is right is itself identical with the
state of being motivated (this is the expressivist’). Or on the other hand, we can
say that the reliable connection between judgment and motivation is to be
explained externally: it follows from the content of the motivational dispositions
possessed by the good and strong-willed person (Smith 2004 p. 72) [italics
added].
The three ways of explaining the reliable connection are, according to Smith; one, the
content of the moral judgment produces a motivation (internalism, rationalism), two that
the judgment is an affective state and thus already a motivational state (internalism,
expressivism), or three, that the judgment and the motivation are separate
(externalism). The solution that Smith ultimately defends is the internalist rationalist
position, explanation one. The expressivist explanation, explanation two, is not an
acceptable option for Smith because it is in direct conflict with the objectivism that he
seeks to defend elsewhere. Importantly for this chapter, Smith goes on to argue that
there are also serious defects with the externalist explanations, explanation three.
Smith argues that only theories that embrace what he calls the “practicality
requirement” can explain the reliability of this connection in the “good and strong willed
person” (Smith 2004 p. 72). The practicality requirement, put in formal terms by Copp,
says: “It is necessarily the case that a person who believes she is morally required to do
Φ in circumstances C is motivated to do Φ in C unless she is ‘practically irrational’”
(Copp 1997 p. 36). More specifically, the “desire [to do Φ] is caused by the belief that it
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would be right to do the thing” (Copp 1997 p. 36).The practicality requirement is a
conceptual truth and a necessary truth about moral judgment.
Crucially for Smith’s internalism, the desire that is at work in his practicality
requirement is the desire to do the right thing in a direct and un-derived sense. Smith
calls this a de re desire to do the right thing, which is caused necessarily in a person
who judges that something is the right thing to do. A de re desire to do the right is a
desire for example, to help a friend, or to relieve suffering, or to tell truth. In contrast, a
de dicto desires to do the right thing, is a desire simply to do what is right, the desire
then to help a friend, or to relieve suffering, or to tell truth, is derived from this desire
and is an indirect desires. This distinction between a de re desire to do the right thing
and a de dicto desire to do the right thing is crucial for his argument.
Smith charges that the externalist is unable to adequately explain why our
motivation changes as our moral judgments change. Smith considers what he takes to
be the externalists’ only competing explanation of the reliable connection between moral
judgment and motivation (Smith 2004 p. 74). All that the externalist can do, Smith
argues is claim that the reliable connection between judgment and motivation in “the
good person” is the result of a “de dicto desire to do-whatever-is-morally-required”
(Copp 1997 p. 49). This desire is indirect and derived, unlike the desires that the good
and strong-willed person has according to his internalism. So Smith thinks that the
externalist must posit the existence of a belief-desire pair to explain a shift in motivation
that occurs with a shift in moral judgment. This explanation fails, however, according to
Smith, because it means that the externalist agent is engaging in a kind of “moral
fetishism” (Smith 2004 p. 128). I will refer to this as the “fetishism argument”:
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the good person is, at bottom, motivated to do what is right, where this is read de
dicto and not de re, and that is really a quite implausible claim. For
commonsense tells us that if good people judge it right to be honest, or right to
care for their children and friends and fellows, or right for people to get what they
deserve, then they care non-derivatively about these things. Good people care
non-derivatively about honesty, their fellows, people getting what they deserve,
justice, equality and the like, not just one thing: doing what they believe to be
right, where this is read de dicto and not de re. Indeed common sense tells us
that being so motivated is a fetish or a moral vice, not the one and only moral
virtue (Smith 200, p. 75) [italics added].
The good externalist agent who is motivated by a desire to be moral (the de dicto desire
to do what is right) cannot possibly be morally praiseworthy. Smith thinks that even the
best morally good externalist agent cannot actually care about the objects of her moral
judgments; she does not care about being honest or compassionate. Nor does she
care about the people that are affected by her actions. Instead she cares about “doing
the right thing” (read de dicto and not de re, in Smith’s language) (Smith 2004 p. 83).
As Shafer-Landau puts it, “we nowadays frown on the view that sees those who
assiduously attend to the moral qualities of their conduct as paragons of virtue…those
possessed of the motive of duty seem just a tad too preoccupied with the moral worth of
their actions” (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 285).
Smith concludes that the only avenue open to an externalist to explain the
reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation is inconsistent with
common sense about the nature of a good and strong-willed person. And since the
expressivist explanation of the connection is inconsistent with Smith’s other theoretical
commitments, he concludes that his unique form of internalism, captured by the
practicality requirement, is the only acceptable alternative.
Externalists have three main strategies for responding to the connection
argument. First, the externalist may challenge the existence of the reliable connection
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between moral judgment and motivation. This response usually involves counterexamples, pointing out cases where the connection does not hold, as in cases of moral
indifference and amoralism (See Chapter 3). A small part of this response will be
developed in section 2.3.1. The second option for an externalist is to show how an
externalist need not adopt the de dicto desire view as their theory of moral motivation.
Several externalists have taken on this project; it is part of the wider effort to articulate
the most plausible version of externalism. These arguments show why we need not
believe that according to externalism agents have only one kind of moral motivation (de
dicto desires). This will be done in section 2.3.2. The third avenue for defending
externalism is to show that even if the de dicto desire view is the only option available to
externalists, it is not problematic or inconsistent with our view of the good agent, to
address the moral fetishism argument. Instead, de dicto desires can play some role in
the good agents’ moral psychology. This is argued for in section 2.3.3.
There has been a vast amount of discussion in the metaethical literature on the
argument from connection, responses to it, and Smith’s account of moral motivation.
Every response and counter-response cannot be accounted for here. In the following
sections I will present the objections to the connection argument that are salient to the
species of externalism that I find most persuasive, pluralistic externalism. This allows
me to present a wide variety of responses to the argument from connection. This is
because the kind of externalism I endorse is a fairly permissive, in that it includes the
possibility of a wide variety of motivational mechanisms and sources for moral
motivation.
2.3.1 There is No Reliable Connection
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Smith stipulates that the reliable connection between making a moral judgment
and being motivated only holds in agents who are both good and strong-willed.
Obviously this makes Smith’s version of internalism applicable to a fairly small group of
moral agents. As Copp illustrates with the case of Carol, the reliable connection that
Smith describes does not necessarily exist in an agent who is only good, but not strongwilled (Copp 1995 p. 209).
Suppose a demagogue convinces Carol that she is in fact obligated to support
capital punishment. A while ago you persuaded her that she ought to oppose it,
and you managed to link her fundamentally compassionate nature to her
opposition to capital punishment. The link is cemented so firmly, let us suppose,
that the demagogue is unable to overcome Carol’s revulsion to the death penalty.
He successfully convinces her that she is obligated to support it, but she
continues to oppose it. Now Carol may well be a good person, it seems to me,
despite the fact that she is weak-willed; her belief about capital punishment has
changed without an accompanying change in motivation, yet (I assume) her
fundamental motivations or values are appropriate. Indeed, her goodness seems
to depend on her not having the desire to-do-whatever-she-is-obligated-to-do,
for if she has this desire, her wavering beliefs about her obligations would bring
about wavering motivations (Copp 1995a p. 211).
If an agent is good, but weak-willed, she may lack the reliable connection between
moral judgment and motivation. In response, Smith might disagree with Copp’s claim
that the demagogue has truly “convinced” Carol that she is “obligated” to support the
death penalty. But if he accepts that aspect of the case, it seems Smith would have to
say that Carol is not a good person at all. Smith defines what a good person is in the
following way: “it is constitutive of being a morally good person that you have direct
concern for what you think is right” (Smith 1994 p. 76).
So Copp’s case is doing more than illustrating how a person who is good, but not
strong willed, can fail to have the reliable connection. Instead, he is challenging Smith’s
notion of a good person. In the case of Carol, he assumes we will all agree that Carol is
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good, as the source of one’s goodness is to be found in “one’s motivations rather than
in one’s beliefs or the connection between one’s beliefs and one’s motivations” (Copp
1995a, p. 211).38 In offering an account of the relationship between moral judgment and
motivation, I wish to remain neutral on the first order normative issue of what makes an
agent a good agent as much as possible, be it their motivation, actions, character, or
otherwise. This is a debate I will only engage in to the extent that I wish to leave this an
open question, where other theorists, like Smith, unnecessarily close the question, and
make certain assumptions about what a good agent has to be like. So while I do not
endorse Copp’s description of what makes Carol good, his case is useful in revealing
the assumptions Smith is making about what makes an agent good.
Copp offers a second case that questions whether the connection between moral
judgment and motivation always obtains even in agents that are both “good and strongwilled” (Copp 1997 p. 50). To illustrate this doubt, Copp imagines a case of a good and
strong-willed person who comes to believe that abstaining from sex is morally required.
This belief happens to be false; abstaining from sex is not morally required. Despite the
fact that this person:
values doing all the other things she believes she is required to do, and all her
other (basic) beliefs about what she is actually required to do are accurate…she
desires as any good person would desire, this agent never comes to see
abstaining as being valuable, and never comes to desire to abstain (Copp 1997
p. 51fn.).
In this case, it seems that the connection between the moral judgment that she makes
and her motivation has been severed, despite the fact that she is good, strong willed,
38

Here Copp’s unique “standard based account” of moral obligation and moral judgment is important.
Whether the agent is good or not is a matter of whether or not she “subscribes to the appropriate moral
standards”, which Carol does, despite the fact that she has the mistaken moral belief that she is obligated
to support the capital punishment. Most of the time one’s moral beliefs and the standards one subscribes
to are lined up, but they do not necessarily have to be (Copp 1995a p. 211).
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and lacks practical irrationality.39 Smith might respond to this example by saying that we
cannot attribute to her the judgment that “abstaining from sex is morally required” in light
of these other facts about her desires and what she values. But if he makes such a
claim, he seems to be assuming part of what his argument is trying to establish, since
the case description of Carol doesn’t sound incoherent or implausible.
In the following chapter I will discuss a related, but wider range of phenomenon
that I am calling forms of “moral indifference” (Zangwill 2008). Cases of moral
indifference are a further way of challenging the reliable connection between moral
judgment and motivation. I will suggest (with Zangwill and others) that moral
indifference is not only present in pathological personality types, like psychopaths, but is
also a common phenomenon among everyday moral agents like you and me. And
indifference thus, serves as a strong counter-example to not only Smith’s argument, but
the general form of the reliable connection argument.
2.3.2 Alternatives to De Dicto Desires
An important part of Smith’s argument against externalism is that externalists’
only way of explaining the reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation
is to posit a de dicto desire to the morally right thing (Smith 1995). Smith argues that
this puts externalists in the position of having to embrace moral fetishism.
Externalists respond with several persuasive arguments that the de dicto desire
account that Smith presents is not the only possible externalist account of the
motivating state that causes the good person (or any person) to act morally.

39

Cuneo also briefly questions the reliability of the connection, suggesting that “one could have some
slight change in moral judgment and experience no change in moral motivation” (Cuneo 1999 p. 371fn.).
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The first suggestion that several externalists have made is that it is plausible to
think that along with de dicto desires to do what is right, good and strong-willed agents
possess a host of other desires that play a motivational role as well. The pluralistic
externalism that I find most persuasive embraces the following defense of a multitude of
desires and affective states that might be the motivation that gets a person to act on
their moral judgments.
Several externalists have pointed out that we have no reason to think that people
have one single motivation for any particular morally good act (here an act includes
refraining from an action) (Cuneo 1999; Svavarsdóttir 2005; Shafer-Landau 2000; Copp
1997; Olson 2002).
A morally good and strong willed person may have a de dicto desire to do the
right thing (which Svavarsdóttir calls the “desire to be moral” and Shafer-Landau calls
“the motive of duty”) and at the same time possess many other morally relevant “direct
desires,” for example, the desire for her friends and family to be happy, the desire for
world peace, the desire to be kind, the desire to be a good friend, or the desire to not
hurt people, etc. (Copp 1997 p. 50; Cuneo 1999 p. 370; Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 158,
285). Olson also points out the possibility of “motivational over-determination” (Olson
2002 p. 91).
All of these desires can remain external to our moral judgment; in that just
because we make a moral judgment does not necessitate that we have one of these
direct desires to act on it. In these cases there is no need to introduce the de dicto
desire to the right thing to explain the reliability of the connection between moral
judgment and motivation.
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It sounds plausible to suggest, as externalists do, that the reason our moral
judgments often motivate us to some extent to act on them is that our moral judgments
connect up in the relevant way with related desires we have.40 It is important to be clear
about how this suggestion differs from internalist accounts of motivation. The
abovementioned suggestions are not the claiming, as internalists do, that once we have
formed a moral judgment, either the moral judgment by itself motivates us to act, or the
moral judgment necessarily causes a desire that motivates us to act.
At the same time this externalist account is not ruling out the possibility that
sometimes we do act on the de dicto desire to do the right thing. What is appealing
about this kind of “motivational over-determination” is that it seems to capture the
concern that someone like Smith has about good and strong willed moral agents being
motivated directly by the objects of moral concern, justice, friendship, and so on. On
this version of externalist explanation this is often the case. But it is not because the
moral judgment necessarily motivates. It is because good and strong-willed agents
possess a host of other desires to promote justice, friendship, etc. It is unlikely that
agents that are not good or strong-willed also possess many of these desires.
Another advantage of this externalist position is that if someone lacks the desire
with the appropriate content (desire to promote the welfare of the poor, for example)
and lacks the de dicto desire to do the right thing, then it is possible that even if he
makes the moral judgment that he ought to help the poor, he may lack any motivation to
help the poor. Thus this kind of pluralism about motivation is consistent with the
phenomenon of moral indifference.

40

How these desires are created is not being addressed here.
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According to Smith however, the presence of any de dicto desire to do the right
thing, even if it is only one motivating desire among many, somehow taints the
goodness of the moral agent or the value of the actions they perform (Olson 2002 p.
91).
To illustrate how odd this result of Smith’s theory is, Copp considers this case:
“[i]f he (Smith) is correct, then no (entirely) good person has this desire [the de dicto
desire to do what is right], not even a good person who is also strong-willed” (Copp
1995 p. 212). The point is that Smith’s account implies that even if a strong-willed
person has a whole host of de re, “direct concerns” for morally relevant things, such as
“justice, honesty, and the well-being of her friends,” if even one de dicto desire is added
to her moral psychology, she no longer qualifies as a good agent (Copp 1995a p. 212).
This seems to be inconsistent with our beliefs about morally good agents. Simply
acquiring a new de dicto desire, while all of an agent’s previous direct concerns remain
intact, cannot be enough to no longer call her a good agent (Copp 1995a p. 212).41
The views that I have just discussed all suggest that we have no reason to think
that an externalist has to say that the good and strong-willed agent (or any agent) has
only one kind of motivation or desire that causes them to do the right thing or be inclined
to do so. Further, that if the de dicto desire to do the right thing, is one among many

41

Copp explains that Smith would probably want to know, in this case, “what would happen to Dena if she
were to acquire a new belief about what she is obligated to do”, to test the reliability of the connection
between judgment and motivation (Copp 1995a p. 212). Would she be motivated by the de dicto desire
“to-do-whatever-she-is-obligated-to-do” or would she have a direct, de re concern for the object of her
new moral obligation? Copp suggests that this might be the way that this agent acquires a new “desire to
do a new thing,” her desire or interest in the object of the new moral obligation could be derivative. It is
very strange to say that this now makes Dena a bad person, or no longer a good person (Copp 1995a p.
212). “Nor does it seem that Dena would have been a better person if she had been able immediately to
acquire a direct and non-derivative desire to do the new thing” (Copp 1995a p. 212-13).
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other morally relevant desires in the agent’s motivational set, then it would be odd for
this to cast any doubt on the agent’s goodness.
The next group of arguments provides further reasons to think that de dicto
desires are not the only explanation for the reliable connection between moral judgment
and motivation that externalists have at their disposal. First, externalists need to use
the de dicto desire to do the right thing to explain the reliable connection in only a very
limited number of cases. Second, I make the case that there are other theories of moral
motivation that do not involve the de dicto desire view at all and are explanatorily
adequate.
Strandberg defends externalism by arguing that it does not necessarily have to
resort to a de dicto desire view to explain the reliable connection in the vast majority of
cases. Strandberg sees Smith’s fetishism argument as posing the following question for
the externalist: “What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral
motivation? [emphasis added]” (Strandberg 2007 p. 250). Strandberg restates the
difference between the de re and de dicto desires in terms of the propositional content
of the desires: “[i]f a person is motivated by a desire de dicto to do what she judges to
be right, her desire has a content that involves the concept of rightness; the concept of
rightness figures as part of the intentional content of her desire” (Strandberg 2007 p.
251). This is exactly what Smith finds objectionable. While the person who is “motivated
by a desire de re to do what she judges to be right, her desire does not have a content
that involves the concept of rightness” (Strandberg 2007 p. 251). That is the account
that Smith and internalists in general are able to give.
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Strandberg offers the following account of one way an externalist can avoid
having to endorse de dicto desires view:
Assume first that the person in question believes that certain features make
actions right. We may for the sake of simplicity call these features F. To illustrate
we may suppose that F consists, among other things, in helping people in need.
Next we may assume she has a desire to perform actions that have these
features F. Externalists can now account for the reliable connection at issue by
assuming that the person in question alters her beliefs as regards what actions
have F (Strandberg 2007 p. 253).
The agent has a belief about what one of the right making features of actions is, that is,
for example, that they help people. What the agent in question is motivated by is the de
re, unmediated desire to help people. At one time she may not be motivated to give to
the homeless because she believes it is not a way to help them, and thus the action
lacks the crucial right making feature. She may believe that it is actually be a way of
harming them, and thus has a wrong making feature instead. If, at a later time, she
changes her mind and comes to believe that giving to the homeless actually does help
them, she will then judge that it is right to give money to the homeless, and she is now
motivated to do this. Now that she believes that giving money to them helps them, she
is motivated to give. This account does not involve the agent ever being motivated by a
de dicto desire to do the right thing. Instead, it is “a desire de re to do what is judged to
be right;” she desires to help people and judges that it is the right thing to do
(Strandberg 2007 p. 253). In this case Smith can have no complaint of fetishism.42
Cuneo makes a related argument; the externalist can analyze the source of the
reliable connection in terms of the concerns that a virtuous person has:

42

Similarly, Cuneo argues that externalists can explain the reliable connection in terms of “a change in
belief” about whether or not a particular action in fact promotes one of the goods she has a de re desire
for and is thus motivated by, in Cuneo’s example it is human flourishing (Cuneo 1999 p. 372).
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The virtuous person possesses a whole constellation of virtues, and hence, a
whole pack of correlative concerns. Thus, when some strong-willed virtuous
agent judges that one or another action is morally obligatory, helpful,
compassionate, etc., that virtuous person is typically motivated to some
appropriate degree or other to take that action because she typically possesses
the requisite concerns with which the content of that judgment can combine in
the right fashion (Cuneo 1999 p. 370).
Virtuous agents have standing concerns about helpfulness, being a good friend,
compassion, and the like, and when they judge that an action has those features, the
features themselves motivate the agent to act accordingly (Cuneo 1999 p. 370).
The objection of an internalist like Smith to these accounts would be that if the
agent changes her mind about what the right making features of actions are, then her
desire to do actions with that feature may not track her change in belief (Strandberg
2007 p. 254).
Strandberg addresses this objection, arguing the agent may have already had a
“pre-existing” desire “to perform actions which have these features,” that is the new
“right-making” feature (Strandberg 2007 p. 255). The agent may believe that the right
making feature of actions is that they respect other people’s autonomy. This same
agent desires to help people and desires to respect people’s autonomy. She believes
that giving money to the homeless is a way of helping people but is inconsistent with
respecting their autonomy. So while she is somewhat motivated to give money to them,
she has a stronger motivation to refrain. Over time, she comes to believe that what
actually makes actions right (or what is more important) is that they help people, rather
than that they respect their autonomy. She then judges that giving to the homeless is
right and is also motivated all things considered to do so, because she had the preexisting motivation to help people. Here externalists do not have to rely on any de dicto
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desires with the content that includes the concept of rightness. If this is not the case
however, and the agent had no pre-existing desire to help people, then externalists may
only be able to explain her new desire to do what she now believes is right in terms of a
de dicto desire (Strandberg 2007 p. 255).43
Dreier proposes a second-order desires externalism, where the second order
desire is the “desire to desire to do whatever is in fact right” (Dreier 2000 p. 623). Dreier
explains the second order desire to desire, as being analogous to having a “maieutic
end.” The idea is that people are capable of choosing their own final ends; “[a] final end
is one that is pursued for its own sake and not merely for the sake of something else”
(Dreier 2000 p. 629). This is possible because of a “maieutic end,” which is “an end
achieved through the process of coming that have other ends” (Dreier 2000 p. 630).
Dreier’s example of pursuing a career in medicine is helpful. If one desires to have a
satisfying career, that is an instrumental end, but it is also a maieutic end. In order to
achieve it you have to adopt some other ends as final ends in themselves:
[One] chooses medicine for this reason, an instrumental end. But once you have
chosen medicine as a career, the goals you have-of relieving suffering, being a
respected member of the medical community, and so forth-are goals you pursue
for their own sakes. Having adopted these goals for one reason, you then
pursue them not for that reason but for reasons internal to the outlook of your
profession (Dreier 2000 p. 630).
Dreier likens maieutic ends to second order desires, “to have a maieutic end is to
desire to have certain ends, or ends of a certain type” (Dreier 2000 p. 630). Applying
this machinery to externalism and the moral case, Dreier argues that the agent who has
a second order desire to “value for their own sake those things that are (or that one
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Of course, Smith will object that the agent can no longer be counted as good (Strandberg 2007, p.
255).
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believes to be) morally right,” might fit with the criterion that Smith thinks a virtuous
agent must meet (Dreier 2000 p. 630).
The two criterion or tests that Smith presents for any externalist model of
motivation are the reliable connection and the avoidance of moral fetishism. Dreier
argues that this kind of moral agent can meet both of those standards. First consider
the reliable connection. If this agent’s (David’s) moral judgments change and he now
believes he is morally obligated to vote for a different political party, he will experience a
reliable change in motivation and likely a change in behavior as well:
David’s motivations will track his changes in moral view, for once he comes to
believe that, say, voting for Social Democrats is right, David’s second order
desire will kick in and he will actually desire to vote for Social Democrats (Dreier
2000 p. 630-31).
The charge of fetishism does not apply here. When Dreier’s imagined virtuous agent
…desires to vote for Social Democrats because (a genuinely causal ‘because’)
he believes that it is right to do so, but once the desire is generated it is not
conditioned on the belief that voting for Social Democrats is right, any more than
out doctor’s desire to cure the sick is conditioned on his belief that medicine
would be a satisfying career (Dreier 2000 p. 631).
Yet the generation of the desire is not necessarily connected to making the moral
judgment that voting for the Social Democrats is right. So this view is distinct from
internalism.
This section has provided some of the alternatives that externalists have to the
pure de dicto desire view of moral motivation. These views are all fairly consistent with
one another. If we take these accounts of externalist alternatives to de dicto desire
motivation to be complimentary rather than competitors, the following picture emerges.
While agents may have de dicto desires to do the right thing, these are not the only
desires that motivate them to act on their moral judgments. Agents have a wide range
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of direct de re desires that relate to their moral judgments. They may have desires for
justice to be realized, the desire to be a good friend, the desire to end the suffering of
others, or for their families to be happy. It is convenient to call these desires, but this
could include a range of propositional attitude types, such as concerns for or caring
about. So I may judge that it is the right thing to do to call my Mom on her birthday. I
believe that calling her on her birthday will make her happy. And I am motivated to call
my mom on her birthday by my desire for my mom to be happy.
This fits well with Strandberg’s suggestion that agents make judgments about
whether or not certain actions have “right making” features or properties. Agents
sometimes judge that an act has a particular right making property, for example, that it
will make someone happy. When we are motivated to act on this judgment it is often
because we have a direct de re desire for those right making properties, we have a
direct de re desire to make people happy.
Another way to think about the relationship between our desires and our moral
judgments is Dreier’s suggestion that we have a second order desire to desire whatever
is morally right. These complimentary accounts of alternatives to the de dicto desire
view add up to a pluralistic externalist picture of motivation that is far more subtle and
has much more explanatory power than Smith and other internalists attribute to
externalism.
2.3.3 Defending De dicto Desires and Embracing Moral Fetishism
It is important to defend de dicto desires because the ultimate account of
externalism that I advocate is a pluralistic account. This view says that de dicto desires
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can and do play a role in our moral psychology, whether or not we are good and strongwilled agents. The pluralistic account stipulates, however, that these are not the only
desires involved.
I will remain ultimately neutral on what it is that makes a good agent morally
good. But Smith engages in that debate when he claims that there is something morally
wrong with “moral fetishism” and that the good agent cannot be motivated by de dicto
desires. A fundamental problem with Smith’s charge of moral fetishism against de dicto
desire views, is his assumption that “the moral desires which motivate a person to act
on a moral belief would have to be what makes a person morally good” (Smith 1994 p.
74-76; Zangwill 2008 p. 148). Smith thinks that the person who is motivated to act on
their moral judgments by the de dicto desire would fail to be a virtuous or morally good
agent. But as Zangwill points out, why should we think that what motivates someone to
do the right thing can make or break them as a good or virtuous agent? Smith would at
least need a separate defense of that substantive moral claim. An agent’s “virtue” or
goodness does not necessarily have to be grounded in the desires that motivate us to
act on our moral judgments (Zangwill 2008 p. 148).
In an effort to keep open the possibilities of what kind of motivation (if any)
determines whether or not an agent is good, I argue against Smith’s condemnation of
moral fetishism. I argue instead that it is perfectly plausible and consistent with much
common sense and philosophical thought about good agents to say that they may be
motivated by de dicto desires to do the right thing.
A more appealing way of thinking of being motivated by a de dicto desire to do
the right thing, is that such an agent is keeping an open mind to the content of morality
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while remaining motivationally committed to acting on whatever morality requires. In fact
this is a characteristic that Socrates’ embodies in the early and middle Platonic
dialogues, if we consider the Iakovos Vasiliou’s contrast between “aiming principles”
and “determining principles”:
An aiming principle tells the agent what overall aim she ought to have in acting,
for example, to do the virtuous action; because this particular aiming principle is
so important to Socrates and Plato, I shall give it a same: ‘the supremacy of
virtue’…By contrast, a determining principle (e.g., a proposed moral rule such as
“Never kill anyone”) would be one that actually determines which action or actiontype is forbidden or required; once you adopt “Never kill anyone” as a principle,
then, at least as far as that principle is concerned, if an action involves killing
someone, it is forbidden…According to Cleitophon, then while Socrates has a
clear answer to an aiming question…he utterly fails to offer answers to
determining questions” (Vasiliou 2008 p. 2-3)[italics added].
Socrates does not claim to have knowledge of determining principles; instead, he
espouses knowledge and adherence to the aiming principle of the supremacy of virtue.
In the Crito, for example, Socrates engages dialectically with Crito, determined to
decide whether he should escape from prison or not by finding out which course of
action is morally better (Plato 2002). Whatever course of action turns out to be the good
action, is the one he will choose. On Vasiliou’s analysis, Socrates, as a virtuous agent,
is committed to the supremacy of virtue. This gives us insight into his motivation:
we know that the agent is motivated to determine what the virtuous or vicious
action is, and base her acting (or not acting) on that ground. Thus when the
agent committed to SV acts, she will refrain from acting viciously because the
action is contrary to virtue and will act virtuously because the action is virtuous
(Vasiliou 2008 p. 43).
In other words, when the virtuous agent does the virtuous thing, the agent is “not acting
for a further end” (Vasiliou 2008 p. 44-5). Thus the virtuous agent’s ultimate aim is to act
virtuously. Eventually, Vasiliou gives an account of the source of this motivational
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commitment to “put[ting] virtue above all”, one that I will not go into here (Vasiliou 2008,
p. 44-5).
I cautiously suggest that one way to think of the aiming principle is akin to a de
dicto desire to do the right thing. Smith charges that the person who is motivated to
behave morally solely out of some kind of a desire to do the right thing is morally flawed.
If my translation of aiming principle/supremacy of virtue into a de dicto desire to do the
right thing is defensible, then Smith would have to reject Socrates as a virtuous agent,
as well as Platonic notions of the relationship between virtue and motivation. Surely,
the fact that Socrates, presumptively a paradigm of a moral agent, seems to be
motivated in this way should lead us to question Smith’s assumption. My appeal to
Socrates and Plato is not meant to be a mere appeal to authority to lend credence to
this defense of externalism. But it does seem that there are perfectly plausible ways of
understanding ideal moral agents that include motivation on the basis of de dicto
desires to do what is right.
Olson also argues that there are situations in which “desires de dicto to do what
is right, because it is right, seem to be reasonable as well as morally preferable” (Olson
2002 p. 92). One of the cases he presents he calls the “freedom of expression” case, in
which a person is a strong supporter of freedom of expression because he believes it is
morally right (Olson 2002 p. 93). The agent defends a Holocaust denier’s (“history
revisionist’s”) right to speak and publish on views that the agent in question finds
morally abhorrent. So he is not motivated by the de re desire to let this person speak
their mind. Instead what he cares about is the rightness of freedom of speech, on
Olson’s analysis:
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This person is more likely to say that he cares about freedom of expression also
qua its rightness…he may have strong de re desires that such opinions shouldn’t
be voiced, the ‘history revisionist’ should have his right to speak his mind
because it is right that he should have that right…Rightness thus figures as a
dominant part of the intentional object of his desire. It would be odd to say that
such a de dicto desire would make this person morally flawed…it serves to make
his position understandable and reasonable… (Olson 2002 p. 93).
The reason that the moral agent in this case is motivated to defend the history
revisionist’s right to speak is that he has the de dicto desire to do what is right, and in
this case, defending free speech is right.
Another reason for thinking that de dicto desires to do the right thing may be a
morally valuable part of an agent’s moral psychology is that sometimes it may be that
the de dicto desire to be moral is what motivates the agent to act in cases where the
demands of morality are in conflict with other desires we have, especially the desire to
act in our self-interest. Shafer-Landau writes, “…we can see the motive of duty as a
special sort of standing desire, one that serves as a limiting condition on the formation
of other desires” (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 286).
Olson credits J. H. Sobel (in an unpublished manuscript) with making a similar
point; ordinary moral agents, as opposed to ideal moral agents, are probably frequently
motivated by de dicto desires to the do the right thing. These desires, he says, are
“somewhere in the back of [the agent’s] head” and may “function as a kind of safety
device when [the agent’s] de re concerns are (momentarily) not sufficient to provide
motivation to act” (Olson 2002 p. 92). Reversing Smith’s charge of moral fetishism
against the agent who is motivated by de dicto instead of de re desires, Olson suggests
that it would be odd, and perhaps even morally undesirable for an agent to have no
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concern (de dicto concern, that is) “about the moral rightness (wrongness) of her
actions” (Olson 2002 p. 92).44
Before concluding this defense of de dicto desires, it is important to consider a
related point made by Shafer-Landau. Some internalists point to the phenomenology of
moral motivation to suggest that de dicto desires are not the motivating force behind
good actions in the good and strong willed agent. They claim “we can tell from simple
introspection that many of our motivated moral actions are unaccompanied by such a
desire” (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 159, 285). Internalists claim that when we reflect on our
own case we do not find that we are motivated by the motive of duty or the desire to be
moral read de dicto.
Shafer-Landau rightly points out first, we can certainly be mistaken about what
desires we have. We have no reason to think that we have perfect access to what our
desires and motivations are. We shouldn’t think that all of the desires that cause us to
act in particular ways have a “distinctive ‘feel’ at all” (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 286). We
have many “standing desires such as the desire to have a successful career, to have
healthy parents, to avoid giving offense…” (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 286). These are
desires that we may not consciously reflect on very much at all. So it makes sense that
we can have the standing desire to be moral without it jumping out on introspection
(Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 286). Desires do not have to be the hot passions, instead “one
may possess…desires without at every moment being aware of them” (Shafer-Landau
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If the externalist does embrace what Shafer-Landau calls the “motive of duty” and what Smith calls the
de de dicto desire to be moral as the favored explanation of the relationship between moral judgment and
motivation, they still face the challenge of explaining why the presence of this desire is as widespread as
it is. Shafer-Landau suggests that externalists have at least four options: innatism, socialization, selfcreation and a hybrid account (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 159).
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2003 p. 158). In fact, if one takes desires to be functionally defined, an agent may have
many desires that he or she is never aware she has.
The arguments given above are intended to make two main points. First,
possessing and being motivated by de dicto desires to do the right thing is at least not
morally objectionable, and at best, a morally praiseworthy characteristic. The example
of Socrates is meant to show that there are plausible and widely respected accounts of
moral motivation that do not necessarily involve de re concern for the objects of morality
without being fetishistic. Olson’s account of the free speech supporter also lends
credibility to the notion that the de dicto desire to do the right thing is sometimes a
virtue.
Second, Olson and Shafer-Landau’s characterization of the de dicto desire to do
the right thing as a background desire or limiting condition on the formation of other
desires contributes to a picture of how a pluralistic externalist can incorporate nonfetishistic de dicto desires into their moral psychology. This defense of the de dicto
desire to be moral fits with the most plausible version of externalism, pluralistic
externalism.
3. Two Kinds of Externalism
Very broadly, motivation judgment externalism comes in two species. For both
kinds of motivational judgment externalism, moral judgments are primarily expressions
of beliefs, so they must be coupled with some kind of conative state in order to result in
a motivation to act on them. What separates the first kind of externalism from the
second is that in the first kind, the “conceptual content” of the “conative attitudes” “does
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not involve moral concepts” (Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 167). The conative state posited by
this first kind of motivational judgment externalism is usually an emotion, like sympathy
or compassion (Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 167). I will refer to this type of externalism, after
Zangwill, as no-moral content externalism. The second type of motivational judgment
externalism, embraced by Svavarsdóttir and Zangwill, suggests that in order for moral
judgment to motivate, it must be coupled with a conative state that does involve a moral
concept or some moral content (Svavarsdóttir 1999; Zangwill 2003). For some
externalists, this state is simply the desire to be moral (Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 170). Let
us call this second kind of externalism, moral content externalism (Zangwill 2003).
Brink’s externalism is a version of no-moral content externalism. He makes the
important point that to a large extent people are motivated by their moral judgments
because of both the beliefs and desires that the particular agent has and the moral
theory that the agent endorses (Brink 1989 p. 49). He goes on to say that if the agent
endorses a moral theory, for example, that emphasizes “the other-regarding character
of many moral demands” then what may motivate this agent to act on his moral
judgment is the experience of sympathy for his fellow man (Brink 1989 p. 49). Brink’s
take on externalism seems to exclude the possibility of the motivating force of a desire
with moral content, like a desire to do the right thing. Brink writes that “[e]xternalism
claims that the motivational force and rationality of moral considerations depend upon
factors which are external to the moral considerations themselves” (Brink 1989 p. 28).
Brink’s characterization of externalism seems too strong. Just because there is
an external and contingent connection between the moral judgment and the motivation
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to act on it, this doesn’t have to mean that the motivation to act on moral judgments
cannot contain any moral considerations (Zangwill 2003 p. 145).
Boyd’s externalism also seems to be a kind of no-moral content externalism.
Boyd agrees with Brink in that he claims that the moral theory that one endorses
determines what will motivate an agent to act on their moral judgments (Boyd 1988 p.
186). Boyd ties motivation directly to the substantive moral theory that he defends:
homeostatic consequentialism (Boyd 1988 p. 216). Boyd argues that moral goodness
is tied to promoting a cluster of goods that “satisfy important human needs,” such as
physical well-being, health, love, companionship, cooperation, autonomy, intellectual
work, etc. (Boyd 1988 p. 203). The intimate connection between making a moral
judgment and having a motivation to act on it, can then be partially explained, according
to Boyd, because human beings will “naturally prefer” actions and characters that
promote these human goods (Boyd 1988 p. 215). Boyd thinks that sympathy, for
example, provides a powerful explanation for why we care about other people achieving
human goods (Boyd 1988 p. 215). It seems right to think that we have some desires to
support actions and characters that promote important human goods. But Boyd’s
externalism also seems incomplete in that he does not address situations in which an
agent lacks sympathy for the person positively affected by his actions, but does the right
thing despite this. Nor does he address cases in which we have moral obligations that
sympathy is inapplicable to, for example, moral obligations that we might have to
ourselves or moral obligations that we might have towards the natural environment.
Zangwill’s externalism serves as an example of the alternative kind of
externalism, moral-content externalism. On this view moral motivation comes from a
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distinct kind of desire, a desire with moral content. Zangwill argues that externalism
should be framed in terms of “the representational content of propositional attitudes”
(Zangwill 2003 p. 144). Those propositional attitudes could be either “cognitive or noncognitive” (Zangwill 2003). If externalists use this language they can maintain that
moral judgments are beliefs. In other words, externalists can claim that moral judgments
are cognitive and have “realistic moral content… that is content that represent mindindependent moral states of affairs” (Zangwill 2003 p. 144).
At the same time, the externalist can say that “we also have non-cognitive states
with realistic moral content-consider guilt, remorse, and the feeling of moral horror”
(Zangwill 2003 p. 144). So Zangwill introduces two sets of propositional attitudes, those
that make up our moral judgments and our motivating moral desires. When we are
motivated to act on a moral judgment, it is because we also have an “independent
desire” that also has moral content. The content of the desire that motivates us:
…represents a mind-independent moral state of affairs, where a moral state of
affairs is the instantiation of a moral property by something. The motivating
desire is the desire to do the morally preferable thing-or perhaps to do the right
thing (Zangwill 2003 p. 144).45
Zangwill rejects versions of externalism like Brink’s and Boyd’s, which claim that
“desires with non-moral content,” like sympathy or benevolence are the sources of
moral motivation, views. Zangwill has a clear explanation, consistent with the Humean
theory of motivation about how moral actions are produced. Both the agent’s belief (her
moral judgment) and her desire share the same or similar moral content (Zangwill 2003
p. 147).
“Moral motivation, on this view, is a matter, first, of believing that some act of ours would have the
property of being morally better than some alternative, plus second, there is an independent desire to do
actions with that property” (Zangwill 2003 p. 144).
45
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Zangwill’s moral content externalism, what motivates us to act on our moral
judgments is a distinctively moral desire. This desire is not moral in the sense that it is
the only desire that is morally praiseworthy. Instead, it is distinctively moral in terms of
its representational content. Zangwill calls non-moral desires that spring from empathy
or compassion, “altruistic motivation[s]” (Zangwill 2003 p. 147).
… the distinction between moral and altruistic motivation, between our concern
with duty and our concern with the welfare of others. Some actions are indeed
motivated by sympathy and benevolence, but Kant was right to insist that "acting
out of duty" or moral motivation is quite different. To describe actions that are
motivated by duty or moral goodness as motivated by sympathy or benevolence
is intuitively inaccurate. […]The difference lies in the contents of the desires: one
employs moral concepts, the other does not. The person motivated by duty has
the thought "It is morally good that I do this thing," whereas the person motivated
by altruism has the thought "So and so needs such and such." Altruistic acts are
not done for the sake of duty, but for the sake of others. Acting out of altruism is
one thing acting “out of duty” is another” (Zangwill 2003 p. 147).
Both kinds of desires could motivate the same action, for example, an agent
gives to charity. It could be that the agent formed the belief with the content that giving
to charity is their duty and had the desire to do their duty (a desire with moral content).
At the same time the agent might feel compassion for the hungry children (a non-moral
desire, according to Zangwill).
Despite Zangwill’s recognition that both forms of motivation can be operating in
an agent at the same time, and without giving one privileged status as being more
morally praiseworthy, Zangwill sharply distinguishes between these two types of
motivation: altruistic motivation is not a kind of moral motivation. It is clear from the
above quoted passage that Zangwill takes Kant’s distinction between the motive of duty
and compassion and other inclinations that motivate us to be moral to be quite a
significant one.
114

Recall that on Smith’s view, the only kind of motivation that a virtuous agent
could act on is the direct concern for the objects of morality (a de re desire). On
Zangwill’s view, that is called altruistic motivation. While Zangwill does not say that it is
not virtuous to act on altruistic motivation, he does say that it is not moral motivation.
Zangwill however, does not provide a reason for restricting the scope of moral
motivation in this way. The pluralistic externalism that I defend can embrace both what
Zangwill calls altruistic motivation and a host of desires with moral content all as forms
of moral motivation.
3.1 Desiderata for Externalism
After getting a sense of both of the major strains of externalism, it is important to
ask: What do we want from our view of the relationship between moral motivation and
moral judgment? What features will the most plausible version of motivational judgment
externalism have to have? I suggest three desiderata for the best theory of externalism.
First, externalism should be able capture the subtle complexity of moral
motivation, making the first desideratum for externalism flexibility. Externalism should
account for the appearance of a reliable connection between changes in judgment and
changes in motivation and behavior on which Smith builds his internalism. When we
change our minds about what the right thing to do is, we often also experience a change
in motivation and a change in behavioral tendencies.
At the same time, externalism must be able to capture the darker side of our
moral lives that is the reality of a range of forms of moral indifference and amoralism.
This includes the variety in levels of motivation that obtain when competing different
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agents, for example, you and I may share the same moral judgment that eating meat is
wrong, but this moral judgment provides me with very strong motivation to abstain from
eating it, while it provides you with only a weak motivation to abstain. But this variation
can also be found within a single agent over time. There are also a variety of ways in
which motivation to do the right thing can be destroyed under certain kinds of
psychological stress and under pressure from competing desires (see Shafer-Landau
2003 p. 1460). Most controversially, externalism should be able to accommodate the
existence of agents who systematically fail to be motivated by their moral judgments
(Further examination of this variability will be undertaken in Chapter 3).
The second desideratum for externalism is the empirical constraint. Unlike many
internalists, who generally argue for their position based on a priori and conceptual
analysis of moral judgment, the externalist analysis of moral judgment presents itself as
contingent fact about human moral psychology and moral discourse. Arguments for
motivational judgment externalism are often presented as inferences to the best
explanation. If externalists are to be consistent with their criticisms of internalism for
focusing solely on conceptual a priori analysis, they must not neglect empirical
constraints themselves. So the second characteristic externalism must have is it must
be the one that fits best empirical evidence, taken from psychology, cognitive science
and neuroscience, about the relationship between beliefs, and motivation.
The best version of externalism should not include a view or make assumptions
about what make a good agent good, or morally praiseworthy, this is the neutrality
constraint. This question should be left as open as possible, because we want a theory
of moral psychology and motivation that can fit with a variety of normative theories
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about what makes someone virtuous, etc. First order normative theory may side with
Kant that an action is only morally praiseworthy if it is produced by the good will, and
done out of respect for the moral law or it may side with Mill and other
consequentialists, that an action’s moral worth is the same irrespective of the agent's
motivation for performing it. It is better is externalism remains neutral on this issue
because these are in principle two distinct questions: how does morality motivate us
and how should morality motivate us? The third desiderata is thus normative neutrality.
3.2 Pluralistic Externalism
The version of externalism that best fits these conditions, the flexibility condition,
the empirical evidence condition, and the neutrality condition is a pluralistic or hybrid
externalism. It is a pluralistic in that it embraces a range of kinds motivations. It does
not assume that there is one dominant or uniform type of interaction between these
mental states. Being motivated to act on one’s moral judgments is a contingent matter.
Pluralistic externalism provides sufficient conditions for being motivated to act on one’s
moral judgment; it does not provide necessary conditions for being motivated to act on
one’s moral judgment. The pluralistic view can embrace both Zangwill’s and
Svavarsdóttir’s style of externalism, as well as Brink’s and Boyd’s. For example, on the
pluralistic view, sometimes an agent may be motivated by the de dicto desire to do the
right thing. Other times, it may be that the agent’s sympathy for another person causes
them to act on their moral judgment.
In this way, pluralistic externalism is close to Mill’s account of the motivations that
people have to be moral (Mill 1863). The external sanctions include fear of punishment
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and hope for reward, from other people and God, fear of social ostracism, and the
“sympathy and affection” that we feel for our fellow human beings (Mill 1863). Mill urges
that feelings of sympathy and “unity with our fellow creatures” should be inculcated
through education (Mill 1863). The internal motivation to be moral is also a mental
state, but it is not sympathy. Instead it is:
…a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation
of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious
cases, shrinking from it as an impossibility (Mill 1863 p. 28).
This kind of motivation is contingent; “[u]ndoubtedly this sanction has no binding
efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to (Mill 1863 p. 29).
On the pluralistic account an agent may be motivated by the de dicto desire to do
the right thing. This is a standing or background desire. An agent may also have direct
desires or concerns for other morally relevant objects like, being a good friend, the
happiness of other people, or global justice. These desires or concerns may also
provide them with motivation to act on their moral judgments. There may also be a
relationship between making a moral judgment and then acquiring a desire to promote
the things that one judges to be morally right.
Pluralistic externalism best fulfills the three desiderata for externalism. The first
part of the flexibility condition is meeting a standard close to Smith’s reliable connection
standard. It does surprise us when other people espouse a moral view and then claim
they have no motivation to act on that view. This is easily explained on pluralistic
externalism. There are many different ways people can be motivated to act on their
moral judgments, so they often do have some motivation to act on them, whether they
are motivated by the desire to do the right thing, empathy or some other concern. The
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other side of the flexibility condition is that externalism must capture the observation of
variable motivation in one agent at different times, in different agents, the way
motivation can be snuffed out and the existence of the morally indifferent. Pluralistic
externalism can also accommodate these complications, as a form of externalism, the
theory says that it is perfectly possible for an agent to make a moral judgment and fail to
be motivated by it.
Pluralistic externalism has the best prospects of meeting the empirical evidence
condition. We know that people who have diminished empathy and other affective
limitations have trouble acting on their moral judgments, even when there is some
evidence that they seem to make the same moral judgments that the rest of us make.
We also know that empathy, sympathy, and compassion can sometimes lead people to
act against what they judge to be morally required of them. Most importantly, pluralistic
externalism is best equipped to meet the empirical evidence condition because it
embraces its status as an a posteriori view that is open to amendment.
Pluralistic externalism best meets the neutrality condition because it does not
build into its content, the way that Smith or Zangwill do any judgments about what a
uniquely “moral” in the sense of morally good or praiseworthy motivation is. Pluralistic
externalism aims to be a purely descriptive theory and can remain compatible with a
variety of normative ethical theories about motivation.
For example, on some interpretations of Kant, acting on the good will is the only
type of moral motivation that can confer morally praiseworthiness on an action. Kant
explicitly says that in reality it is very difficult to know whether there ever are any truly
morally praiseworthy actions.
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In fact there is absolutely no possibility by means of experience to make out with
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action that may in
other respects conform to duty has rested solely on moral grounds and on the
representation of one’s duty…We like to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a
more noble motive; but in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination,
completely plumb the depths of the secret incentives of our actions (Kant
1785/2012 Sect. 2, Par. 407).
Versions of externalism that stipulate up front what kind of motivation the good agent
has, or what kind of motivation is moral motivation disallow for this kind of uncertainty.
What I take to be a strength of pluralistic moral judgment externalism, some
would argue is a weakness. A possible objection to pluralistic externalism may be that it
allows for too many motivations, even selfish ones to count as ‘moral’ motivation. The
question arises, does pluralistic externalism need to be able to distinguish desires that
motivate a person to do the right thing from desires that motivate a person to do what
happens to be the right thing to do?
It seems that being motivated to act on one’s moral judgments is not the same
thing as just having a moral judgment and also having a motivation that leads one to do
the same action that the moral judgment would prescribe. For example, someone might
believe that the right thing to do is to help an old lady cross the street. He lacks any
empathy for the old lady, does not have a desire to ease human suffering (or any like
desire), and does not have a desire to do the right thing, qua the right thing. Instead, he
has a desire for a reward. He believes that if he helps the old lady cross the street she
is likely to give him a reward. So this agent is certainly motivated to help the old lady
cross the street. He also believes that this is the right thing to do. But he does not seem
to have moral motivation; he is not motivated to act on his moral judgment. He is exactly
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the sort of person that internalists have to explain away because he is exhibiting a form
of moral indifference or amoralism.
An explanation of the difference between moral motivation and this agent’s
motivation cannot merely rely on the counter-factual claim that in this case, if the agent
did not make the moral judgment ‘helping the old lady cross the street is the right thing
to do,’ he would still be motivated to help the old lady cross the street. This explanation
does not help. This is because the same thing could be said about motivations based
on compassion, or a direct desire to ease the suffering of others, and those are
motivations that pluralistic externalism counts as moral motivations. We could ask, if the
compassionate individual didn’t make the moral judgment, ‘helping the old lady cross
the street is the right thing to do,’ would they still have helped the old lady cross the
street? The answer to this question may very well be, yes they would have. This does
not seem like the appropriate grounds on which to say that they weren’t acting on a
“moral motivation.” If I were to adopt the view that the only motivations that count as
distinctly moral are those that are desires with moral content, this puzzle could be
avoided. This is not a puzzle that I can respond to here, except to repeat that this is an
issue for first order normative theory.46
Zangwill raises a related objection to his own view:
Objection (b): If actions are always the result of desires in addition to beliefs, then
they are motivated by selfish considerations. But moral and selfish motivations
are diametrically opposed. So the motivating force of moral judgments cannot be
external to them (Zangwill 2003 p. 145).
Zangwill responds to this objection by pointing out that externalism does not entail
psychological egoism, the view that people are only ever, at bottom motivated by self46

However, I am not arguing that metaethics and moral psychology can take a completely Archimedean
perspective on the rest of ethics.
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interest. Of course, I agree with Zangwill on that point. Psychological egoism is a
notoriously difficult position to defend, as it makes the sweeping claim that all of our
desires are self-interested, rather than being directed at the well-being of others, for
example.
4. Conclusion
In Chapter 1 I introduced a set of five claims that moral realists make. Defending
naturalist moral realism against the internalism objection and arguing for motivational
judgment externalism helps to secure for the moral realist claim (3), that is,
psychological cognitivism, the claim that moral judgments are beliefs. In this chapter
moral realism was defended against the internalism objection in several ways: first, by
undermining the considerations in favor of internalism. Second, the chapter posed an
independent argument against internalism. And third, I presented a plausible version of
externalism, pluralistic externalism that can adequately meet the challenges that
internalism raises. In the following chapter I will present another independent argument
against internalism, the argument from moral indifference.
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Chapter 3: Moral Indifference and Amoralism
The morally indifferent are those who whether globally, locally, permanently or
impermanently do not “car[e] very much about the demands of morality” (Zangwill 2008
p. 101).47 Characters exhibiting a wide range of forms of moral indifference pose
problems both for internalism about moral motivation, and non-cognitivism more
generally.48 The morally indifferent play a significant role in arguments against
internalism, because they seem to be able to make the same moral judgments that
morally deferential people do, without having any corresponding motivation to act on
those judgments. Thus at their strongest, the morally indifferent present a central
counter-example to the internalist’s claim that there is a necessary, essential, or
inherent connection between moral judgment and motivation.
The morally indifferent also pose a problem for some non-cognitivist theories of
moral thought. This is because non-cogntivists generally characterize moral judgments
as conative or affective states, which are usually taken to be inherently motivational
states. If the morally indifferent can make a moral judgment without having the
corresponding motivation, then this casts doubt on the notion that moral judgments are
conative states.
Cognitivists who are also externalists can give a more straightforward
explanation of the morally indifferent than anyone else can. On externalism, the moral
judgment itself does not motivate the agent to act; instead, it is some appropriately
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Stefan Baumrin, in “Moral Blindness,” argues that moral philosophers have by and large failed to put
sufficient effort into explaining cases of gross failure to act morally or make the right moral condemnation
of those who act in a grossly immoral fashion (Baumrin 1986).
48
In the previous chapter I focused on the weak appraiser form of motivational judgment internalism. So
in this chapter I use the term ‘internalism’ to refer to the ‘weak appraiser form of motivational judgment.’
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related contative state, like a desire, that motivates. The relationship between the moral
judgment and the motivation is a contingent one. On this view, moral indifference
occurs anytime the appropriate conative state is missing or fails to connect to the moral
judgment in the relevant way.49
In the previous chapter, I suggested that my proposed version of externalism,
pluralistic externalism, has advantages over internalism, as well as over other more
narrowly conceived forms of externalism. The fact that we are often motivated to act on
our moral judgments is a purely contingent matter. The view is pluralistic in at least two
ways. It does not assume that there is one dominant or uniform type of interaction
between moral judgments and moral motivation. Nor does it stipulate that only certain
kinds of conative states motivate people to act on their moral judgments. For example,
on the pluralistic view, sometimes an agent may be motivated by the desire to do the
right thing. Other times, it may be that the agent’s sympathy for another person causes
them to act on their moral judgment. In other words, pluralistic externalism provides
sufficient conditions for being motivated to act on one’s moral judgment but it does not
provide necessary conditions for being motivated to act on one’s moral judgment.
Because on this view agents are motivated to act on their moral judgments by a
wide variety of sources, there are also a great many ways this motivational system may
fail to function. Without a necessary, essential, or inherent connection between moral
judgment and motivation, failures of motivation are much easier to explain. And if we
grant pluralistic externalism, the range of possible explanations for motivational failures
is wide open. For example, an agent may lack the desire to do the right thing in general
49

The externalist who is also moral realist also has the unique advantage when it comes to explaining
amoralism, in that they can give a better account of the nature of the disagreement between the moralist
and the amoralist (Brink 1989 p. 85).
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or in a particular case, or an agent might not desire something more specific, like the
well-being of her friend in a particular situation. Some agents are highly motivated by
their moral judgments and others are only motivated a little or not at all because they
have different psychologies.
In this chapter I will first present a brief taxonomy of some of the major forms of
moral indifference and explain the role that they each play in arguments for externalism
and against internalism. In the following section I will move from the most extreme case
of moral indifference, amoralism, to the most mundane, everyday cases of occasional
amoralism and diversity in levels of moral motivation. I also include a brief section on
depression and listlessness. Although I discuss the amoralist, depression, and
listlessness, along with others, I stress that moral indifference should not be understood
as an exotic phenomenon found only in psychopathic serial killers or suicidally
depressed. Instead, it is commonplace. I suggest that moral indifference might actually
be the majority of our moral experience, rather than the exceptional case.
Second, I will explain how internalists have defended their view against
objections based on moral indifference and amoralism. The basic internalist strategy is
to come up with an alternative explanation of the morally indifferent. The most popular
strategy is to suggest that the externalist presents a distorted picture of what the morally
indifferent are doing when they make a moral judgment (construed either as a mental
act or a verbal act). I will assess the internalist responses, finding them lacking on
grounds specific to each argument, as well as on the general grounds that they fail to
meet the standard of giving independent support-an independent reason to believetheir reinterpretation of the cases of moral indifference. Finally, I revisit pluralistic
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externalism and provide some reasons why it has a straightforward explanation of moral
indifference.
1. A Brief Taxonomy of Moral Indifference
1.1 Amoralism
Because for the amoralist, the necessary connection between moral judgment
and motivation has been severed, externalists cite the amoralist as evidence against
internalism. The amoralist is not dissuaded from performing an action by the fact that he
judges that the action is morally wrong. An amoralist is different from someone who just
does the wrong thing, occasionally, or even consistently, someone we might call a bad
person. Such a person might simply have very strong counter-veiling motivations that
always or often outweigh the motivation he has to act on his moral judgment. A bad
person might have a host of false beliefs about, either what their circumstances are, or
about what the consequences of their actions will be, or about what the right thing to do
actually is.
The amoralist, on the other hand is not motivated by his moral judgments at all.
Amoralists do not necessarily, although they might, engage in a lifetime of immoral
behavior. For instance, we can imagine, or may perhaps know someone, who behaves
morally as long as doing the right thing is consistent with their prudential interests.
However, when morality and prudence diverge, this person does the prudential action.
All along this agent hasn’t been motivated to act on his moral judgments; he has been
motivated only to act on his prudential judgments, which happen to coincide with
morality. It seems that not only can we imagine an amoralist, but we also have
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evidence to suggest that such people exist. How the behavior and utterances of
amoralists should be interpreted plays a role in a wide range of metaethical debates.50
Peter Railton’s case of Roger, the “sensible cad,” is a good example of an
amoralist, who can make moral judgments in a reliable and seemingly normative way
but is not motivated by them.51 Roger is a charming and attractive man who works in an
office. He sleeps with many of the women in his workplace and then leaves them. When
he is criticized by his colleagues, Roger explains his behavior to his co-workers in the
following way: “Look, we’re all grownups—they know what they’re doing. I never force
myself on anyone-that just turns me off” (Railton 2009 p. 170). The boss in this office is
Fred, who has been “putting a lot of pressure on an attractive new secretary, Marisha,
to go out with him, and she’s begun to yield,” something he has done before (Railton
2009 p. 170). Roger joins in the following water-cooler conversation about the
relationship developing between Fred and Marisha:
‘…Marisha wouldn’t have anything to do with Fred if he weren’t her boss and
putting all kinds of pressure on her. When someone with direct power over you
puts moves on you, it’s got to be harassment.’ Instantly Roger is challenged ad
hominen…Roger rejoins. ‘I never have any personal power or official authority
over the women I go out with. And I don’t want any. What would be the fun in
that? Like I say, coercion is a turn-off. Except maybe for jerks like Fred. What
Fred’s doing is harassment because he’s got the power to hire or fire her,’ he
continues. ‘Yes isn’t yes in a case like that. But don’t think that you’ll do Marisha
any favor by reporting it. Believe me, I know this place. You’ll just get her in
trouble.’ A co-worker is put off by the cad’s unfeeling tone. ‘So you’re happy with
just letting this go on, knowing that it’s harassment?’ ‘I’m neither happy nor
unhappy,’ he replies. ‘It’s nothing to me. For losers like Fred, harassment is the
only way to get to first base. But if Marisha’s as smart as I think she is, she
knows this, and she’ll play him for all he’s worth’ (Railton 2009 p. 170).
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Non-cognitvists of all stripes often cite the moral psychology of amoralists as evidence for the close
connection between having the right sentiments and doing the right thing. See (Prinz 2007; Nichols
2002).
51
Also see Zangwill’s mercenary, and Svarsdottir’s Patrick, the moral cynic (Zangwill 2008 p. 106;
Svavarsdóttir 1999).
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As Railton presents the case, Roger is not misusing moral language. Roger is sincere
in saying what he thinks and feels. He seems to understand the term ‘sexual
harassment’ well and why it is wrong. Roger is able to speak in an authoritative way
about moral issues. He can make arguments and has facility with moral concepts.
Roger does not sexually harass women, but this is not because of moral concerns, he
just does not enjoy it.
Roger provides a useful characterization of an amoralist because he does not
behave in an overtly immoral manner and he seems to have a clear grasp of moral
concepts, and is even at times, morally insightful. Given this characterization we have
no reason not to think that Roger makes moral judgments. Despite this, Roger seems
to fail to be motivated by his moral judgments. Whether or not people like Roger exist in
reality, we can certainly conceive of such people. Thus Roger and others like him are
counter-examples to the view that there is a necessary connection between moral
judgments and motivation, internalism.
1.2 The Occasional Amoralist
Amoralists conjure up images of people who are evil and do very bad things. But
an amoralist does not have to be someone who always fails to be motivated by their
moral judgments or someone who fails to be motivated by their moral judgments in
dramatic or extreme moral situations. Individual instances of amoralism may also exist
in a single person. In order to bolster the argument against internalism, as ShaferLandau writes, “[w]e need defend only the conceptual possibility of an agent who on a
single occasion fails to be motivated by a moral judgment that he endorses…the moral
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indifference we assign such a person needn’t be systemic” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p.
145). Shafer-Landau canvasses several cases to help us imagine under what
circumstances this could occur.52
Some moral demands, may be so strenuous and difficult to fulfill that the agent
loses all of their motivation to comply with them, yet continues to judge that he or she is
behaving immorally by failing to comply: “[a] sincere prediction of futility may be
sufficient to entirely sap one’s motivation for carrying through…such a prediction does
not appear to entail revocation of the value judgment” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 149).
This is certainly the case when it comes to the accomplishment of non-moral goals. We
may be initially motivated to work to achieve a goal, but as it becomes apparent that
there is a high probability that we will not succeed, our motivation begins to wane and
sometimes disappears entirely. Shafer-Landau suggests we have no reason to think
that moral goals would be any different. Similarly, there is the cynical agent who makes
the moral judgment that she ought to donate to famine relief, for example. But she also
believes that since no one else is doing the same thing, her own efforts are pointless
and thus loses all motivation to give to famine relief (Björnsson 2002 p. 339).
Second, in cases where prudence is at odds with the demands of morality, that is
doing the right thing involves great personal sacrifice, an agent may lose all motivation
to comply with his or her moral judgment (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 149). For example,
imagine a soldier who is ordered to go to the front lines of a battle where he is very
likely to be killed. His fear of death may snuff out his motivation to go to the front lines
and instead he might desert. He may still judge himself a coward. This judgment reveals
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Shafer-Landau takes it to be a virtue of his cases that they are “neutral as between Humean and antiHumean assumptions about moral judgment” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 149).
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that he continues to hold that the morally right thing to do, his duty, is to join his fellow
soldiers on the front lines (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 150).
Third is the freshman philosophy student who is fully persuaded by ethical
relativism.
Imagine an introductory philosophy student who has become convinced of the
truth of a sort of ethical relativism. She believes that the ultimate moral standard
comprises the fundamental mores of the society in which an action is performed.
Armed with this view of morality, she issues certain moral judgments that she
takes to be correct. But she is alienated from her society…she finds much of the
prevailing cultural code amendable, she rejects a strand. She is voicing what she
takes to be the moral truth, yet is unmoved (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 150).
Copp’s case of Alice is similar in that the overall moral system that she believes in
yields a particular moral judgment that she fails to be motivated by (Copp 1995). Alice
is a divine command theorist, she believes that right and wrong are “determined by the
commands of God”(Copp 1995 p. 190-1). Part of her conception of God is that of a
“vengeful ruler” who endorses the dictum “an eye for an eye,” as a result of this
conception of God:
Alice believes that capital punishment is obligatory in cases of murder and she
believes she has an obligation to support capital punishment. But she is deeply
compassionate, and she is quite out of sympathy with what she takes to be
God’s vengefulness. Because of her compassion she is not motivated in the
least to support capital punishment. She is in fact active in opposing it, even
though she believes she is morally forbidden to do so (Copp 1995 p. 190-91).
Shafer-Landau’s fourth example is the case of the moral outsider. This person
used to make moral judgments like the rest of us and be accordingly motivated. “But
something awful happens to this person, causing her to reassess her attachment to
morality…she no longer feels compelled to ‘play that game’” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p.
151). Although this person continues to make the same moral judgments that she has
been making her whole life, she is now detached or alienated from morality in the sense
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that she no longer “gives any sort of priority to moral demands” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p.
151).53
1.3 Diversity in Moral Motivation
You and I may both judge that it is morally wrong to eat meat. This might give
you a strong motivation to abstain from it, while it gives me only a weak motivation to
abstain from eating it. There is wide variation between individuals in the degree of
motivation that they have even while making the same moral judgment.
On a more general level, moral concerns might motivate me to a greater extent
across my lifespan, than they motivate someone else, even though we share most core
moral beliefs (Zangwill 2008 p. 101). In other words, morality might play a greater role
motivational role in one person’s life than another’s. This is not the claim that different
individuals have competing desires and will therefore not always end up acting on their
moral motivations to the same extent or in the same situations. That is very likely true,
but probably not enough to explain the phenomenon. Instead, the objection is that the
force of the motivation that the moral judgment provides seems to be stronger in some
people than others.
Moral judgments can also have a varying degree of motivational force in one
individual across time (Zangwill 2008 p. 101). Zangwill’s mundane example is that
when he first wakes up in the morning, before having his coffee, he holds all of the
53

Russ Shafer-Landau: “externalists claim that the connection between holding a moral judgment and
being motivated is a contingent one…contingent on a person’s psychological make-up and on the
perceived content of moral demands” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 151). The case of futility, the conflict with
prudence and the freshman relativist are cases in which the “perceived content of moral demands”
“undermines” motivation to act on moral judgments. Cases of depression and listlessness and of the
person who has lost her “attachment to morality” are cases in which “aberrations in psychological makeup…cut the connection between moral judgment and motivation” (Shafer-Landau 2003 p. 151).
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same moral beliefs that he did the day before, but they have much less motivating force
than they do at any other time of the day. In the simplest case, in a life full or moral
judgments that lead to moral action (in whatever way that is cached out), an agent may
on a single occasion fail to be motivated by their moral judgment (Bedke 2009 p. 191).
Other times there is a delay between the making a moral judgment (especially
when that moral judgment is a reversal of a previously held moral judgment) and when
we are motivated to act on that moral judgment, or when it informs our behavior (Sadler
2003 p. 72). For example, if for a long time I believed that eating meat is morally
permissible, and was subsequently convinced of the immorality of eating meat, it may
take time and some effort on my part to work up the motivation to actually stop
consuming meat. At times, it requires considerable and “deliberate effort” to motivate
ourselves, to rev ourselves up, to act on our considered moral judgments (Sadler 2003
p. 72). If moral judgments necessarily, essentially, or inherently motivate, as internalists
claim, this delay needs to be explained. On the internalist view we would expect that a
change in moral judgment would be “automatically” accompanied by a change in
motivation, meaning that it would happen immediately and without effort (Sadler 2003 p.
72).
I am grouping these phenomena of variability together with moral indifference
because of the way they similarly challenge the internalist claim that there is a
necessary or inherent connection between moral judgment and motivation. Given the
phenomenon of variability in moral motivation, the internalist has the further burden of
explaining why it is that different people are motivated to varying degrees by the same
moral judgments. This is not to say that it will be impossible for the internalist to come
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up with some explanation of these cases. They just have more work to do. If the
internalist is a non-cognitivist, and claims that moral judgments are in fact, just attitudes
of some kind, which are inherently motivational, then “why should the motivational
aspect of attitudes vary?”(Zangwill 2008).
Another often overlooked form of diversity in moral motivation that supports
externalism has to do with the wide range of kinds of moral judgments that we make.
Many of our moral judgments involve speculating about hypothetical cases, or
commenting on the rightness or wrongness of the actions of other people, either people
around us, our politicians or world leaders, fictional characters, or the actions of
historical figures (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010 p. 66). We also make judgments about
states of affairs being (or having been) good or bad and types of actions, thoughts and
characters being right wrong, good, bad, praiseworthy, or blameworthy etc. And finally,
we make judgments about our own conduct, in many temporally diverse ways. The
judgments we make that pertain to ourselves range widely from judging how we have
behaved in the past, deciding how to behave in the very long term, as in reflective lifeplanning and considering which values to prioritize, to concrete immediate decisionmaking about whether or not to tell a lie to get out of this awkward situation (SinnottArmstrong 2010 p. 66) .
In many of these cases it seems implausible to say that the moral judgment
necessarily, essentially, or inherently motivates. I suggest that many of the moral
judgments that we make involve this kind of moral indifference. For example, the
necessary connection with motivation seems strained when reflecting on the actions of
other people that occurred in the distant past. How would reflecting on the injustices
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perpetrated by a particular feudal lord against his serfs in medieval Europe necessarily
motivate me, and to do what? Internalists might say that it would motivate me to
prevent those conditions to ever exist again, for example. But that surely involves
another, second, or third moral judgment, namely that the same actions would be wrong
if, in some roughly analogous situation in the present day, and further that if such a
situation were to develop I would be obligated to do something about it. Even if
internalists could make a convincing case that all of these moral judgments necessarily,
essentially, or inherently motivate, it seems unlikely that they would they all have equal
motivational force.
An initial response that internalist might give to these cases of motivational
variability and indifference is to limit the scope of internalism by restricting the kinds of
moral judgments that the theory applies to. For example, they may claim that
internalism only applies to “first-person present-tense (in situ) moral thoughts that seem
true”(Sinnott-Armstrong 2010 p. 67). While this weak form of internalism limits the
number of cases that the internalist has to be able to offer a plausible interpretation of, it
does seem like an ad hoc limitation of the view (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010 p. 67).
The other important point to notice about this limitation is that it makes
internalism inapplicable to a very wide swath of our moral judgments. Assuming that
many other people are like me in this way, in the course of an average day, I may make
very few first person, present-tense (in situ) moral judgments, but I make many
judgments about other people and states of affairs. Embracing this restricted form of
internalism would make it very narrow in scope. This is especially problematic if the
truth of internalism is being used in an argument against cognitivism and thus against
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realism. Even if we were to grant the truth of internalism in a very restricted set of
cases, this would provide little evidence for a claim about the nature of moral judgments
in general.
The pluralistic externalist position, which I defended in the previous chapter, can
give a straightforward account of the variability of moral motivation it its various forms.
How much or whether a moral judgment motivates an agent has to do with “distinct
desire[s]” and other kinds of conative states, which have different levels of strength
(Zangwill p. 103).
Another widely discussed example of agents who lose their motivation to act on
their moral judgments, but continue to make them are people who are depressed or
listless.
1.4 Depression and Listlessness
Moral indifference is also sometimes thought to be the result of depression and
listlessness (Dancy 1993 p. 5). It is more difficult to make the case that depression and
listlessness are counter-examples to internalism, than other forms of moral indifference,
because they are in many cases pathological states that are not well understood
(Zangwill 2008 p. 113).
However, I include this brief discussion of depression and listlessness because
first, it expands the range of phenomena that the internalist has a harder time explaining
than the externalist. There is a difference between being clinically depressed and being
depressed. While clinical depression has a complex psychiatric etiology and
neurochemistry, everyday depression is something that most of us are familiar with and
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can make a host of folk psychological claims about.
Second, it might be that depression (clinical or otherwise) is related to a wholesale
failure of the depressed person’s motivational system and that the depressed are not
motivated by their prudential judgments either. They are not motivated to take a shower
or go to therapy, even though they judge that these things will make them feel better.
They may not even be motivated to attend to their basic needs (the activities of daily
living, in the language of psychiatry). A large scale motivational failure does not rule out
the depressed or listless as counter-examples to internalism. If it is possible to lose
motivation to do much of anything, including acting on one’s moral judgments, and yet
continue to be able to make moral judgments, then presumably there is a disconnect
between the two, as the externalist contends. In response to these cases, many
internalists restrict their view, to accommodate such failures of motivation, and included
a practical rationality restriction on who their version of internalism applies to, such
restrictions will be discussed in internalist responses section.
Alfred R. Mele uses the character of the listless person to argue against a form of
internalism (Mele 1996 p. 731). The listless agent that Mele describes is “clinically
depressed” yet retains some of her moral beliefs, “while being utterly devoid of
motivation to act accordingly” (Mele 1996 p. 733). This agent, whom he calls Eve, can
hold a moral belief that she ought to help her Uncle, and yet, due to listlessness caused
by the death of her husband and family, fail to be motivated by that belief. According to
Mele, to deny that Eve can both hold this moral belief and fail to be motivated by it is
just to assume internalism (Mele 1996 p. 736).
As discussed in the previous chapter, one possible source of the motivation to act
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one one’s moral judgments could be the “desire to do whatever is morally required”
(Mele 1996 p. 733). Mele imagines two different planets; on one planet, Planet X,
almost everyone possesses the very strong desire to do whatever is morally required.
Very rarely, the inhabitants of this planet succumb to listlessness and their desire to do
the right thing wanes. In those cases they fail to be motivated to act on their moral
judgments. On Planet Y on the other hand, everyone is “…uniformly equipped,
genetically, with a generic desire of the kind just described… the desire is so strong that
it is indefeasible by any competing motivation”(Mele 1996 p. 738). On planet Y “MR
[morally required] beliefs are uniformly efficacious” (Mele 1996 p. 738). The difference
between the two planets is that on planet Y, unlike on planet X, everyone always has
the desire to do the right thing, and thus never fails to be motivated by their moral
judgments.
Mele’s point in making this comparison is that even if we earthlings are like the
inhabitants of planet Y, rather than planet X, internalism could still be false. Even on
planet Y, motivation is only contingently, not necessarily tied to having a moral
belief/making a moral judgment. In other words, on planet Y, things could have been
otherwise. Internalism requires that they be necessarily connected.
2. Internalist Responses to Indifference
The conceivability or existence of people who can make moral judgments but are
not motivated to act on them is a counter-example to the theory of that there is a
necessary, essential, or inherent connection between moral judgment and motivation.
In the previous section I offered a range of ways in which someone might fail to be
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motivated by their moral judgments. Internalist replies have focused primarily on
responding to the case of the amoralist who consistently fails to be motivated by his or
her moral judgments. At the end of the responses section, after I have argued that
these replies fail in various ways, I will explain why these failures are particularly
apparent, when applied to cases of variable motivation, occasional amoralism,
listlessness and depression.
The internalist has four possible responses to the amoralism counter-example.
(1) She can restrict the cases in which internalism applies so that the amoralist falls
outside of the realm of cases that internalism needs to explain, by excluding people who
are not “good,” or “strong willed,” or who are “irrational,” or “practically irrational” (Lockie
1998 p. 21; Smith 1995).
(2) She can deny that the amoralist makes moral judgments at all. This is by far the
most popular strategy for responding to the externalist objection – re-describing what
the amoralist is actually doing. Internalists may accept that the amoralist does lack
moral motivation, but they argue that we are mistaken in saying that the amoralist is
really making a moral judgment. For example, the claim originally made by R.M. Hare,
is that the amoralist is not making the moral judgment at all; he is simply stating the fact
that other people judge, or it is conventionally accepted, that the act in question is
morally wrong (Hare 1952 p. 125).

(3) The internalist may concede that while individual instances of moral indifference or
amoralism are possible, it is impossible to conceive of a of community of amoralists.
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(Bedke 2009). This is sometimes taken to show that the inverted comma interpretation
of the amoralists moral judgments is the correct one (Lenman 1999; Bedke 2009).
(4) The internalist can deny that the amoralist lacks motivation; this is usually done by
re-construing what motivation amounts to, or by arguing that the amoralist is in fact
motivated, but very little, by his moral judgment (Björnsson 2002).
The second, third, and fourth responses attempt to diffuse the amoralist counterexample by offering an alternative interpretation of his or her behavior, utterances, and
psychological states. In order to be successfully these responses have to be able to
show that there are independent grounds for accepting them, besides an effort to
defend internalism (Lockie 1998 p. 22). It is on this ground that internalist responses to
cases of amoralism overwhelmingly fail. For example, there have to be good
independent reasons for saying that in a particular case an agent does not make a
moral judgment, other than the fact that this is the only way to make the evidence fit
with internalism. Most of the time it makes sense to take what people say about how
they feel, what they believe, and what they are experiencing as good prima facie
evidence about how they feel, what they believe, and what they are experiencing.
These internalist responses have to rely on exceptions to this principle.
Externalists are not the only ones who point out that there have to be
independent reasons for favoring one interpretation of the amoralist’s moral judgments
over another; this point is also made by Michael Smith. He thinks that he has provided
the grounds for favoring his internalist interpretation of the amoralist’s moral judgments
(See Chapter 2 Section 2.3) (Sadler 2003 p. 68-9). However, the independent reasons
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he gives for favoring his interpretation of the amoralist have been undermined by
arguments I made in Chapter 2 having to do with de dicto versus de re desires to do
what one is morally obligated to do and the charge of moral fetishism (See Chapter 2
Section 2.3).
It is difficult to establish who bears the burden of proof in the debate. There is at
least one methodological principle taken from Svavarsdóttir that suggests that the
internalists bear it (Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 178-179). She argues that in any field when
two reasonable people disagree about which hypotheses is the correct explanation of
some observable phenomenon (in this case the behavior and utterances of the
amoralist or the morally indifferent) the burden of proof is on the person who insists on
the more “restrictive explanation” of the phenomenon in question (Svavarsdóttir 1999 p.
178-179).
In this case the externalist says that what might be going on in cases of moral
indifference is that these agents are making moral judgments, but failing to be motivated
by them. In defending the necessary connection between moral judgment and
motivation, internalists say that their opponents’ explanation is impossible. The
externalist interpretation is immediately ruled out because it is inconsistent with the
internalist proposed concept of a moral judgment. Thus the internalist gives the more
restrictive interpretation of indifference and amoralism, they eliminate the externalist
understanding of the situation in virtue of their conception of moral judgment.
2.1 Restricting the Scope of Internalism
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Internalism often serves as a crucial premise in one type of argument for the view
that moral judgments are non-cognitive or conative states. If moral judgments
necessarily, essentially, or inherently motivate an agent to act on them, then they
cannot be beliefs, the argument claims. Since beliefs are not the type of things that (by
themselves) can motivate an agent to act.54 But as internalists restrict the scope of
agents that the theory applies to, the role that it can play in metaethical disputes about
cognitivism diminishes (Björklund et al. 2012 p. 126). The more restricted the form of
internalism, the smaller role it can play in arguments of this kind. For example, on a
restricted form of internalism, moral judgments may be necessarily, essentially, or
inherently, tied to motivation only in agents that are morally good, practically rational,
and mentally healthy (lacking depression, etc.). Further, the theory only applies to moral
judgments that are in the first person, and applied only to actions that I am about to
engage in or refrain from doing. This characterization of internalism severely restricts
the class of agents and judgments that the theory applies to. For this reason such a
restricted form of internalism would seem to give us more of a reason to think that moral
judgments and motivation are two separate kinds of mental states that are complexly
related to each other, rather than thinking that moral judgments are expressions of noncognitive states like approval or disapproval.
One of the most common restrictions on internalism is a rationality constraint.
The rationality constraint is a convenient way for internalist to respond to amoralism or
moral indifference –these agents are irrational, and thus beyond the scope of
internalism (Smith 1995; Korsgaard 1996; Garrard and McNaughton 1998; Dancy
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I am not disputing the claim that beliefs cannot by themselves produce action (part of the Humean
theory of action).
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1993). To paraphrase, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, the morally indifferent go from being
impossible, to irrational (Sinnott-Armstrong 2010 p. 69). There are several different
versions of this view, but the basic claim is that it is a requirement of practical rationality
that one is either motivated by one’s moral judgments, or that one acts on one’s moral
judgments.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess the individual merits of each of
these views. And much of the plausibility of any one of the views may come down to
what these internalists include in their theories of practical rationality. They all bear the
burden of making a convincing case that the morally indifferent are irrational. Not only
is this a more complicated account than the one that the externalist can give, there is
little evidence to think that one has to be irrational in order to fail to be moved by one’s
moral judgments (Zangwill 2008 p. 115; Foot 1958, 1972). To claim that the morally
indifferent are irrational the internalist has to bite a bullet. If moral indifference is as
widespread and common as I am claiming it is, then we have to accept that many of us,
much of the time, are irrational. We have to discount all appearances to the contrary,
even in more extreme cases, like the case of Roger. Second, it is unclear how much of
a help theories of practical rationality actually are in explaining these cases of moral
indifference and amoralism (Zangwill 2008).
The internalist theory cannot simply rule out certain cases or kinds of agents on
an ad hoc basis to diffuse the challenges to the theory. They must have a well-defended
reason for setting the particular conditions that they do (Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 179)55
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As Bjorklund et al., point out, whatever the exclusion or application conditions run the risk of making
internalism “explanatorily impotent” or “vacuous” (Björklund et al. 2012 p. 128). For those arguments see:
(Lenman 1999 p. 298-9; Roskies 2003 p. 53-55; Miller 2003 p. 221).
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2.2 Amoralists do not make moral judgments
The most common internalist response to amoralism is to argue that amoralists
do not make judgments at all.56 The locus classicus of this response is found in R.M.
Hare’s discussion of moral cynics. According to this internalist response, the amoralist
is not making the moral judgment at all; he is simply stating the fact that other people
judge, or it is conventionally accepted, that the act in question is morally wrong. In
Hare’s language, that is, amoralists use moral language in merely an inverted comma
sense (Hare 1952 p. 125). Those moral terms have a different meaning when they are
used in this way.
The Hare-style strategy is a common non-cognitivist one. Since non-cognitivists
claim that moral statements are expressions of non-cognitive, affective states, they are
always motivational. So if the agent is not motivated to act on his purported moral
judgments, this means they cannot be making a sincere moral judgment at all. Hare’s
original comments provide the general form of the argument that internalists use to
defend their view against the amoralist counter-example.57
In order to maintain the amoralist as a counter-example to internalism,
externalists have to give a counter-response to Hare’s inverted comma analysis.
56

A related kind of response to the amoralism objection to internalism is to re-describe what the amoralist
is doing as a rejection of the mainstream system of morality altogether in favor of an alternative value
system: “We cannot make sense of someone rejecting the moral viewpoint unless we can see him as
embracing some other perspective from which morality is seen as of no value” (McNaughton 1988 p. 140;
Sayre-McCord 1997 p. 64-65).
57
Jonathan Dancy similarly argues that internalists should question the way externalists have described
the phenomenon of amoralists. The amoralist is “person who sees the institution of morality from the
outside, as something whose claims on us he rejects. But this person does not accept the moral
judgments whose relevance he denies; at best, he merely knows what judgment would be made by
others” (Dancy 1993 p. 5). A related point is made by Brook Sadler, who points out that perhaps “some
amoralists are amoral in virtue of the fact that they promote new, non-moral evaluative standards” (Sadler
2000 p. 119). She uses this point to show that such amoralists “are untouched by the inverted-commas
argument”(Sadler 2000 p. 119).
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Externalists can either respond to the argument at a general level, or to specific
versions of the argument. I am going to give three general responses first. I will then
respond to the specific ways that Smith and Jesse Prinz make use of a Hare-style
argument in defending their versions of internalism.
There are three general arguments against the Hare-style response to the
amoralist. First, I present an argument based on moral disagreement (Brink 1989; Copp
1995; Sturgeon 1986 p. 120-124). Second, I raise the response that the Hare-style
response does not take the amoralist challenge seriously enough (Brink 1989). And
third, I question whether or not the inverted-commas analysis of amoralists’ moral
judgments can in fact ward off the externalist threat.
If we assume that the inverted comma analysis of the amoralist is correct, this
yields some puzzling conclusions about moral disagreements between amoralists and
non-amoralists. This argument unfolds in two parts. While the normal agent expresses
the belief that ‘X is morally wrong,’ according to the inverted-comma analysis, the
amoralist expresses instead the belief that ‘other people think that X is morally wrong.’
This means they express two different beliefs (Copp 1995 p. 13). When someone
denies what the amoralist says, he merely denies that other people think that one ought
to give to famine relief, for example. This means that when the amoralist and the
normal person seem to have a moral disagreement about whether or not something is
morally obligatory, this disagreement is merely an illusion (Copp 1995 p. 13). In some
sense, a non-amoralist cannot disagree with an amoralist. This is a puzzling result since
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it seems that we can engage in genuine moral debate with people like the amoralist,
who lack motivation to act on their moral judgments.58
The second, part of this puzzle has to do with the sense in which we can actually
be disagreeing with the amoralist on a non-cognitivist view. The non-amoralist and the
amoralist Roger, for example, may both say that ‘killing babies for fun is wrong’ (Brink
1989 p. 85). Further, both may explain why killing babies for fun is wrong, and share
reasons for asserting this, such as the pain that it causes the baby and his or her family,
or the disrespect for human rights that the action exhibits. The amoralist’s statement,
however, is not accompanied by any corresponding negative attitude towards or
motivation to abstain from killing babies for fun (Brink 1989 p. 86). According to the
Hare-type analysis of the amoralist, the amoralist is only parroting what is
conventionally accepted as wrong.
Based on the non-cognitivists semantic analysis however, “[i]t would seem to
follow …that the amoralist and the moralist must be in moral disagreement, because
they hold different attitudes towards the same actions, for example” (Brink 1989 p. 86).
So non-cognitivists should be able to say that the amoralist and the non-amoralist do
disagree because they hold different attitudes toward killing babies for fun. But this
does not accurately represent the difference between the amoralist and the nonamoralist either, the amoralist and the moralist are not disagreeing about first order
ethical principles, or ethical theories, or even about “what makes good or right actions
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Copp goes on to argue that Hare could be right about the following claim about the meaning of moral
terms: “Hare's claim is that the fact that a person using moral terms to make a moral judgment expresses
a corresponding conative state is due to the meaning of moral terms when they are used literally. He is
also claiming that this aspect of the meaning of moral terms can be canceled or eliminated by placing the
terms in "inverted commas.” Copp argues that this view could still be compatible with moral realism and
externalism, according to Copp’s unique “realist expressivism,”(Copp 1995).
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good or right” (Brink 1989 p. 86). The content that they are disagreeing about remains
mysterious.
The second general response to Hare-style analysis of the amoralist is the
charge that it dismisses the amoralist too easily, or in Brink’s words it “doesn’t take the
amoralist’s challenge seriously enough” (Brink 1989 p. 47). Brink sees the amoralist as
presenting a classic kind of moral skepticism, sometimes called practical moral
skepticism. It would be quite surprising if this philosophical challenge could simply be
dissolved by claiming that such a skeptic is not really using moral language the way the
rest of us normally do.59 Taking the amoralist challenge seriously, then involves
entertaining the possibility that some people are not motivated by their moral judgments,
and that they may ask why they should be.60
Brink explains that all non-cognitivists must ignore what the amoralist says in a
certain way, “by accusing the amoralist of a conceptual or semantic confusion” (Brink
1989 p. 84). The Hare-type analysis of the amoralist gives us only a “skeptical solution”
to a skeptical problem. The skeptical problem is the existence of someone who is not
motivated by his or her own moral judgments. The existence of this person does not
worry the non-cognitivist, because for them, “the very meaning of moral judgments

59

Brink says says two distinct things about the skeptical challenge of the amoralist: “if we are to take the
amoralist challenge seriously, we must attempt to explain why the amoralist should care about morality”
(Brink 1989 p. 48). And “amoralist skepticism” is “skepticism about the justification or rationality of moral
demands” (Brink 1989 p. 48). The question of why someone should care about morality is ambiguous,
and brings us close to the question of the authority or normativity of morality. Brink’s response to
internalists can be strengthened if these two issues were disambiguated. Why and how we are motivated
to act on our moral judgments is distinct from the question of whether or not we should care about moral
demands or give priority to our moral judgments in our decision making.
60
When they ask why they should be motivated to act on their moral judgments however, they are asking
a normative question. One potential answer to that question has to do with rationality, but there are
certainly other possibilities. But explaining to the amoralist that it is irrational not to care about morality is
a possibility open to a cognitivist externalist that is not open to a non-cognitivist or most internalists
according to Brink (Brink 1989 p. 84-5).
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ensures motivation, the skeptical problem posed by the amoralist is, according to the
non-cognitivist, really misconceived” (Brink 1989 p. 84).
The third response, examines what the inverted-commas analysis of amoralist
moral judgments can show. Since Smith and other internalists rely heavily on Hare’s
inverted-commas analysis as a way of explaining the way that amoralists make moral
judgments, it is important to start by looking at what Hare means by this phrase and
whether or not it supports internalists’ argument that amoralists do not really make
moral judgments at all (Sadler 2000 p. 114).
We noticed that it is possible for people who have acquired very stable standards
of values to come to treat value-judgments more and more as purely descriptive,
and to let their evaluative force get weaker. The limit of this process is reached
when, as we described it, the value-judgment 'gets into inverted commas', and
the standard becomes completely 'ossified'. Thus it is possible to say 'You ought
to go and call on the So-and-sos' meaning by it no value-judgment at all, but
simply the descriptive judgment that such an action is required in order to
conform to a standard which people in general, or a certain kind of people not
specified but well understood, accept (Hare 1952 Sect. 11.1)
Sadler argues that in order to understand how useful inverted-commas analysis can be
for the internalist, we have to have a little background on Hare’s purpose for using this
phrase.
There are three things we know from Hare about the inverted commas sense of a
word: (1) that it reflects or effects a change in standards; (2) that is represents a
purely descriptive use of a word that also has, or primarily has had, an evaluative
sense; and (3) that there is a connection between the inverted commas sense of
a word and convention (Sadler 2000 p. 115).
What is important to note here is the contrast between the purely descriptive use of the
word in the inverted-commas sense and the conventional use of the word. The
conventional use of the word must “have an evaluative sense in order for it to be
apparent that the evaluative sense is not being invoked when the word is used in an
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inverted commas sense or purely descriptive sense” (Sadler 2000 p. 115). This is
important for the internalists analysis of the amoralist because it means that the
amoralist making an apparent moral judgment, or using moral language in an inverted
commas sense, has to be able to “allude to the conventional, evaluative sense” of the
moral terms being used (Sadler 2000 p. 116).
In order for the amoralist to be able to “allude” to the evaluative sense of the
word or judgment, he or she must have certain capacities. Sadler argues that these
capacities include the ability to have “a real understanding of the conventional
evaluative sense” of the moral terms that they are using in their moral judgments
(Sadler 2000 p. 116). An easy way to misunderstand this argument is to take it to be
saying that in order for the amoralist (or anyone) to utter a sentence that contains a term
that has an evaluative sense, they must have a robust understanding of the evaluative
sense of the term. This cannot be correct. Surely we utter terms and even allude to
things that we do not understand all of the time. This is not the claim being made.
Instead, it is that in order for the amoralist to make a moral judgment in the invertedcommas sense, he or she must be able to understand the evaluative sense of the moral
terms. In other words, if someone used moral terms in an utterance and truly did not
understand that those terms have an evaluative sense, this would not even count as
using them in an inverted-commas sense (at least in the way that Hare intends the
significance of this term). Such a use would be some other kind of use, if it could even
be called a use at all, of moral language.
If this analysis is correct, then it turns out that after all, saying that the amoralist’s
moral judgments are just inverted commas moral judgments does not tell us very much
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about those judgments or why we should think of them as “not real moral judgments”
(Sadler 2000, p 116). This is because “it is hard to see just what is missing from his
judgments which serves to classify his [amoralist’] judgments as not real moral
judgments” (Sadler 2000 p. 116).
It seems that part of what the internalist is hoping to get at when they say that the
amoralist does not make real moral judgments, is that the amoralist “alludes to a value
judgment [but] does not herself endorse it” (Sadler 2000 p. 116). But as Sadler points
out, if this is the problem with the amoralist’s inverted commas use of moral judgments,
then this does not seem to be sufficient to illustrate that the amoralist is exhibiting “some
kind of confusion or incoherence” as Hare intends (Sadler 2000 p. 116). “We can,
though we are not amoralists, make judgments about what other people judge to be
right and wrong, without endorsing those judgments” (Sadler 2000 p. 116). In fact we do
this all of the time and it does not lead us to think we are confused or incoherent.
How then should we understand what Hare means when he “says that when we
make inverted commas judgments we are not ‘making a value judgment ourselves, but
alluding to the value judgments of other people’” (Sadler 2000 p. 117)? Sadler argues
that alluding to other people’s moral judgments “requires the agent to make moral
judgments.” In fact, someone who is able to allude to other people’s moral judgments, in
Hare’s sense, has to be able to make two distinct types of moral judgments, both first
and second order judgments (Sadler 2000 p. 117-118). If the agent is an amoralist, the
externalist contends, they are able to make moral judgments but fail to be motivated by
them. On Sadler’s analysis, this phenomenon involves two distinct moral judgments.
[A]moralists…first…exercise their ability to make first-order judgments which
concur with the first-order judgments of normal moral agents; and second, they
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make some kind of second-order judgment by which they reject the evaluative
sense of the first-order judgment” (Sadler 2000 p. 118).
We can conclude from this reevaluation of Hare’s inverted commas sense of moral
judgments that simply citing inverted commas as an explanation of the moral judgments
of amoralists is not a useful internalist rebuttal to externalism. Internalists who rely on
inverted commas must be more precise about what element of the amoralist’s moral
judgment is missing that disqualifies their judgment from being like our moral judgments
(Sadler 2000 p. 117). Of course, what is missing cannot simply be motivation. If that is
all the internalist has to offer then they are simply assuming the truth of internalism.
2.2.1 Smith’s Response to Amoralism
To be able to maintain that there is a necessary, inherent, or essential
connection between making a moral judgment and being motivated by it, internalists
have tried to respond to amoralist counter-examples with Hare-style interpretations of
their moral judgments. Smith also gives a Hare-type response to the externalist
challenge of the amoralist; the amoralist “tr[ies] to make a moral judgment but fail[s]”
(Smith 1995 p. 68-9).
What is unique about Smith’s argument against the possibility of amoralism is an
analogy with color judgments. Imagine someone who is born blind but has been
attached to a machine her whole life that allows her to reliably make color judgments
based on the machine’s translation of the presence of surface reflectance properties
into tactile sensations. According to Smith, we would not say of this blind person that
she is making color judgments in the same sense that sighted people do, even though
she can reliably detect the presence of colors. In the same way, we cannot say that the
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amoralist is making moral judgments, even though he may be able to reliably detect
moral properties (Smith 1995 p. 69).
Smith’s argument based on the analogy with color judgments fails on three
grounds. First Smith does not give us a reason to think that color judgments are an
appropriate analogy with moral judgments, so that color judgments can reveal the
nature of moral judgments (Brink 1997 p. 25). Every argument from analogy has to
start with a useful analogy. There are a considerable number of differences between
the color judgments and concepts and moral judgments and concepts. For example,
part of the analogy involves comparing our visual perceptual system with our
motivational system. Smith certainly does not mean to suggest that we detect moral
properties in the world in an analogous way to the way in which we perceive colors. But
if he is not adopting that type of view, it is not at all clear why we should think that these
two different systems function in ways that are similar enough to be able to draw
informative conclusions about one from facts about the other. This is enough to create
doubt about how much this argument could show, even if it was successful.
At the same time, Smith’s characterization of the nature of color concepts and their
relationship to visual experiences is by no means uncontroversial in the philosophy of
perception or mind. The obvious question to ask Smith here would be: what is a color
concept in the first place? Whether or not color concepts even exist and in what sense
is contested. See (Tye 2002; Rosenthal 2001, 2010; Papineau 2006; Mandik 2012).
Whether or not color experience is needed in order to have knowledge of colors is also
an area of ongoing debate. See (Unger 1966; Lewis 1990; Alter 1998; Stoljar 2005;
Jackson 1986).
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Second, Smith does not provide a good reason to accept the claim that “certain
visual experiences are constitutive of color concepts” (Brink 1997 p. 24). It is perfectly
reasonable to think that though a blind person might lack “visual experiences,” they
could still use color terms in a meaningful way and issue judgments about the colors of
objects, for example, based on what they have learned in other ways (Brink 1997 p. 24).
Railton’s character of the amoralist Roger, seems like an obvious example of a person
who uses moral concepts, and makes moral judgments, reliably detecting moral
properties, without any corresponding motivation, just like the blind person issuing color
judgments, using color concepts (Railton 2009 p. 166).
Third, Smith’s view implies that those who become amoralists or morally indifferent
mid-life, lose their ability to use moral concepts and make moral judgments, and can
now do so only in the inverted comma sense. If visual perception is necessary for using
color concepts and making color judgments then we would have to say that those who
become blind in mid-life suddenly lose their color concepts and ability to make color
judgments. We have little reason to think that people who become blind later in life,
those who are temporarily blindfolded, those who simply have their eyes closed, or
those who have only night-blindness or color blindness lack color concepts and cannot
make color judgments consider (Brink 1997 p. 24; Roskies 2003 p. 60).61
This problem for Smith’s response deepens when we consider the empirical
evidence from acquired psychopathy. Roskies and Damaisio have found that patients
with acquired psychopathy, as the result of damage to the Ventromedial frontal region
61

…the principled amoralist need not be congenitally amoral…They made moral judgments with
motivational effect prior to the onset of depression or neurological damage. They continue to make the
same discriminations and judgments using moral terms but now without motivational effect” (Brink 1997 p.
24).
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(VM) of their brains can be characterized as to some extent having lost their moral
motivation and their ability to act on their moral judgments. However, they have limited
other cognitive problems and seem to continue to make the same moral judgments that
they made before the injury (Roskies 2003, 2006; Damasio et al. 1994; Roskies 2008).
Roskies describes them as “lacking motivation” (Roskies 2003 p. 63). A patient who
sustains such a brain trauma later in life and subsequently loses his or her ability to be
motivated by his or her own moral judgments can be thought of in a similar way to the
person who becomes blind later in life (Roskies 2003).
2.2.2 Prinz’s Amoralist
Jesse Prinz uses empirical psychological research to offer a new version of the
classic Hare-style response to the amoralist counter-example to internalism. Prinz uses
psychopaths as his example of real life amoralists. Psychopaths are more prone to
violence, immoral behavior, and criminal behavior than non-psychopathic individuals
(Glenn et al. 2009 p. 497-505; Belmore and Quinsey 1994; Ishikawa et al. 2001). Yet,
they seem to be able to make the same moral judgments about the wrongness of these
actions as non-psychopaths do (Cima, Tonnaer, and Hauser 2010 p. 59-67).
Prinz’s theory of epistemic emotionism involves a commitment to internalism and
so Prinz gives an explanation of the moral psychology of psychopaths that is compatible
with internalism (Prinz 2007 p. 46). Prinz argues that psychopaths do not actually
possess the same moral concepts that the rest of us do. Instead, Prinz likens
psychopaths to anthropologists who are merely reporting on what other people take to
be morally right and wrong; Prinz writes, “the concepts that psychopaths express when
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they use the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ differ from our concepts in both sense and
reference. They can mention these concepts, but they can’t use them” (Prinz 2006 p.
38).
To support his interpretation of the moral judgments of psychopaths, Prinz relies
on two pieces of evidence. First, psychopaths are less sensitive than non-psychopaths
to the difference between moral rules and conventional rules (like etiquette)62 (Blair
1995; Prinz 2007 p. 44). This work shows that inmates who scored high on
psychopathy checklist rated violations of conventional rules to be very serious and
impermissible even if society and authorities said that it was all right to break the rules.63
The second piece of evidence is that psychopaths suffer deficiencies in a range of
emotions, for example, they exhibit a lack of fear and sadness and a lack of a “vicarious
stress response” when they see other people in pain (Prinz 2007 p. 45). Prinz
arguesthat normal moral concepts are “essentially emotionally laden” (Prinz 2007 p.
46). Because psychopaths do not possess the same moral concepts that we do, they
are not able to issue genuine moral judgments. Instead they merely “report on morality”
(Prinz 2006 p. 38).
Prinz’s empirical version of the Hare-style response to the amoralist counterexample is vulnerable to two criticisms. First, Prinz does not offer a justification for
thinking that being able to make the moral conventional distinction is essential to
possessing a moral concept or the ability to make a moral judgment (Roskies 2008 p.
202). An independent argument, which Prinz does not provide, is necessary for thinking
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Similar to an argument made against Roskies (Kennett and Fine 2008).
Patients with damage to their prefrontal cortex late in life do, however, seem to be sensitive to this
distinction (Saver & Damasio 1991).
63
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that the moral conventional distinction is an essential part of having moral
understanding or possessing moral concepts (Roskies 2008 p. 202).
Second, the externalist does not have to deny that competency with moral
concepts, and possession of a standard range of moral emotions, is linked with
motivation. Instead, they deny that there is a necessary connection between the two, or
that moral judgments are necessarily or intrinsically motivating. The co-occurrence of
emotional and moral deficits cannot establish that the emotions are necessary for
possession of the moral concepts.
Prinz’s Hare-style interpretation of the amoralist work less well when applied to
cases of occasional amoralism or diversity in moral motivation. Agents who are
occasionally amoral do seem to possess normal moral concepts, but still fail to be
motivated by their moral judgments (Bagaric 2002). These are agents that are
otherwise mentally healthy, in general are motivated by their moral judgments, and
often act consistently with them. Yet they may sometimes fail to be motivated by them
or at least are motivated by them to different extents at different times (Zangwill 2008 p.
101). In these cases, Prinz cannot claim, as he did with psychopaths, that the agents
fail to possess moral concepts necessary to make moral judgments, possession of a
concept does not seem to come and go that easily.
Prinz could respond to the occasional amoralist case by agreeing that the moral
judgments agents make in cases of occasional amoralism do involve standard moral
concepts (Bagaric 2002). Although the agents lack motivation when they make some
moral judgments, they must have a “disposition” to be “motivate[d] under the right
circumstances” (Prinz 2006 p. 38). On one reading, this response means that Prinz
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does not hold anything like a strong form of internalism. As he does not maintain that
moral judgments necessarily or inherently motivate. If this is not the correct
interpretation, it seems that the challenge of the occasional amoralist puts the burden of
proof on Prinz and other internalists to explain why motivation is activated in some
cases but not in others. Externalists offer a straightforward explanation of the
phenomenon of occasional amoralism. Moral judgments may be motivationally inert
until the agent also possesses the appropriately related desire or other conative state
(Svavarsdóttir 1999 p. 170).

2.3 The Impossibility of Community Amoralism

In response to the counter-example of the amoralist, internalists attempt to save
their theory by reinterpreting the amoralist’s moral judgments along the lines of Hare,
claiming that they aren’t really making moral judgments at all. As we have seen, this
interpretation is not convincing. The response to amoralism discussed in the following
section concedes that individual amoralists might seem like counter-examples to
internalism. However, we can conceive of individual amoralists only because our overall
moral practice is consistent with internalism. In other words, amoralists are able to
make what appear to be genuine moral judgments because they are parasitic on our
community moral practice. We cannot even conceive of a community of amoralists.
And this, the response continues, shows us that the inverted comma interpretation of
the moral judgments of the amoralist is vindicated (Blackburn 1998 p. 61).
James Lenman argues that while we can conceive of amoralists who make
genuine moral judgments, we cannot conceive of “global amoralism” (Lenman 1999 p.
156

144). Lenman writes, “you can’t be an amoralist on your own…You can’t be a group of
amoralists on your own” (Lenman 1999 p. 445). Lenman imagines what he calls a
“preposterous story” about a planet populated entirely by amoralists (Planet Amoralism),
who are very good at detecting and studying moral properties, and reporting on the
moral facts, but unlike us, “they don’t care about them…do not allow their discoveries
about what these facts are to impinge in any way on their habits or desire and action”
(Lenman 1999 p. 446). Lenman argues that if there was only a contingent connection
between making moral judgments and being motivated by them, then this story should
not strike us as strange at all. If internalism is true it will. Since it does strike us as
absurd, then this is evidence in favor of internalism (Lenman 1999 p. 446).
Lenman’s argument is supposed to support the internalist rejection of the
possibility of amoralism. However, a crucial part of his argument is that the individual
amoralist makes moral judgments only in an inverted comma sense. Lenman goes on to
say that this is what makes the planet of amoralists preposterous. On planet Amoralism:
“… there is nothing for the content of the judgment that something is ‘morally good’ (is
what other people think is morally good) to be” (Lenman 1999 p. 452).
So on planet Amoralism the moral judgments of its denizens lack propositional
content (Lenman 1999 p. 452-3; Bedke 2009 p. 193). This is because, according to
Lenman, the best any amoralist can be doing is reporting on the genuine moral
judgments of other people. But on the planet of amoralists, there are not any genuine
moral judgments being made to be reported on. Of course, the externalist disputes this
interpretation. Because Lenman assumes the inverted comma interpretation of the
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amoralists’ moral judgments from the very beginning it is hard to see what his thought
experiment can actually add to the internalist’s defense of their view.
A related kind of community amoralism is found in M.S. Bedke’s thought
experiment about the planet Amoralsville (Bedke 2009 p. 194-5). On Amoralsville
people perform actions that seem identical to the actions that we call moral actions here
on earth. But on Amoralsville no one uses moral language or concepts, nor do people
make moral arguments. Instead, people do what they do based on judgments of their
own prudential interests. On this planet, a strong ruler doles out swift and severe
punishments for breaking a set of rules (that happen to coincide with our moral rules).
Bedke stipulates that no one on Amoralsville is motivated by anything but self interested
fear of punishment (Bedke 2009 p. 194). Due to radio transmissions from earth making
it to Amoralsville, the inhabitants are able to hear us using moral language and making
moral arguments:
With the introduced moral vocabulary, the residents of Amoralsville learn to apply
moral concepts correctly. As a result, Amoralsville residents correctly pick out
what is right and wrong, acknowledge obligations, and can correctly categorize
that which they (morally) ought to do. In fact, forming first personal putative moral
judgments and speaking in ethical terms becomes kind of a fad in Amoralsville,
though the judgments never garner any motivational force, and moral demands
simply do not weigh with them. Residents of Amoralsville are at all times solely
motivated by their own interests (Bedke 2009 p. 194-5).
Given this characterization and the assumption that the inhabitants of Amoralsville are
able to acquire linguistic competence with moral terms, Bedke remains convinced that
we would still not characterize these people as making moral judgments. This is
because, Bedke argues, on Amoralsville morality has lost the “action-guiding character”
that it possesses here on earth (Bedke 2009 p. 195).
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While this imaginary case of community amoralism maybe better articulated than
in Lenman’s version of community wide amoralism, it still fails on two grounds. The first
problem is that it draws the unsupported conclusion that the citizens of Amoralsville fail
to make moral judgments. It remains open to the externalist to say that the citizens of
Amoralsville do make moral judgments; they just lack the related emotions, desires, or
other conative states to act on them.
Second, the externalist does not have to reject the claim that morality is action
guiding when she rejects the internalist notion that there is a necessary, inherent, or
essential connection between moral judgments and motivation. For externalism, moral
discourse continues to be action guiding in the sense that moral actions often arise as a
result of moral discourse and that moral beliefs, when coupled with other propositional
attitudes, often produce moral actions. This is not the same as claiming, as Bedke
seems to, that being action guiding is an essential feature of making a genuine moral
judgment.
The idea that morality is fundamentally action guiding may alternatively have to
do with the authority of morality. Part of my response to this case is beyond the scope of
this chapter and will be addressed in Chapter 4 on the authority objection to realism. In
short, morality itself can be action guiding, without action guiding-ness being an
essential feature of making a moral judgment. We are morally obligated to act on our
moral judgments. We may also be morally obligated to be motivated to act on our moral
judgments or to attempt to develop the disposition to be motivated to act on our moral
judgments. But this does not mean that when we make a moral judgment, for it to count
as such, it has to be acted on, or dispose us to act on it, by itself.
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2.4 The Amoralist Is Motivated
Internalists may deny that the morally indifferent actually fail to be motivated by
their moral judgments. Internalists claim that externalists are describing a psychological
profile that cannot exist. If the hypothetical agent insists that they are not motivated by
their moral judgments, an internalist might insist that the agent is simply confused with
respect to his or her own moral commitments or motivations (Björnsson 2002 p. 336;
Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 152).64
While there is no doubt that we have imperfect access to our own motivational
states and that introspection has its limitations, it is uncomfortable for the internalists to
have to explain a wide variety of cases in this way. Although amoralism is the most
commonly discussed form of moral indifference, this response must also stand when
applied to otherwise normal agents who engage in occasional amoralism and simple
diversity in moral motivation. On this response all of these people are mistaken about
their level of motivation or its absence. The other curious thing about this kind of
response is that it only comes up when the agent introspects and finds they lack
motivation, not when internalists introspect and find that motivation always accompanies
their moral judgments!
64

Bjornsson has argued that the phenomenon of “silencing” can explain the way in which it might
sometimes seem (even to the agent) that he has no motivation to act on his moral judgments (Björnsson
2002). Using the example of the judgment that he has an obligation to report some income to the IRS, X
explain how silencing differs from the externalist explanation of these phenomenon, that is, that the agent
had no motivation to act on his moral judgment. The difference is that silencing is consistent with
internalism. Silencing means that the agent does not feel and internal struggle, does not experience guilt,
or anxiety, and is not disposed to act in ways that someone in a moral conflict would act. Instead the
agent is not aware that they have a counter veiling motivation to act on their moral judgment, because it
has been silenced by their opposing optation to preserve their self interest. X argue that “the moral
optation is silenced by the personal cost” of acting on the moral judgment. (Björnsson 2002 p. 338). The
same thing happens in cases when the agent feels like in a world where everyone else is behaving
immorally, their own moral actions can make little difference, and thus seem to lose all motivation to act
on their moral judgments (Björnsson 2002).
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It is certainly plausible that agents can make these kinds of mistakes, the
internalist cannot simply stipulate that the agents are mistaken as a way of saving the
theory from these counter-examples without “any detailed acquaintance with the
psychology of the agent” (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 152). Shafer-Landau likens this
strategy to the way a defender of psychological egoism may re-explain any instance of
altruistic motivation as actually self-interested (Shafer-Landau 2000 p. 152; Zangwill
2008 p. 104). Simply asserting that a hypothetical agent must be morally motivated
cannot get the internalist very far.
Bjornsen and Olinder argue that internalists commit the “Deviance Fallacy” and
that this explains why internalists think it is impossible that an amoralist, a person who
makes moral judgments but is not motivated by them, could exist. Internalists “have
unconsciously relied on the commonsense assumption that actual moral opinions
normally are followed by genuine moral motivation” (Björnsson and Olinder 2012 p. 10).
In other words, internalists only consider the amoralist against a background of normal
agents who are routinely motivated to act on their moral judgments. With this
background in mind, amoralists “will seem significantly deviant” (Björnsson and Olinder
2013 p. 10). The deviance fallacy involves:
[F]ailing to recognize that the intuitions about such scenarios depended on the
unconscious background assumption, we committed the ‘deviance fallacy’.
Mistaking an intuitive judgment of deviance from our model of paradigmatic
cases for a judgment of conceptual impossibility (Björnsson and Olinder 2013 p.
11).
They use the “cynical hypothesis” to argue for the existence of the deviance fallacy. The
cynical hypothesis says that “the tendency for people to act in accordance with their
moral opinions ultimately stems from a desire to appear moral”(Björnsson and Olinder
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2013 p. 1). The point of the cynical hypothesis is to “bracket our ordinary understanding
of moral psychology.” By doing so, we have the opportunity to reevaluate the intuitions
that lead to an acceptance of internalism, specifically strains of internalism that involve
the claim that amoralism is a “conceptual impossibility.”
3. Pluralistic Externalism and Moral Indifference
The pluralistic externalism that I argued for in the previous chapter, does not
assume that there is one dominant or uniform type of interaction between moral
judgments and moral motivation. The fact that we are often motivated to act on our
moral judgments is a purely contingent matter. Pluralistic externalism provides
sufficient conditions for being motivated to act on one’s moral judgment but it does not
provide necessary conditions for being motivated to act on one’s moral judgment. For
example, on the pluralistic view, sometimes an agent may be motivated by the desire to
do the right thing. Other times, it may be that the agent’s sympathy for another person
causes them to act on their moral judgment.
At the same time it does not make any empirical claims about what the
breakdown of actual human motivation comes from, in any one individual or across the
human population this may vary. Because on this view agents are motivated to act on
their moral judgments by a wide variety of sources, there are also a great many ways
this motivational system may fail to function. In this chapter I have discussed several
forms of moral indifference, various kinds of amoralism, and listlessness.
These forms of variability in the relationship between moral judgment and
motivation serve as counter-examples to internalism, which insists there is a necessary,
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inherent, or essential connection between making a moral judgment and being
motivated by that judgment. Internalists defend their position centrally by reinterpreting
these forms of moral indifference. There most popular strategy is to claim that the
morally indifferent fail to make genuine moral judgments in one way or another.
What all of the internalist responses have in common is that they rely on internalist
assumptions about what it means to have a moral belief, make a moral judgment, or
possess a moral concept. In other words, people who are defending the necessary
connection between moral judgments and motivation, define moral judgment to fit their
theory, then of course when they look counterexamples to the theory, they will say that
there aren’t any moral judgments being made in the counter-examples.
3.1 An Objection to Modal Intuitions and a Response
Some have argued that while the range of situations and characters that I
describe in this chapter might be entertaining, we should be very skeptical about how
much they can actually illuminate the relationship between moral judgments and
motivation (Björnsson 2002 p. 331-2). In other words, I can imagine all sorts of strange
and puzzling states of affairs, and psychologies, so what? (Björnsson 2002 p. 331-2). I
am sympathetic to this objection and also think we should be skeptical about the extent
to which twin earth thought experiments, for example, can tell us about metaphysics.
Fortunately, these aren’t imaginary cases in the relevant sense. The characters and
phenomena that this chapter presents are almost all just folk psychological descriptions
of our moral lives, those of the philosophers cited, and those of people we know and
observe.
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These critics will also point out that there is considerable disagreement in
intuitions about how to interpret the hypothetical case of amoralism and instead we
should focus on finding the theory with the greater explanatory power (Björnsson 2002
p. 332) This is another point I concede, bare clashes of intuitions about imaginary
cases cannot settle the dispute between internalism and externalism. We have to
consider which theory taken as a whole offers better explanation of the range of
phenomenon in question. Of course, when considering competing theories in moral
psychology, we must also consider the empirical evidence on both sides. Evidence from
acquired psychopathy and VM patients is not definitive at this point for either internalism
or externalism. I have argued in this chapter that pluralistic externalism is the theory
that provides the better explanation of the phenomenon of moral indifference.
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Chapter 4: The Authority and Normativity Objections
In Chapter 1 I presented family of classic queerness objections that have been
posed against moral realism, and focused on one strain of that argument called the
normative force objection. I argued that the normative force objection is ambiguous
between two interpretations, the internalism objection, and the authority objection. In
Chapters 2 and 3 I responded to the internalism objection. In Chapter 2 I offered
arguments that undermine considerations that are often taken to support internalism
and defended the alternative view, externalism, against criticisms. I also presented a
version of externalism, pluralistic externalism, which is best suited to explain the
relationship between moral judgment and motivation. Chapter 3 extended the response
to the internalism objection by focusing on the phenomenon of moral indifference and
amoralism. In it, I argued that these phenomena are also more easily explained by a
pluralistic externalist theory of moral motivation that by internalism or competing
versions of externalism.
1. The Authority Objection
This chapter focuses on responding to the authority objection. According to the
authority objection, moral realism, (especially naturalist moral realism) wants to have its
cake and eat it too. Morality, according to realism, consists of an objective realm of
facts. On this view, obligations and duties exist, regardless of what beliefs people have
about them or emotive reactions they have to them. Naturalist moral realism, in
particular, insists that these facts and properties do not introduce anything mysterious
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that we should worry about into our ontology, nor do they commit us to anything
epistemologically troubling, like a special faculty of intuition with which to detect them.
Instead, moral properties and facts are just like historical, sociological, biological, or
psychological facts. We have access to them in the ordinary way, through observation.
The kind of relationship they have with more basic physical facts and properties can be
understood as one of identity, constitution, or supervenience.
But, the objector to realism protests, morality is not like history or psychology.
The facts of history and psychology aren’t facts that have any authority over us. They do
not have to matter to us in the way morality does. They are not action guiding or
practical. I can shrug and walk away from them in a way I cannot shrug and walk away
from moral facts and properties. The authority objection questions the authority that any
set of facts or properties could have over our behavior. In other words, the moral realist
seems to lack a convincing response to the moral skeptic who asks, ‘why should I be
moral?’ The surprising upshot of this objection is that, while the realist may be able to
secure the objectivity of moral rules and the truth of moral facts, they cannot secure its
authority.
This objection is cashed out differently depending on whether the objector is
focusing on moral realism as a whole, as Christine Korsgaard does in her classic
normativity objection to moral realism or if the objector is focusing specifically on
naturalistic versions of moral realism, as Derek Parfit does in his recent normativity
objection and triviality objection to what he calls non-analytical naturalist moral realism.
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The authority objection charges that [naturalist] moral realism cannot explain the
authority morality has over us.65 The idea of the authority of morality is vague. It is
broader than normativity, but includes normativity. It may specifically mean the
inescapability of moral requirements, the special level of importance that morality has in
directing our decision making and life choices, the way in which moral considerations
seem to override all others, or the categorical nature of moral reasons.66 Without
narrowing down authority at all, the following is the basic argument from authority.67
(1) Morality has a certain kind of authority over us.
(2) Naturalist moral realism precludes this kind of authority.
Therefore, naturalist moral realism must be false.
Two obvious strategies emerge for responding to this argument. First, the realist can
deny premise one, arguing that, in fact morality does not have the kind of authority that
critics claim it has. Second, the realist can give an account of the authority that
comports with naturalist moral realism.
My strategy will employ both of these responses. Premise one is true, given a
certain, limited account of authority. The first step here is to consider what a critic might
mean by the authority of morality. I consider two plausible accounts of morality’s
authority. The first type of authority I consider is authority as normativity, according to
Korsgaard’s rationalist neo-Kantianism. I present her normativity based objection to
moral realism and respond to it. Second, I consider Parfit’s recent account of
normativity.

65

One of the earliest sources on the authority of morality is Joseph Butler (Butler 1726 Sermon 2-3).
Sometimes the authority of morality is also explained in terms of the notion that “moral requirements
provide reasons for acting which override other kinds of reasons” (McNaughton 1988, p. 115).
67
Other ways you could put this in more detail-on naturalist moral realism moral properties or facts are
similar to the kinds of properties or facts that don’t have authority over us, like facts about history.
66
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Contrary to their accounts of authority, I argue for a minimal authority for morality
rooted in objectivity. Given the minimal account of authority, premise two is false, this
minimal kind of authority is no more a problem for naturalist moral realism as a
metaethical theory than any other metaethical theory.
1.1 What has Authority?
Before discussing what authority might plausibly mean for naturalist moral
realism and what it means in the context of Korsgaard’s and Parfit’s influential
objections to moral realism and naturalistic moral realism, respectively, it is important to
make two crucial distinctions in what we are talking about when we talk about the
authority of morality.
First, it is important to distinguish between the authority of morality itself, that is of
moral rules, moral facts, or moral properties, on the one hand and the authority of moral
language and terms on the other hand. Some claim that the terms “good” or “ought”
have a kind of force that comes from the role they play in our language. Copp refers to
this type of authority as “generic normativity” and explains that this type of normativity
has to do with the “semantic connection” that moral claims gave “to decisions about
action or choice” (Copp 2007). Copp takes this form of normativity to be difficult for the
realist to explain because of the way realists understand moral language or moral
claims as “express[ing] propositions that attribute moral properties;” they are descriptive
claims (Copp 2007). The puzzle for a realist is how a claim that describes a part of the
world can also “evaluate, recommend, or prescribe” at the same time (Copp 2007).68

68

Copp’s explanation of generic normativity comes from his “standard-based account” (Copp 1995 p.
267).
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This chapter will focus on the authority of morality itself, rather than the authority of
moral language, specifically whether moral facts or properties carry with them an
authority over us that other kinds of properties or facts lack, rather than whether moral
language has a prescriptive or normative force.
Second, it is important to distinguish between the idea that morality itself, the
properties of goodness, rightness, wrongness, or the moral facts or truths themselves
have authority over us and the claim that our beliefs that have moral content have
authority over us. This is a distinction that is often overlooked. If it is the moral facts
themselves that are supposed to have authority over us, this is something different from
saying that psychologically speaking our moral beliefs, happen to (or often do) have a
certain kind of priority in our decision making. I think that this is one of the sources of
the ubiquitous conflation of the authority objection with the internalism objection.
Another source of the conflation might be the distinction between reasons for action and
motivational reasons. If it is the moral facts or considerations themselves that are
supposed to have authority, then we are saying that they give us reasons for action (it
does not have to be action necessarily that is just the easier way to put it). If we are
saying that it is our moral beliefs or judgments that have the authority then we may be
talking about reasons that are going to motivate us in some way (See Chapter 2).
1.2 What is Authority: Inescapability, Overidingness, or Just Normativity?
In discussion of the authority of morality, the three most common strains of
thought have to do with its inescapability, its overidingness, and its normativity. I will
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give a brief gloss of each of these senses of authority and how they apply in arguments
against realism.
1.2.1 Inescapability
The inescapability of the moral is the idea that one cannot “opt out” of the
demands of morality in the way that one can opt out of other kinds of norms, such as
the rules of a game or the laws of a nation, by giving up or leaving.
Philippa Foot offers several different ways of understanding the idea that moral
demands are inescapable, focusing on Kant’s idea that moral demands are categorical
rather than hypothetical imperatives (Foot 1972).
Modern philosophers follow Kant in talking, for example, about the "unconditional
requirement" expressed in moral judgments. These tell us what we have to do
whatever our interests or desires, and by their inescapability they are
distinguished from hypothetical imperatives (Foot 1972 p. 308).
She considers several different ways this claim can be understood and finds all of them
to be problematic. One way to understand a categorical imperative is as a demand that
it is binding on you independent of your individual desires. But Foot argues that the
rules of etiquette work the same way; they are rules that are binding whatever desires
you might have. For example, one ought to write a thank you note when one receives a
gift. This is not an imperative that does not apply to someone simply because the
person “has his own good reasons for ignoring this piece of nonsense, or who simply
does not care about what, from the point of view of etiquette, he should do” (Foot 1972
p. 308). Such a person is still bound by the norms of etiquette, despite their views about
their arbitrariness and so on. This person who fails to write a thank you note is rude,
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regardless of whether or not they “choose to play the etiquette game.” So this cannot be
the special kind of authority that morality alone possesses.
A second way of understanding the categorical nature of moral demands
according to Foot, is that they “necessarily give reasons for acting to any man …all
‘should’ or ‘ought’ statements give reasons for acting”(Foot 1972 p. 309). On this view
what the unique authority of morality consists in is that it is a kind of irrationality to fail to
take moral reasons to be categorical in the sense that Kant and Kantians seem to
require.
However this is an extremely difficult position to defend. Foot argues that failing
to act morally need not be either inconsistent or irrational. A person can only be
irrational if he “…in some way defeats his own purposes, doing what is calculated to be
disadvantageous or to frustrate his ends”(Foot 1972 p. 310). Here Foot is assuming
what some have called the internal reasons proposal (in contrast with external reasons).
The idea is that the only reasons we have to act on come from the inside rather than the
outside, in that in order to have a reason to do something the act in question has to
serve the satisfaction of a preexisting desire that one has.69 Thus on this view there is a
tight connection between motivation to act and having a reason to act. So according to
a simplified version of internal reasons, it wouldn’t be irrational for someone to do
something immoral, as long as they were acting in a way that is consistent with their
desires and goals.
Even if we accept Foot’s arguments thus far, a feeling may remain that the
requirements of morality are more stringent than the requirements of a system of rules

69

Here Foot has to argue that there cannot be external, rather only internal reasons. For more on this
idea see: (Williams 1980).
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like etiquette. However, Foot speculates that this probably has to do with the way we
are raised and the emphasis that is put culturally on following moral rules over other
types of rules (Foot 1972 p. 312). Even if we abandon the idea of categorical
imperatives, Foot’s alternative is that people have other reasons for acting morally, that
have to do with the value they place on other people’s well-being, for example (Foot
1972 p. 312). The ends and reasons that people have to act morally may be contingent,
but this is the only alternative to pretending that morality has the “magic force” of the
categorical imperative (Foot 1972 p. 315).
In the context of a discussion on the authority of morality, whether or not people
act rationally when they disregard moral considerations or intentionally act contrary to
moral considerations is somewhat of a red herring. If it is the requirements of morality
themselves that have the authority, then whether or not we act rationally or irrationally
when we ignore them seems to be beside the point. Unless we think that the only kind
of authority that morality could have is authority within a particular theory of rationality.
1.2.2 Overridingness
The overridingness of moral considerations is closely related to, but distinct from
the idea that they are inescapable, especially in so far as the focus is on reasons and
rationality. This is the idea that “moral verdicts are always in some sense supreme
whenever they come into conflict with the verdicts of a distinct normative domain” (Gert
2013 p. 3).
Overridingness can be understood in several different ways as well, but is usually
understood as having to do with reasons. Moral reasons trump other reasons for acting,
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the classic examples being self-interested reasons. This might mean that it is irrational
to prioritize another kind of reason over a moral reason. But the claim does not have to
be understood this way. It can also be understood as saying that moral considerations
should always have priority over other kinds of concerns.
Kramer puts this kind of overridingness in terms of the higher degree of
normative strength, force, “unremittingness,” “insistence,” or stringency, that moral
obligations have when they conflict with other kinds of considerations, such as
“prudence or aesthetics or supererogatory ethics” (Kramer 2009 p. 143). On this view,
moral duties almost always override other kinds of normative requirements (Kramer
2009 p. 144).
Phillip Pettit explains that what separates moral considerations from other kinds
of “grounds of assessment” is that morality has an “authoritative standing,” “priority,” or
overridingness (Pettit 2001 p. 234-36). For certain kinds of values, for example the
values proscribed by the law, an agent can justify ignoring them by appeal to moral
considerations. But this kind of justification does not run in both directions.
What distinguish ethical justification is not the particular norms it invokes but
rather the role it plays in relation to justification of other sorts. We will say that the
criterion of ethical as distinct from other kinds of assessment is precisely the fact
that it enjoys a certain sort of priority in people’s justificatory practices (Pettit
2001 p. 235).
In other words, an agent “cannot expect to be able to justify indifference to such a
criticism [a moral one] by arguing that it would be wrong in terms of etiquette or
prudence or law, or indeed in any other terms, to honor the demands of ethics” (Pettit
2001 p. 234-36).
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A related formulation of overridingness says that: “the totality of practical
reasons, taken together, always uniquely favors acting in line with a moral verdict, even
though it may not always be irrational to act in ways that are not uniquely favored in this
way” (Gert 2013 p. 1). The basic idea here is twofold; first, it could be that moral duties
are overriding because rationality, taken as a whole, considers all kinds of reasons,
moral, prudential, aesthetic, etc., and it happens that moral requirements also happen to
be the most rational. The second strain here is that moral reasons already take into
account other kinds of reasons, such as prudential reasons. So the fact that a particular
action is in one’s own self-interest has already been taken into account if a moral
requirement tells us to act against it (Kramer 2009 p. 144).
Foot also uses the term “overriding” to describe one of the purported features of
morality (Foot 1978). Foot attacks the notion she attributes to D.Z. Phillips (1977) that
“to anyone who cares about morality moral considerations must be the most important
of all considerations” (Foot 1978 p. 181). Foot points out that people act contrary to their
moral judgments all the time without being bothered by it (Foot 1978 p. 185-6). She
takes this to shows that most people take moral considerations to be merely one set of
considerations among several competing sets, that also include etiquette and selfinterest, for example (Foot 1978 p. 184). Foot explains that while it might be morally
required to prevent ones party guests from driving home drunk, etiquette requires that
one should neither restrict one’s guests’ level of alcohol consumption or embarrass
them by suggesting that they shouldn’t drive (Foot 1978 p. 184).
The sense we have that moral considerations are overriding, she concludes is
again, as in her analysis of the categorical nature of moral demands, simply a result of
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the way morality is taught. Whereas etiquette is explained to children “a rigid set of rules
that are on occasion to be broken;” “moral rules are not taught as rigid rules that it is
sometimes right to ignore; rather we teach that it is sometimes morally permissible to
tell lies (social lies)…” (Foot 1978 p. 186).
In this debate between Philips and Foot, questions of the authority (in this case
the overridingness) of morality and questions of moral motivation are being conflated. It
seems terribly obvious that people who really care about morality act in immoral ways
routinely and fail to feel remorse or guilt. But it is difficult to see how this psychological
observation can give us insight about the nature of the moral demands or requirements
themselves. On a more charitable interpretation of Philips’ position, moral
considerations should override other considerations in all agents. If he were to put his
point this way then he would clearly be addressing the authority of morality and not
motivation. In that case Foot’s response misses the mark.
1.2.3 Normativity
Although the chapter is on the authority of morality, both of the objectors I
consider, Korsgaard and Parfit, argue that realists and naturalist realists respectively,
have a problem explaining normativity. Normativity is a broader concept than the
inescapability, categoricity, or the overridingness of moral requirements. Normativity is
arguably not only a feature of ethical judgments, facts, and properties, but is also often
invoked in aesthetics, law, epistemology, philosophy of mind, semantics, rationality, and
even logic. Normativity is about the way that certain theories, concepts, or facts serve
as standards or rules for evaluating character. Norms are rules or standards that are
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meant to serve as guides to decision making and action. This is because normativity
has to do with what we have reason to believe, do, or feel. I will briefly explain why I
think I am entitled to use objections that claim to be about the normativity of morality in
this way.
Korsgaard’s objection to realism has two important features that keep it close
enough to the authority objection to make my case. First, part of her charge against the
realist is that he has no response to the moral skeptic who asks “Why should I be
moral?” This sounds like a plea for the authority of morality to be justified. Second, it
seems she sees the fact that her view can capture in a certain sense, why morality is
inescapable, to be a virtue of her position. The account that she gives has to do with
features of our agency.
For Parfit, one of the core problems with non-analytical naturalism is that it
essentially eliminates normativity by claiming that identities exist between natural facts
and normative facts. Parfit’s conception of normativity is essentially tied to reasons.70
What is important to figure out about Parfit’s account is why he thinks the elimination of
normativity is a loss. Although it is not obvious, there is a way in which Parfit’s worry
about the disappearance of normativity in non-analytical naturalism is close to
Korsgaard’s charge that the realist has no response to the moral skeptic.71 Parfit writes,
“…normativity is best understood as involving reasons or apparent reasons. Things
matter only if we have reasons to care about them” (Parfit 2011 p. 269). Reasons are

70

The dialogue between Parfit and Korsgaard on their respective views is a fascinating one but would
take me too far afield to be explored here.
71
Parfit would probably deny this, since he thinks that Korsgaard is exclusively focused on the
motivational sense of normativity. I think Korsgaard slips into that way of thinking sometimes, but her
account is not reducible to motivation.
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“where the buck stops when we are asking what really matters - or seeking decisive
guidance as to what we ought to think and do” (Railton 2013 p. 2).
1.3 Distinguishing Authority from Motivation
Distinguishing the authority objection from the internalism objection is a way of
responding to premise 1 of the authority objection, the claim that morality has a certain
kind of authority over us. Making this distinction has been one of the continuing and
central themes of the essay thus far. If we discover that what an objector to naturalist
moral realism really means by authority is that moral judgments (or facts-more
implausibly) necessarily motivate then this is really just the internalism objection all over
again, which has been dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3.
A conflation of the two objections is relatively common in the history of moral
philosophy. For example, John Stuart Mill, addressing the following list of objections to
his theory, provides an example of the conflation of the internalism objection and the
authority objection:
The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral
standard - What is its sanction? What are the motives to obey? Or, more
specifically, what is the source of its obligation? When does it derive its binding
force? (Mill 1863 p. 38).
Here, Mill’s naturalist theory of morality is confronted with both the internalism objection
and the authority objection. The internalism objection is the question posed to Mill
about how his theory of morality can motivate. While the authority objection, is the
question about the “binding force” of his moral theory. Mill however, does not
differentiate these two challenges to this theory.
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The way that Hare interprets the authority (or overidingness) of morality has to do
with our psychology and slips into talk of motivation. Hare argues that
“…[overridingness] is the thesis that one’s morality is something that yields prescriptions
which, as a matter of psychological fact, one lets override all other prescriptions. Hare
argues that ‘critical moral principles’, that is, judgments about what ought morally to be
done, all things considered, are ‘overriding’ in this sense” (Hare 1981 p. 24, 55-62;
Copp 1995 p. 77).
A similar conflation of motivation and authority can be found in David
McNaughton’s criticism of externalist moral realism (McNaughton 1988). McNaughton
stipulates that for the externalist moral realist what makes an action right or wrong is
independent of the agent’s desires. However, for the externalist moral realist, he
charges, whether or not a moral judgment has any authority over an agent is dependent
solely on the agent’s desires. According to McNaughton’s criticism, the externalist
moral realist must say that while an agent may “recognize” that “inflicting unnecessary
suffering on others is morally wrong” this judgment gives them no reason not to inflict
that suffering, unless they also have a desire not to do so:
If he lacks the appropriate desires then he has no reason to act in accordance
with moral requirements-they are not seen as authoritative…Externalist realism is
happy to view moral questions as factual ones, but distances them from
motivation in its claim that moral commitments do not, in themselves, provide the
agent with reason to act…Thus both sides must claim that the apparent authority
of moral demands is an illusion (McNaughton 1988 p. 48-9).
He charges that the externalist moral realist cannot account for an important aspect of
moral phenomenology, the experience of moral authority. But here he assumes that if
an agent does not happen to have the desire to act morally then morality is not
authoritative.
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Another example of the conflation of the internalism objection and the authority
objection to naturalist moral realism is found in Mackie. Mackie argues that:
On a naturalist’s [realists] analysis, moral judgments can be practical, but their
practicality is wholly relative to desires or possible satisfactions of the person or
persons whose actions are to be guided (Mackie 1977 p. 33).
Mackie is saying that naturalists usually embrace motivational judgment externalism,
which is the view that when one makes a moral judgments one is not necessarily or
inherently motivated to act on that moral judgment. Instead, on motivational judgment
externalism, moral judgments are only contingently connected with motivation to act
morally (See Chapter 2). Mackie claims that on a naturalist realist view, the action
guiding force of morality is tied to the contingent desires of human beings. This can be
understood as a comment about moral motivation or a comment on the authority of
morality. Understood as a comment on moral motivation, it is simply a statement of
motivational judgment externalism. If this is the right way to understand what Mackie is
saying then he is correct; externalism does claim that moral judgments are only
contingently motivating. However, as I discussed in Chapter 2, this view is actually
superior to the competing view, internalism.
A second way to understand what Mackie is getting at in this passage has to do
with the authority of morality. Moral claims are thought to make authoritative demands
on our conduct. This may be the kind of “practicality” to which Mackie is referring.
Mackie may be concerned that the naturalist ties the authority, the demandingness or
authority of morality, to the contingent desires of human beings. Kant articulates this
point when he says that moral laws are categorical rather than hypothetical.72 However,
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Working out exactly how Kant’s claim about categorical imperatives relates to the authority of morality
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179

Kant’s observation does not mean that moral laws are inherently tied to motivation; it
means that we are obligated to act according to the moral law regardless of our desires
or goals.
More recent conflation of authority and motivation objections can be found in
Copp and in Seriol Morgan who takes himself to be strengthening Copp’s point (Morgan
2006). Copp claims that normativity is “internal” to moral properties. This means that
moral properties are necessarily normative. Copp argues that the naturalist moral
realism of Boyd, Brink, Railton, and Sturgeon make normativity external to moral
properties, rather than “essential” to them (Copp 2007 p. 4). Copp goes on to cite as
his proof that these realists make normativity external to moral properties, the fact that
they make motivational force of moral judgments external to moral properties, which is a
different matter (Copp 2007 p. 4).
According to Copp, the Cornell realists are not able to give an account of how a
“natural property could be normative” (Copp 2007 p. 4). It is surprising that Copp makes
this mistake; given the fact that elsewhere he distinguishes between internalism about
motivation and internalism about normativity. In fact he embraces externalism about
motivation, along with the Cornell realists (Copp 2007 p. 6).
Morgan argues that realism espouses a “queer” metaphysics of morals that is
incompatible with the kind of special status that we take morality to have. In other
words, there is a central feature of morality that naturalism cannot accommodate. He
variously refers to this feature of morality as its “practicality,” “normativity,” “categorical
nature,” its status as giving us “universally compelling standards,” and “reason giving”
(Morgan 2006). Morgan’s argument is that while naturalism might be able to tell us that
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moral standards are objectively real, it has to concede that there are other sets of
standards that are just as objectively real, like a Nietzschean set of values having to do
with nobility and ruthlessness (Morgan 2006).
There are multiple sets of real values and we know they are real because they
figure in the best explanations of things. However, according to Morgan, naturalism has
no way of giving any one set of values or moral standards any special status or
significance. This is because, according to Morgan’s argument, naturalists are
externalists about moral motivation; “on the naturalist account of normativity, an
individual has reason to act morally if she has a motivational profile which contains
appropriate sympathetic desires and feelings” (Morgan 2006 p. 333).
While it may be true that many naturalists are also externalists about moral
motivation, there is no reason to think that they have to identify the authority of morality
with contingent features of human beings, like our sentimental propensities. In addition
to the conflation of moral motivation and morality’s authority, Morgan assumes that to
be a naturalist is to deny rationalism. This is not a point I focus on but it is significant to
note that to be committed to naturalist moral realism one need not reject moral
rationalism, understood as the view that if one has a moral obligation this means
necessarily that one has a reason to act on it (Shafer-Landau 2012 p. 159).
Even if we assume that naturalists are committed to anti-rationalism, Morgan still
is not entitled to attribute to the naturalist the claims that on their view “naturalism
grounds the normativity of the properties that guide the actions of persons of a particular
evaluative outlook in their contingent non-cognitive states” or that “normativity springs
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from contingent sentiment, our sentiments differ from theirs, that is all there is to it”
(Morgan 2006 p. 337).
Morgan’s argument offers a perfect example of the kinds of criticisms of
naturalism or realism that come from merging together these two distinct issues: how do
our moral judgments motivate (cause) us to act and why our moral judgments should
motivate us to act (the authority of morality). Realism, as I have been defending it, has
two central components, a metaphysical component, about the ontological status of
morality and a psychological component, having to do with the nature of our moral
thoughts. The psychological question of whether or not we are motivated to act on our
moral judgments cannot even tell us about whether or not we have reasons to act on
our moral judgments (unless we assume reasons internalism). So it certainly cannot
definitively answer questions about the authoritativeness or morality.
The internalism and authority objections should be differentiated because
whether and how morality motivates us to act does not bear on the place that morality
should have in our lives and decision-making. We may have no motivation to do things
that we should do, and we may be extremely motivated to do things we should not do.
The most common way of making this point is to say that motivation has to do with
whether or not we care about moral facts and properties, whereas, the authority of
morality deals with whether or not we have reason to care or a justification for caring
about the moral facts and properties.
2. The Authority Objection: Korsgaard’s Challenge
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Korsgaard is a good example of a comprehensive rationalist neo-Kantian
account of the authority of morality. At the same time, her view is close to moral realism
in that she is a cognitivist and takes morality to be objective. Korsgaard explicitly
challenges moral realism on the grounds that it cannot account for the authority of
morality, what she calls the normativity of morality.
As part of her overall defense of Kantian constructivism, she presents a version
of the authority objection against moral realism, arguing that her view can explain the
authority of morality, while realism cannot. She argues for premise 1 of the authority
objection, that morality has a certain kind of authority over us; she calls this the
normativity of morality. She also argues for a version of premise 2. Recall that premise
2 says that moral realism precludes this kind of authority. She argues that moral
realism cannot provide an explanation of the normativity of morality. Korsgaard argues
that realism cannot give an account of normativity (authority), but her view, Kantian
constructivism can, and is therefore superior.
Unlike Mill, McNaughton, and Mackie, Korsgaard recognizes formally the
distinctiveness of the question of the authority of morality calling it the “normative or
justificatory” problem, and elsewhere the normative question (Korsgaard 1996 p. 13).
An answer to the normative question, according to Korsgaard, must explain why we
should care about morality, not just why do care about morality (Korsgaard 1996 p. 23).
The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral agent
who must actually do what morality says. When you want to know what a
philosopher’s theory of normativity is, you must place yourself in the position of
an agent on whom morality is making a difficult claim. You then ask the
philosopher: must I really do this? Why must I do this? And his answer is his
answer to the normative question (Korsgaard 1996 p. 16).
And later she writes:
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If someone falls into doubt about whether obligations really exist, it doesn’t help
to say, “Ah, but indeed they do. They are real things.” To see this, imagine a
case where morality requires you to face death rather than do a certain action.
You ask the normative question: you want to know whether this terrible claim on
you is justified. Is it really true that this is what you must do? (Korsgaard 1996 p.
38).
Korsgaard charges that the realist does not, and cannot, provide an adequate response
to the normative question. The realist’s difficulty in answering the normative question
comes from moral realism itself, whether naturalist or not.73
Why is it that Korsgaard thinks that realism has a harder time than constructivism
(or any other metaethical position for that matter) answering the normative question?
Korsgaard rightly points out that realism is a metaphysical position. The type of realism
that Korsgaard is addressing is what she calls “substantive realism” as opposed to
procedural realism. Substantive realism:
…is the view that there are answers to moral questions; that is, that there are
right and wrong ways to answer them...that there are answers to moral questions
because there are moral facts or truths, which those questions ask about
(Korsgaard 1996 p. 35).
The substantive realist “… thinks that there are correct procedures for answering moral
questions because there are moral truths or facts that exist independently of those
procedures… the procedures for answering normative questions as ways of finding out
about a certain part of the world, the normative part” (Korsgaard 1996 p. 36). Korsgaard
identifies herself as a procedural moral realist, which is the position that, “there are
answers to moral questions…there are right and wrong ways to answer them…But
procedural realism does not require the existence of intrinsically normative entities”
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2008).
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(Korsgaard 1996 p. 35) (From this point forward in the Korsgaard discussion I will refer
to ‘substantive realism’ as simply ‘realism’).
The realist conception of the task of moral philosophy is part of their problem,
she argues. Since realists see themselves as discovering and documenting the
normative part of the world, it is hard for them to be able to show how those discoveries,
the moral reality, moral facts, and moral properties, connect up with human action and
practical decision making in the right way. Korsgaard says that realists see ethics as a
branch of applied knowledge and this is the source of the problem.
In contrast, as a constructivist, Korsgaard sees ethics as providing solutions to
practical problems:
…according to constructivism, normative concepts are not …the names of
objects or of facts or of the components of facts that we encounter in the world.
They are the names of solutions of problems, problems to which we give names
to mark them out as objects for practical thought. The role of the concept of the
right, say, is to guide action… (Korsgaard 2003 p. 116).
Initially, there seem to be two options for locating the source of normativity, or
answering the normative question, according to Korsgaard:
So we are faced with a dilemma. If we try to derive the authority of morality
from some natural source of power, it will evaporate in our hands. If we try
to derive it from some supposedly normative consideration, such as gratitude or
contract, we must in turn explain why that consideration is normative, or where its
authority comes from. Either its authority comes from morality, in which case we
have argued in a circle, or it comes from something else, in which case the
question arises again, and we are faced with an infinite regress (Korsgaard
1996 p. 30).
A divine command theorist or a social contract theorist faces the same objection
according to Korsgaard. They have not given a justification for the obligation to obey the
divine commands or the obligation to honor the social contract. If the source of the
authority of morality is located in our desires or some set of emotions, then morality only
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seems to apply to us if we have those particular desires or emotions. And so it loses the
very authority, categoricity, or normativity that needs to be explained.
Korsgaard concludes that neither of these responses is adequate. The realist
refuses to answer or even address the normative question. Instead of telling the moral
skeptic why he is obligated to be moral, the realist, “dig[s] in his heels” and says that
“[o]bligation is simply there, part of the nature of things (Korsgaard 1996 p. 30).
According to the realist, the authority or normativity of morality is something that cannot
be further explained (Korsgaard 1996 p. 33). In other words, the realist’s response to
the normative question is to dismiss it altogether (Korsgaard 1996 p. 30-32). Korsgaard
finds this response to moral skepticism in the work of Richard Price, Samuel Clarke,
H.A. Pritchard, W.D. Ross, and G.E. Moore, who, she explains simply assert that right
actions are “intrinsically right” or have their fit-to-be-doneness built into them (Korsgaard
1996 p. 30-32).
As a metaphysical position, Korsgaard argues that realism falls victim to the
same objection that divine command theory is felled by, which she calls a Kantian
objection. Just as divine command theory is not equipped to respond to the question,
‘why am I obligated to do what God commands?’ realism is not equipped to answer the
question ‘why should moral facts or properties play any role in my practical decisions
about what to do and how to live my life?’
Another way of putting the problem is that Korsgaard sees a gap for the realist,
between knowledge of moral facts or properties and the application of that knowledge to
deliberation and action. Fitzpatrick explains the problem:
…in order to apply such a piece of knowledge and come to be motivated,
Korsgaard argues, one would need another norm dictating, for example that one
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ought (or is obligated) to perform good actions. Where, then is that norm
supposed to come from? It cannot itself be derived from the above knowledge of
the goodness of an action, for the very question is why one should care about
such goodness and apply such knowledge (FitzPatrick 2005 p. 656-657).
Any moral facts that the realist argues exist require “…some further norm prescribing
the application of such knowledge; and that further norm cannot itself be understood on
the realist model, as a known normative truth to be applies, without just raising the
same problem again”(FitzPatrick 2005 p. 656-657). This is why Korsgaard thinks that
realism cannot answer the normative question. Korsgaard takes this to be a variation on
the open question argument: “If it is just a fact that a certain action would be good, a
fact that you might or might not apply in deliberation, then it seems to be an open
question whether you should apply it” (Korsgaard 2003 p. 112).
This creates an infinite regress for the realist, whose only answer can be to
defend the existence of another moral fact that says that we ought to apply the original
moral facts to our deliberations, but why should we apply this new moral fact to our
deliberations?
For even if we know what makes an action good, so long as that is just a piece of
knowledge, that knowledge has to be applied in action by way of another sort of
norm of action, something like an obligation to do those actions which we know
to be good. And there is no way to derive such an obligation from a piece of
knowledge that a certain action is good. A utilitarian thinks an action is good
because it maximizes good consequences and a virtue theorist thinks it is good
because it is kind of brave, But how is it supposed to follow that it is to be done?
(Korsgaard 2003 p. 111).
In order to avoid circularity, the realists might argue that “some things are intrinsically
normative”(Korsgaard 1996 p. 33). The intrinsically normative things are just the things
that we have to do. The realist takes up the following strategy:
Having discovered that obligation cannot exist unless there are actions which it is
necessary to do, the realist concludes that there are such actions, and that they
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are the very ones we have always thought were necessary, the traditional moral
duties… (Korsgaard 1996 p. 34).
But this realist retreat to intrinsic, necessary, normativity cannot answer the normative
question, Korsgaard argues. Especially when we imagine the first person position of an
agent whose moral obligations come into sharp conflict with their own self-interest. The
agent takes on the role of the moral skeptic and asks whether she is really obligated to
do as morality requires.
2.1 Responding to Korsgaard’s Challenge
Moral realism needs to have a strong response to Korsgaard’s challenge and the
normative question. I respond to Korsgaard’s criticism in four related ways. First, I think
that she mischaracterizes realism’s resources for answering the normative question.
That is, she assumes that all the realist can do is stamp her foot and say that the
normativity is just there. I think realism can do more than that without falling into the
vicious circularity that she suggests it will. Namely, realism can give answers that come
from first order normative theories about why we ought to do what is morally required. If
this is not enough and the imagined situation of the moral skeptic still has force, it might
be that there is a subtle conflation of justification and motivation going on. I expect that
Korsgaard would not be satisfied by that response that realism can rely on first order
normative theories to answer the normative question that she is asking.
I offer a second, Prichard-style response to Korsgaard’s challenge. Prichard
famously argued that the question ‘why should I do what I am morally obligated to do?’
is a confused question. It is self-evident that one ought to do what one is obligated to
do. On his analysis any attempt to answer the question that Korsgaard poses will either
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be trivial (it will give a reason to do one’s duty in moral terms) or it will change the
subject by giving an answer in nonmoral terms.
Third, I argue that Korsgaard’s alternative to realism, Kantian constructivism,
cannot adequately answer the challenge she poses. Her own view faces the same
regress with which she charges the realism.
Fourth, I suggest that if all metaethical theories have difficulty answering.
Korsgaard’s strenuous formulation of the normativity question, realism fares better than
many others on the grounds that it captures objectivity in a unique way and that
objectivity is ultimately a large part of what we are talking about when we talk about the
authority of morality (See Section 5).
2.2 Is Korsgaard Conflating Justification and Motivation?
The obvious response to the moral skeptic who asks whether he is really
obligated to do what morality requires of him, is to lay out the reasons why the particular
course of action is indeed morally required. What those reasons are and how
persuasive they are is a matter of first order ethical theory. Depending on the first order
ethical theory that the person answering the normative question is working with, they
may appeal to the suffering of others affected by the agent’s actions, the respect that
we are all required to show for fellow rational beings, the rights of other people, etc.
Korsgaard recognizes that first order moral theory can give us straightforward
answers to this question; she writes, “a utilitarian might say that the rule says that
certain kinds of actions are to be performed (the principle of utility)”(Korsgaard 2003 p.
111). However, she thinks this is not enough to answer the normative question, for two
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reasons. First, a theory like utilitarianism does not explain “why there is such a rule” (the
rule of utility). Second, utilitarianism does not explain “…why we should conform to the
rule,” (Korsgaard 2003 p. 111). For Korsgaard, what needs to be further explained is
why the rule has any normative force itself or whether any proposed rule is obligatory to
follow.
Korsgaard draws a strong contrast between substantive realism and her
constructivism. Part of this contrast has to do with the way that realist take themselves
to be “describing normative reality,” while constructivists take morality to be “solving
practical problems of what to do in conflict” (Hussain and Shah 2006 p. 289). But this is
unfair to the realist because not only will they agree that the purpose of morality is
“about finding the solution to the problem of what to do,” they argue that “[c]orrectly
describing normative reality, discovering which actions have the property of to-bedoneness, answers the question of what one should do” (Hussain and Shah 2006 p.
289).
In the test case that Korsgaard uses for answering the normative question, doing
the right thing requires great personal sacrifice on the part of the agent in question. Of
course simply telling the agent that it is a real moral requirement will not help. Facing
death in order to fulfill a moral requirement is an extreme situation. Citing moral reasons
drawn from either a philosophical ethical theory or common morality probably will not
help either. When imagining this conversation, convincing someone on a first person
level that they are obligated to risk their life, it is very hard to differentiate questions of
justification from questions of motivation. It is easy to imagine the agent saying, yes I
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see why risking my life is the morally required course of action, but then hesitating and
asking for further justification.
But I wonder at that point in the conversation if the skeptic is simply expressing
the fact that they just cannot gather up any motivation to do what they are morally
required to do. Much of the force of considering this issue in a first person context is that
it is easy to imagine oneself struggling to accept, not only that morality requires a
particular action in challenging circumstances, but further that moral obligations really
are obligatory in general, if they are the kinds of things that require extreme selfsacrifice. In these cases one has an overwhelming conflicting motivation to take a
different course of action. Korsgaard points out that, the realist may be confident in the
obligatory nature of moral requirements, but not everyone is (Korsgaard 1996 p. 39-40).
In addition to the first person perspective, our interpretation of the skeptical
question may also be influenced by the fact that a moral requirement is being posed
that involves serious self sacrifice. What if the example was much more mundane and
involved minimal personal sacrifice in order to fulfill a moral requirement. Imagine
morality requires a young and healthy agent forfeit their seat on the bus for an elderly
person with a broken leg. The agent has only two stops left before they get off the bus
and so surrendering their seat to the elderly person will create only a little discomfort for
the agent. In this case, our agent is convinced that giving up the seat is the right thing to
do (on whatever first order ethical theory we are assuming is correct). Now he asks,
“Am I really obligated to do what is morally required? Must I make this sacrifice?” When
the level of personal sacrifice involved in fulfilling one’s moral duty diminishes, so does
the rhetorical force of the question. Although Korsgaard explicitly distinguishes
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between motivation and normativity, part of the force of this question seems to be
coming from the motivational issue. This leads to the next response, which is the
Prichard-style response. If indeed, the person is asking am I “obligated to do what I am
obligated to do?” then the answer, rightfully, can only be ‘yes.’
2.3 Prichard-Style Response to Korsgaard74

The mistake that moral philosophy famously rests on, according to Prichard, is
trying to provide a foundation for our moral obligations outside of duty itself. For the
Prichard-style response, the problem is not that any answer to the first person demand
for an explanation of the normativity of moral obligations will not satisfy the agent (that
criticism will be addressed in section 2.4 on why Korsgaard’s answer the moral skeptic
is unsatisfactory). The problem is that the question itself is conceptually confused and
self-defeating (Stern 2010 p. 1). The answer to the skeptic’s question will have to place
the source of the normativity of morality outside of morality itself. The Prichard style
response says that:
…to take skepticism seriously in the way that Korsgaard does, is to assume that
morality needs some extra-moral basis; however, to be moral is precisely to think
the moral reasons one has to act are compelling in themselves without any such
basis for them being required by someone who is a genuine moral agent (Stern
2010 p. 3).
Prichard argues that when the question is asked “why should I do these things [which I
am morally obligated to do]?”(Prichard 1912 p. 22) There are two kinds of responses
that are available to answer this question: “the reason 'why' is stated in terms either of
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the agent's happiness or of the goodness of something involved in the action”(Prichard
1912 p. 22). Of course Prichard argues that neither of these answers is suitable for the
following reasons.
The answer posed in terms of “the agent’s happiness” is essentially an egoist
answer; this is the type of answer Prichard takes Plato, Aristotle, Butler, Hutcheson,
Paley, and Mill to have given (Prichard 1912 p. 22). The problem with the egoist
answer: “[t]he answer is, of course, not an answer, for it fails to convince us that we
ought to keep our engagements; even if successful on its own lines, it only makes us
want to keep them” (Prichard 1912 p. 23). In other words, that a particular action is in
our own self-interest or will make us happy is “the wrong sort of reason for a person to
conform to specific moral demands” (Gaus 2011 p. 57).
The answer given in terms of the goodness of the action might be either a
consequentialist answer that says that one ought to do what will produce the most good
or a Kantian answer that says that one ought to do what is good in itself. Prichard has
two objections to the answer focused on either the instrumental or inherent goodness of
the action. Prichard understands the instrumental goodness of the action to mean that
the action creates a good state of affairs. This answer, he argues, assumes “that what is
good ought to be” (Prichard 1912 p. 24). And this is not necessarily the case.75 He
argues that this does not fit with our ordinary thinking about right and wrong. When we
think about why we ought to pay back a debt that we owe someone, we do not usually
think that this is the action that will create a state of affairs that is most good (Prichard
1912 p. 25).
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that an ought can only be derived from another ought. See (Prichard, 1912 p. 24).
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The problem with thinking that the inherent goodness of the action can provide
an answer to the question, why ought I to do my duty, is that it involves an incorrect
assumption about what makes an action good. According to Prichard, only the
motivation of the agent makes an action good (Prichard 1912 p. 26). However the
rightness or wrongness of an action is independent of the agent’s motivation (Prichard
1912 p. 26). It is often the case that we do the right thing without a good motivation, as
in the case when we pay our bills not out of our sense of obligation to replay our debts,
but out of fear of being sent to jail (Prichard 1912 p. 27).
2.3.1 Korsgaard’s Response to Prichard
Korsgaard is well aware of the fact that she is committing what Prichard would
call moral philosophy’s mistake, by asking the normative question in the first place.
Korsgaard addresses Prichard’s argument and includes him in her list of realists who
refuse to answer the normative question:
Prichard argues that it makes no sense to ask why you should be moral. If I give
you a moral reason - such as, “it is your duty” - then my answer is circular, since
it assumes you should be moral. If I give you a self-interested reason - such as,
“it will make you happy”- then my answer is irrelevant. That is not the reason why
you should be moral; you should be moral because it is your duty. If a question
admits only of answers that are either circular or irrelevant then it must be a
mistake to ask it. And if that is the question of moral philosophy, Prichard thinks,
then moral philosophy rests on a mistake. Obligations just exist, and nobody
needs to prove it (Korsgaard 2003 p. 32).
Pritchard, like other realists, Korsgaard argues, falsely assume that stipulating the
existence of inherently normative entities will end the discussion (Korsgaard 1996 p.
33). Korsgaard thinks she can do better than this by telling the skeptic that it is part of
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the nature of being an agent, taking anything to be a reason for acting that one value
the humanity of oneself and of others.
Briefly, Korsgaard’s solution to the normative problem has to do with our nature
as deliberative creatures, agents that act based on reasons. As such, we must form
practical identities which guide our decision making. Korsgaard observes that we have
a unique “capacity for self-conscious reflection about our actions.” This structure is what
creates “normative problems” for human beings. We are the types of beings that make
choices and act based on reasons; we deliberate about what we should do (Korsgaard
2009). If we did not have a conception of our practical identity, we would not be able to
formulate reasons for our actions.
Having a practical identity is not optional according to Korsgaard. A practical
identity Korsgaard argues is “a description under which you value yourself and you find
your life worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking” (Korsgaard 2009, p. 24).
Although we have several practical identities, we all share the identity of being a human
being (Korsgaard 1996 p. 212). We value this practical identity as it is the source of
everything else we value. If we did not value this identity, she argues, we would not be
able to value anything else. If Korsgaard can establish that we must value our own
human identity, then, she argues, we are “rationally required” to value humanity “in the
persons of others” as well (Korsgaard 1996 p. 121).
Every subject constructs their own practical identity and the moral law is the law
of that identity. She writes:
The reflective structure of human consciousness requires that you identify
yourself with some law or principle which will govern your choices. It requires you
to be a law to yourself. And that is the source of normativity. So the argument
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shows just what Kant said that it did: that our autonomy is the source of
obligation”(Korsgaard 1996 p. 103-104).
And this is what gives “us a kind of authority over ourselves, and it is this authority
which gives normativity to moral claims” (Korsgaard 1996 p. 19).
2.3.2 Evaluation of Korsgaard’s Response to Prichard
Korsgaard’s response to Prichard is problematic in several ways. First, the way
that Korsgaard interprets Kant, as a “radical constructivist,” leads her to have to say that
the value of rational beings is not inherent in the beings themselves, as a realist reading
of Kant would lead one to say (Watkins and FitzPatrick 2002 p. 360). This is problematic
on two grounds, first it is inconsistent with some of our firmly held moral commitments.
We don’t think that we should value people as rational beings because of the way that
this connects to our ability to will. Second, it is problematic in terms of Korsgaard’s
efforts to explain normativity in a way that is unavailable to realists. The normative force
of the explanation that she can provide for morality seems far weaker than what the
realist can provide. On her reading of Kant:
…the value of humanity …is not simply a fundamental property of humanity, as a
realist would have it, but winds up being further explicated in terms of a certain
modal fact about the nature of willing: the alleged fact that we cannot get our wills
to function unless we think certain things about ourselves (Watkins and
FitzPatrick 2002 p. 360).
Watkins and Fitzpatrick worry that this view does not give the right explanations for
certain moral facts and their normative force, like the fact that it is wrong to enslave a
fellow human being. The reason that Korsgaard has to give, has to do with “…a story
about what I have to do in order to exercise my will” (Watkins and FitzPatrick 2002 p.
361). But this does not seem right; people are not the sort of things that can be
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property, possibly because of something having to do with their inherent value. It is their
value that has “normative force for us” (Watkins and FitzPatrick 2002 p. 360-361). But
instead of giving an account of this, Korsgaard’s view, gives a “… reduction of the value
of persons to the commitments of deliberators arising from generic conditions on the
exercise of rational agency” (Watkins and FitzPatrick 2002 p. 360-361).76
Thomas Nagel makes a related criticism of Korsgaard, arguing that her version of
constructivism is compatible with egoism, depending on “how we conceive of ourselves
as reflective beings” (Nagel 1996 p. 203-204). Thus Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism
does not provide a stable or consistent basis for holding that humanity is intrinsically
valuable, because “…the reflective standpoint can yield different results for different
individuals because each person has his own reflective point of view” (Nagel 1996 p.
203-204).
One of the ways that Prichard considers that one might answer the question
‘Why should I do what I am obligated to do?’ would be in “terms …of the agent’s
happiness.” That is, one response would be that doing one’s moral duty aligns in some
(or in a variety) of ways with one’s own self-interest. Korsgaard’s answer to the
normative question is not obviously self-interested in any way. She is not saying that if
you do not do your duty you won’t be happy or that you will be punished by a deity.
However, on some readings of her work, she continues to fall victim to Prichard’s
charge of asking an incoherent or meaningless question (Stern 2010, p. 4-5).
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This is restated when they write: “There seems to be a commitment at the meta-ethical level to a detour
in the explication of another person’s value insofar as it is normatively significant for me through a certain
modal understanding about me or about what I have to be committed to in order to exercise my will at all”
(Watkins and FitzPatrick 2002 p. 362-363).
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Both of these criticisms can be seen as Pritchard-style responses to Korsgaard,
because they show that she attempts to provide an answer to the question why should I
be moral from outside of morality itself.77

2.4 Korsgaard Cannot Answer Her Own Normative Question
Korsgaard charges that the moral realist cannot and does not address the
normative question or explain the sources of normativity. One way she presses this
objection is by arguing that any acceptable answer to the normative question, must
succeed in addressing someone who is in the first person position of the agent who
demands a justification of the claims which morality makes upon him (Cohen 1996 p.
178).
In this section I will present three difficulties with Korsgaard’s own proposed
solution to the normative question. First, is a point made by G.A. Cohen about
Korsgaard’s demand for an answer to a first person request to the question of why
ought I to do my duty? Second, are Fitzpatrick’s and Copp’s points that Korsgaard’s
solution to the normative problem, focused on valuing one’s own humanity, cannot
answer skeptical worries about the normativity of morality because people can
consistently value other things in addition to their own humanity. A related problem
comes up when we ask why an agent must value their own humanity in the way that
Korsgaard insists they must. If this is a basic psychological fact about human beings,
then it makes sense to raise the objection that Korsgaard’s move from the inescapability
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Stern is the one that makes the connection to Prichard.
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of valuing something to the normativity of valuing something (namely humanity) is
unsupported.
2.4.1 First Person Requests
The first person request for a reason why I am obligated to do what morality
requires, the normative question, could be asked in either “the context of protest” or “the
context of self-justification,” according to Cohen (Cohen 1996 p. 179). The context of
protest occurs when doing the right thing is going to come at high personal cost for the
agent, frustrating the agent’s other plans or desires (Cohen 1996 p. 179). Cohen
wonders whether an “agent asking that question in so intransigent a spirit…could be
satisfied by any theory Korsgaard’s included” (Cohen 1996 p. 178). Korsgaard’s answer
will likely be insufficient; Cohen writes, “[i]t is useless to tell me that it lies in my practical
identity to be thus obliged” (Cohen 1996 p. 180). Cohen explains that if a metaethical
theory is required to answer the normative question in the context of protest it is likely
that the agent’s “practical identity” has already been disrupted by the life circumstances
that have led them to ask this question (Cohen 1996 p. 180). But none of this will be
persuasive to someone who does not see why they are obligated to act morally. Telling
them that it is inconsistent with their own sense of self or will does not apply to someone
who does not feel the force of this (Cohen 1996 p. 182).
A person in a tight corner may not like the sacrifice a moral requirement
demands of her, but she may reasonably be expected to recognize the normative
force of that requirement for her if we have both justified the relevant principle,
showing why it is true, and show how she as an agent has no choice but to adopt
some practical principle in order to function as an agent and so must in effect
choose between this true principle and other incompatible and thus false ones
(FitzPatrick 2005 p. 689).
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Although first person requests may be impossible to definitively answer, realism’s
unique claim to truth and objectivity may best position it to answer such a request.
2.4.2 Why should I value my humanity?
The broader objection here is that whatever reason Korsgaard gives for why we
are obligated by moral obligations, her answer to the normative question, is open to the
same kind of infinite regress that she accuses the realist position of being vulnerable to
(Radzik 1999 p. 36; FitzPatrick 2005 p. 673).
…if it is a fact that I will be acting consistently with all the implications of my
exercise of agency only if I make some sacrifice required by the formula of
humanity, then it is so far an open question whether or not I should apply that
fact in my deliberation and give it overriding weight. Why should I? Her own
argument against realism may thus be turned around against her own account,
again raising the prospect of an infinite regress of justifying norms (FitzPatrick
2005 p. 673).
The agent in the difficult situation can always ask about why he or she is obliged to
value his or her own agency, above and to the exclusion of all else in this situation. And
will then be faced with the same dilemma she accused competing accounts of value to
face, having to locate the source of this value outside of morality (as divine command
theory does) or insisting that the value is just there, in the nature
A related problem for Korsgaard’s answer to the normative question is that while
a rational person certainly values her own agency, she can simultaneously value other
things. Sometimes acting morally will thwart her ability to achieve those other things
she values (Copp 2007 p. 278). This does not mean that the person stops valuing his
or her own agency. But they can ask, “[w]hy should I care about acting full consistently
with all the implications of my exercise of agency…[a]nd why should I care about this
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more than I care about anything else, especially when some onerous sacrifice may be
involved?”(FitzPatrick 2005 p. 673).
Unless Korsgaard can say that it would actually be impossible for them to ask
this question, then she has merely delayed the normative question. At times, she does
come close to saying that it is impossible on her view for the normative question to be
asked again in response to her answer to it: “we as agents should care about these
issues of commitment and consistency because we have no choice: they are practically
necessary for our very functioning as agents, which is our ‘plight’ as creatures with
reflective consciousness”(FitzPatrick 2005 p. 673). Thus it seems that Korsgaard’s
position involves the following unlikely fact:
…it is literally practically necessary in order for us to exercise agency at all (1)
that we strive to act fully consistently with all the implications of the exercise of
our agency (as revealed by Korsgaard’s and Kant’s sophisticated philosophical
reflection) , and it is similarly necessary (2) that we care about this more than we
care about all the things that might conflict with those implications, such as a
central life project the pursuit of which might happen to conflict with the formula
of humanity (FitzPatrick 2005 p. 673).
But obviously people act immorally all the time and so it cannot be that Korsgaard
means that it is literally impossible for us to be inconsistent in this way (FitzPatrick 2005
p. 674). But it is not clear then what kind of impossibility she would be referring to.
2.4.3 From Inescapability to Normativity?
Another way of explaining the inadequacy of Korsgaard’s theory to deal with the
authority of morality can be found by looking at her “move from inescapability to
normativity” (Silverstein 2012 p. 4).
According to this … theory, we should respond to skeptical doubts about the
demands of morality not by digging in our heels and insisting as the realist does,
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that the obligations really do exist, but rather by showing that those demands are
inescapable (Silverstein 2012 p. 4).
According to Korsgaard, we do in fact value our own humanity and for reasons of
consistency, are obligated to value the humanity of others. But as Silverstein points out,
the fact that we value our own humanity does not tell us anything about whether or not
humanity itself is actually valuable or not; [w]e might…be helplessly devoted to pursuing
something which actually ought not to be pursued” (Silverstein 2012 p. 4-5). Valuing
our humanity is an “attitude” that we “inescapably” hold, according to Korsgaard
(Silverstein 2012 p. 6). But this matter is a contingent fact about us, human beings, but
not about the nature of humanity itself.
Korsgaard argues that morality has a certain authority over us, she calls this
normativity. And she argues that substantive realism (realism) cannot explain
normativity, only her form of Kantian constructivism can. In this section I have argued
that realism does not refuse to address or lack the resources to address the normative
challenge that Korsgaard poses. But that the way that Korsgaard poses the challenge is
too hard for any metaethical theory to answer. At the same time Korsgaard’s
constructivism faces its own difficulties in answering the normative challenge that she
argues realism cannot address.
Korsgaard does not specify whether the version of realism she is referring to is
naturalist or non-naturalist. The realism that I defend is naturalist. Thus it is important to
consider a prominent critique of naturalist moral realism’ account of normativity or the
authority of morality that focuses specifically on the naturalist commitments of the
theory. Parfit hold a non-naturalist realism and directs his argument against “nonanalytical naturalism” (Parfit 2011).
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3. Parfit’s Normativity
As a nonnaturalist realist, Parfit takes normative properties to be irreducible nonnatural properties. He claims that “normativity is essentially related to
reasons”(Kiesewetter 2012 p. 466). This is the “reason-involving conception” of
normativity. For Parfit, to deny the “irreducibility of normative facts” is to deny their
existence altogether (Parfit 2011 p. 267). Normative facts are facts about what we have
reasons to do; “[n]ormativity involves reasons or apparent reasons” (Parfit 2011 p. 268).
Reasons are, I believe, fundamental. Something matters only if we or others
have some reason to care about this thing (Parfit 2011 p. 148).
What is normative are certain truths about what we have reasons to want, or will,
or do (Parfit 2011 p. 424-25).
In this section I will give a brief account of Parfit’s objections to naturalism. Parfit’s
objections fail for reasons particular to each argument. But there are also problems with
his overarching approach. Parfit’s objections to non-analytical naturalism seem to be far
more applicable to analytical naturalism. Nor does Parfit distinguish between
nonreductive non-analytical naturalism and reductive non-analytical naturalism. Second,
Parfit’s arguments use the same kind of intuitions that Moore relied on in the open
question argument for the naturalistic fallacy.
3.1 Parfit’s objections to non-analytical naturalism:
Despite Parfit’s dissatisfaction with Korsgaard’s constructivism, there are some
striking similarities between Parfit’s objections to naturalism and Korsgaard’s objections
to realism. Both worry about the possibility of moral skepticism in the sense that a

203

moral agent, even if he or she is aware of all of the facts of a situation, may always be
able to ask, but why should I do what I am obligated to do? For Parfit, the problem in
naturalism that gives rise to this worry is that fundamental reasons are omitted from a
naturalist account. If naturalism is correct, then “we might be aware of pleasure and
pain, weal and woe, hope and despair, helping and harming, truth and falsehoodeverything that is of normative importance-yet absent recognition of independent reason
relations, ‘that importance would be unknown to us-as it is unknown, for example, to
some active intelligent cat’” (Railton 2013; Parfit 2011 p. 288). This means that we could
be aware of everything that has normative significance, but if we do not recognize the
fundamental reason giving force of those things that have normative significance, we
have missed normativity all together (Railton 2013).
This echoes Korsgaard’s claim that realists have the wrong conception of what
morality does; “goodness in action cannot just be a matter of applying our knowledge of
the good—not even a matter of applying our knowledge of what makes action itself
good” (Korsgaard 2003 p. 110). According to both views, having knowledge, or being
aware of all of the facts that are of normative significance, and even knowing that an
action, for example, is morally required, still leaves something significant out of the
picture; it leaves out normativity.
Parfit recognizes that non-analytical naturalists are not trying to make claims
about the meaning of moral terms; rather they are making claims about the nature of
moral facts and moral properties. Parfit also appreciates that what makes such a view
appealing is that it seems more consistent than other forms of realism with a naturalistic
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world view that takes all facts to be natural facts.78 Parfit takes non-analytical naturalism
to say:
…we use some words to express concepts and make claims that are irreducibly
normative, in the sense that these concepts and claims cannot be defined or
restated in non-normative terms. When we turn to facts, however, there is no
such deep distinction. All facts are natural, but some of these facts are also
normative, since we can also state these facts by making irreducibly normative
claims (Parfit 2011 p. 295).
Parfit presents three interrelated arguments against non-analytical naturalism,
“the normativity objection,” “the triviality objection,” and “the fact-stating argument.” 79
The three arguments share some common features. All seem, to share a common
heritage with Moore’s argument against the possibility of defining ‘good,’ especially in
naturalistic terms, despite the fact that Parfit recognizes that naturalists are not talking
about the meaning of moral terms. As part of the Moorean lineage of arguments
against naturalism, Parfit’s objections are also open to some of the responses (in a
modified form) given to the open question argument in Chapter 1. Parfit’s arguments
rely on intuitions about what normative facts must be like. But it is hard to see why
someone who does not already share Parfit’s nonnaturalist position and assumptions
would have the same intuitions that he expresses.
Parfit, like Korsgaard, is explicit about distinguishing questions of normativity
from questions of motivation. When discussing senses of “ought” that have to do with
motivation or “rational necessity,” Parfit writes, “an irresistible impulse is not a normative
reason. Nor is an impulse made rational by its ability to survive reflection on the facts.
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Here Parfit is characterizing the non-analytic naturalist’s position in terms of facts. I prefer to describe
the position in terms of the properties that naturalists take to exist, but here I will use Parfit’s fact
language.
79
Several more arguments or sub arguments against moral naturalism can be identified in Parfit’s work.
However, Parfit identifies these three arguments as his central objections to naturalism.
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Even after carefully considering the facts, we might find ourselves irresistibly impelled to
act in crazy ways” (Parfit 2011 p. 291). Ultimate normativity is not found in either
motivation or in the rational requirement to behave morally. 80
Here I will present and respond to Parfit’s normativity objection and triviality
objection. I leave out the fact-stating objection because he relies on the same intuitions
about the incommensurability of the natural and the normative that inform the other two
stronger arguments and so the third argument does not contribute anything significantly
different to Parfit’s critique of naturalism. The fact-stating objection also assumes a
controversial position about how the non-analytic realist understands the nature of
identities between natural and normative properties (Copp 2013 p. 53). The fact-stating
objection assumes that the non-analytical naturalist is committed to the “strong factidentity thesis” which says that “if M is identical to N, then each fact to the effect that
something is M is identical to the fact that that thing is N” (Copp 2013 p. 53). A
discussion of this principle is not within the scope of this chapter.
3.2 Parfit’s normativity objection to non-analytical naturalism
Parfit takes non-analytical naturalism to be committed to the idea that “we make
some irreducibly normative claims” but “there are no irreducibly normative facts” (Parfit
2011 p. 234). Parfit also thinks that it is committed to the view that true normative claims
“state facts that could also be stated by making other, non-normative and naturalistic
claims. These facts are both normative and natural” (Parfit 2011 p. 234).
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In the background here is a discussion about internal and external reasons; “To avoid confusion, we
should use the phrase ‘a reason’ only in its external, irreducibly normative sense” (Parfit 2011 p. 290).
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His argument against this view hangs on his ability to give evidence for the
following set of claims. First, “normative and natural facts are in two quite different, nonoverlapping categories” (Parfit 2011 p. 324). And second, that “natural facts could not
be normative in the reason implying sense”(Parfit 2011 p. 324-325).
Some kinds of facts have been historically thought of as being “in a different
category that physical facts,” like facts about vital force. But this thought turned out to be
wrong; facts about vital force are not, in fact, in a sui generis category, conceptually
different from natural facts. Parfit cites an ongoing debate about “whether conscious
experiences could be the same as, or consist in, physical events in some brain” as an
example of one of these questions about natural and non-natural facts that remains
unsettled (Parfit 2011 p. 324).
Many kinds of thing, event, or fact are, however, undeniably in different
categories. Rivers could not be sonnets, experiences could not be stones, and
justice could not be— as some Pythagoreans were said to have believed— the
number 4. To give some less extreme examples, it could not be a physical or
legal fact that 7 × 8 = 56, nor could it be a legal or arithmetical fact that galaxies
rotate, nor could it be a physical or arithmetical fact that perjury is a crime. It is
similarly true, I believe, that when we have decisive reasons to act in some way,
or we should or ought to act in this way, this fact could not be the same as, or
consist in, some natural fact, such as some psychological or causal fact (Parfit
2011 p. 325).
The relevant conception of normativity here is the reason giving sense of normativity
that Parfit defended earlier. Parfit’s basic point here is that normative facts and natural
facts are simply two different kinds of facts that cannot be identified with each other.
Even though it makes sense to say water is H20, “rivers cannot be sonnets” (Parfit 2011
p. 323).
So far this is not an argument, but merely a set of assertions that nonnaturalists
make. Copp helpfully reconstructs Parfit’s normativity objection in the following way:
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Any reductive naturalistic theory must identify each normative property M with
some natural property N. …any such property-identity thesis will drain the
normativity from claims to the effect that things that are N are M. Intuitively, such
claims are substantive and normative, but this is not so, if the naturalist is correct
(Copp 2013 p. 37) [italics added].
Parfit clearly anticipates the non-analytic naturalist’s response here, they are not
analyzing the meanings of words, but rather suggesting the possibility of identity
between facts or properties, analogous to cases of the identity between water and H20,
or heat and molecular motion, which were discovered in an a posteriori way, that had
nothing to do with the meaning of the words water or heat (Parfit 2011 p. 325).
However, Parfit argues that the analogy between to water and heat does not hold
for the identity between natural and normative facts. In the case of water or heat the
possible space of identities was “constrained by the relevant concepts” of water and
heat (Parfit 2011 p. 325). In an earlier discussion of naturalism, he argues that, heat for
example, has an “explicit gap that is waiting to be filled, since this concept refers to
some property without telling us what this property is” (Parfit 2011 p. 302). The gap
comes from the fact that we can identify the causes and effects of heat without really
knowing what heat is. Whereas normative concepts like “wrong” do not have “explicit
gaps that are waiting to be filled, in ways that would allow these concepts to refer to one
or more natural properties” (Parfit 2011 p. 302). The concepts of water and heat “leave
open various possibilities, between which we must decide on non-conceptual grounds”
(Parfit 2011 p. 325). So the concepts of heat left it open whether it was molecular
motion or phlogiston, it did not leave every possibility open.
But heat could not have turned out to be a shade of blue, or a medieval king. And
if we claimed that rivers were sonnets, or that experiences were stones, we could
not defend these claims by saying that they were not intended to be analytic, or
conceptual truths. Others could rightly reply that, given the meaning of these
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claims, they could not possibly be true. This, I believe, is the way in which,
though much less obviously, Normative Naturalism could not be true. Natural
facts could not be normative in the reason-implying sense (Parfit 2011 p. 325).
Something about the reason-implying concept of normativity prevents it from being
identical to any set of natural facts. Parfit’s suggestion that heat could not have turned
out to be a king is surely intuitively plausible the way it is presented. As of yet, Parfit has
not made the case that the naturalists identification of moral facts with natural facts is
equally implausible.
Parfit’s central way of illustrating the claim that there is a disanalogy between
other non-analytic property identities and normative identities is with the following
example. Imagine you are in a burning hotel, in order to save yourself you must jump
into a canal:
Since your life is worth living, it is clear that (B) you ought to jump. This fact,
some Naturalists claim, is the same as the fact that (C) jumping would do most to
fulfill your present fully informed desires, or is what, if you deliberated in certain
naturalistically describable ways, you would choose to do. Given the difference
between the meanings of claims like (B) and (C), such claims could not, I believe,
state the same fact. Suppose that you are in the top story of your hotel, and you
are terrified of heights. You know that, unless you jump, you will soon be
overcome by smoke. You might then believe, and tell yourself, that you have
decisive reasons to jump, that you should, ought to, and must jump, and that if
you don’t jump you would be making a terrible mistake. If these normative beliefs
were true, these truths could not possibly be the same as, or consist in, some
merely natural fact, such as the causal and psychological facts stated by (C)
(Parfit 2011 p. 326-7).81
The moral or normative fact here is (B) you ought to jump. The naturalist’s fact is (C) If
you deliberated in certain naturalistically describable ways; you would choose to jump
(paraphrasing one of Parfit’s examples of a naturalistic fact). Parfit’s example of a
naturalist’s proposed fact that they would claim is the same as fact (B). Parfit claims that
if (B) is true, it “cannot possibly be the same as, or consist in” (C). The obvious question
81

For a related, but distinct normativity objection to naturalism, see: (Dancy 2006).
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to ask Parfit here is why this is the case. Especially, considering that naturalists would
hope to give a much fuller account than the account given by (C). Parfit is ruling out the
possibility that any kind of fact (C) that can be stated in non-moral language cannot be
the same as fact (A).
3.3 Responding to Parfit’s Normativity Objection
Copp and others have pointed out that here Parfit does not provide a strong
reason to accept his claim that (B) and (C) cannot possibly be the same fact (Copp
2013 p. 47). Part of the impossibility of the identity between the facts stems from Parfit’s
claim that “reason-implying normative facts” are necessary facts, like the facts of
mathematics (Parfit 2011 p. 326).
It makes sense to think that “…the concept of heat rules out the possibility that
heat is a cabbage or a king” and “that the concept of right ness rules out the possibility
that rightness is a rocket or a mountain lion or that it is the property of being a yellow
rose” (Copp 2013 p. 47). Those would be very strange identities, but those are specific
identities, not a whole category of types of identities, natural identities. So Parfit does
not argue for the conclusion that moral facts or properties cannot possibly be natural
facts or properties as a result of the concept of morality (Copp 2013 p. 47). Claiming
that a concept rules something or another out requires more detail than Parfit provides.
Without answering the questions in what way does the concept of morality rule out
natural identities? or what is it about the concept that does so? All Parfit has given us is
an assertion.
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Parfit may answer this question by relying on his analysis of normativity as
essentially tied to the reason giving nature of moral claims. However, this will not solve
the problem. We would still demand “… to be given a reason to think that the concept of
a reason ensures that the fact that a person has decisive reason to jump ‘could not
possibly be the same’ as any natural fact’” as Parfit claims it could not be (Copp 2013 p.
47).
Here we might be reminded of Frankena’s response to the naturalistic fallacy.
Moore claims that while our moral theories can tell us about what kinds of things are
good, they cannot find define good itself in terms of anything else. Thus good is simple
and unanalyzable. For Parfit, normativity fundamentally has to do with reasons, which
are non-natural and sui generis. As discussed in Chapter 1, there are many reasons to
think that Moore’s argument does not succeed as a devastating objection to naturalism.
Frankena pointed out that “the charge of committing the naturalistic fallacy”
(though it is not a fallacy at all) “can be made, if at all, only as a conclusion from the
discussion and not as an instrument of deciding it” (Frankena 1939 p. 465). The
“generic” mistake being the naturalistic fallacy, the definist fallacy, is the mistake of
“confusing or identifying two properties, of defining one property by another, or of
substituting one property for another” (Frankena 1939 p. 471). But as Frankena shows,
the definist fallacy is only a mistake if one has already established with independent
evidence that the thing being defined (in Moore’s case good) is indefinable (Frankena
1939 p. 473).
The same point applies to Parfit’s normativity objection. Parfit claims that it
simply cannot be that the natural fact that ‘If you deliberated in certain naturalistically
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describable ways, you would choose to jump out of the burning hotel’ is the same as the
normative fact that ‘you ought to jump out of the burning hotel’. Parfit’s only evidence
for this claim is that there is an unbridgeable conceptual divide between these two sorts
of facts.
Railton has pointed out that one of the central differences between rivers and
sonnets, and natural facts and normative facts are the relations of constitution,
supervenience, and determination. While it is true that “rivers do not supervene on
sonnets…all the sonnets in the world do not determine which rivers there are…But all
the natural facts of the world take together do suffice to determine (metaphysically, not
analytically) all the normative facts” (Railton 2013 p. 16). This means that if the moral
facts were to change there would have had to be a change in the natural facts as well. I
think Parfit would respond to this by saying that he is not denying that all of the natural
facts determine all of the normatively relevant or significant facts, for example, what our
psychologies are like, that we feel pain, that we have certain institutions, etc. What
Parfit would deny is that all of these facts taken together capture or constitute
normativity, in the reason giving sense. And if the world does not include normativity,
then none of those facts really matter (Railton 2013 p. 1).
According to non-analytical, nonreductive naturalism, moral facts are constituted
by natural facts, rather than being identical with natural facts. Parfit does not seem to
consider this possibility. If moral facts are constituted or realized by natural facts this
allows for the possibility of the multiple realizability of moral facts, meaning that although
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in this world moral properties are “actually constituted or realized by natural properties”
it did not necessarily have to be this way (Brink 1989 p. 158).82 On this view:
Moral facts and properties …are constituted , composed, or realized by
organized combinations of natural and social scientific natural facts and
properties….This naturalist claim should be understood on the model of other
common constitution claims: for instance, tables are constituted by certain
combinations of microphysical particles, large scale social events and processes
such as wars and elections are constituted by enormously complex combinations
of smaller scale social events and processes, biological processes such as
photosynthesis are composed of [physical events causally and temporally related
in certain ways (Brink 1989 p. 159).
Another way of making this claim is to say that moral facts are a different level of
description from natural facts, just as psychological facts are a different level of
description than neuroscientific facts. Brink does not hang anything in his argument on
the distinction between natural facts being identical to certain normative facts and
natural facts constituting normative facts. But paying insufficient attention to this
distinction may be what fuels some of Parfit’s intuitions about the incommensurability of
normative and natural facts.
For example, in “The Normativity Objection,” Parfit argues that a natural “claim”
and a normative “claim” could not possibly “state the same fact.” I assume here that
Parfit is using “claim” to mean an expression or statement of a fact. I do not find this
claim intuitively appealing, but Parfit seems to. Let’s let the natural fact be “this act
maximizes happiness” and the normative fact be “this act ought to be done.” Parfit’s
position sounds somewhat less compelling when put in terms of constitution. In that
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Brink writes: Moral properties can be natural properties, though, even if they are not identical with
natural properties. F can be G even if the property (or properties) designated by ‘F’ is not (or are not) the
same as that (or those) designated by ‘G’. If G actually composes or realizes F, but F can be, or could
have been, realized differently, then G constitutes, but is not identical with F…a table is constituted by,
but not identical with, a particular arrangement of microphysical particles, since the table could survive
certain changes in its particles or their arrangement (Brink 1989 p. 157-158).
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case, the fact that the act maximizes happiness is what constitutes or realizes the fact
that the act ought to be done.
3.4 Parfit’s Triviality Objection to Non-Analytic Naturalism

Parfit’s triviality objection against non-analytic naturalism relies on a distinction he
makes between three types of normative claims, substantive, trivial, and positive. A
normative claim is “substantive when these claims are significant, because we might
disagree with them, or they might tell us something that we didn’t already know” (Parfit
2011 p. 343). In contrast, trivial claims either do not contain any new information or are
tautologies. Normative claims are positive “when they state or imply that, when something
has certain natural properties, this thing has some other, different, normative property”
(Parfit 2011 p. 343). Parfit ties the features of being a substantive and being a positive
normative claim together in the following puzzling way: “When such claims are true, they
state positive substantive normative facts” (Parfit 2011 p. 343). I will take Parfit to mean
that for the class of normative claims that are true, in order for them to be claims that are
philosophically interesting, they must also “state positive substantive normative facts”
rather than being true but trivial, or true but whatever the opposite of a positive claim is.
In order to illustrate the distinction, he gives an example of what might seem like a
moral view, but is in fact not. He imagines a utilitarian transplant surgeon who removes
vital organs from one patient, killing him, in order to save the lives of a group of younger
patients. When asked to justify his actions before the hospital’s ethics committee he
makes the following statement:
When I claimed that I ought to kill this patient, I was only stating the fact that this act
would maximize happiness. On my view, that is the property to which the concept
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ought refers. I was not claiming that this act would have some different property of
being what I ought to do. On my view, there is no such different property. The
property of maximizing happiness is the same as the property of being what we
ought to do (Parfit 2011 p. 342).
Parfit claims that this statement of the surgeon’s justification for his actions shows that the
surgeon does not actually have a moral or normative view at all (Parfit 2011 p. 343).
Although Parfit is not explicit, presumably this is because the presumptively normative
claim that the surgeon makes does not meet Parfit’s conditions for a normative claim, the
conditions of being both substantive and positive. The statement is not positive because
the surgeon plainly denies that the natural “property of maximizing happiness” is anything
different than being the “property of being what we ought to do”(Parfit 2011 p. 342). The
condition for being positive states “when something has certain natural properties, this
thing has some other, different, normative property” (Parfit 2011 p. 343). The surgeon’s
claim certainly seems substantive, in the sense that there will be people who do not share
the surgeon’s views.
Parfit uses two forms of utilitarianism to illustrate the triviality objection, a nonnaturalist form of utilitarianism and a naturalist utilitarianism. He defines utilitarianism
generically as the view that (A) “when some act would maximize happiness, this act is
what we ought to do” (Parfit 2011 p. 341). According to Parfit (A) is a substantive moral
claim, not a trivial claim. But (A) will be understood differently by non-naturalists and
naturalists.
Non-naturalist utilitarianism says (B) “when some act would maximize happiness,
this fact would make this act have the different property of being what we ought to do”
(Parfit 2011 p. 341). Naturalist utilitarianism says (C) “when some act would maximize
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happiness, that is the same as this act’s being what we ought to do” (Parfit 2011 p. 341).
Parfit makes the following argument:
If, […] (C) were true, (A) could not state such a fact. (A) could not be used to imply
that, when some act would maximize happiness, this act would have the different
property of being what we ought to do, since (C) claims that there is no such
different property. Though (A) and (C) have different meanings, (A) would be only
another way of stating the trivial fact that, when some act would maximize
happiness, this act would maximize happiness.
Therefore: This form of Naturalism is not true (Parfit 2011 p. 343-344).
What is at issue here is whether or not the action has two different properties; the
normative (ought) property and the distinct property of maximizing happiness. Or does the
action have just one relevant property, the property of maximizing happiness which is the
same property as the normative (ought) property. If (C) is the right way of understanding
utilitarianism, then utilitarianism no longer makes a substantive moral claim, it makes
merely a trivial one.
Finally, “[s]ince (A) is not trivial, (C) cannot be true” (Parfit 2011 p. 343-344). The
reason Parfit thinks that any identity claim between a moral property and a natural property
must be false, is that if it were true it would mean that what appear to be substantive moral
claims (like A), would be trivial. Here he seems to be relying on the idea that property
identity statements are always trivial because “every property is identical to itself” (Copp
2013). Frank Jackson helpfully recasts the argument in the following way:
Take any putative identification of being right with natural property N. If it is
correct, saying that an act which is N is right will be trivial. But it manifestly isn’t.
For example, suppose the naturalistic candidate for being right is maximizing
happiness, then [Parfit] argues, the claim that it is right to maximize happiness
will be trivial. It can come to nothing more than the claim that ‘being right is being
right’ or that ‘maximizing happiness is maximizing happiness’. But no one thinks
that. Many think that the claim that being right is maximizing happiness is false,
and those who think it is true agree it needs argument, and, moreover, think it is
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important to tell people about its truth. How then could the claim be trivial?
(Jackson 2012 p. 11).
A way of understanding the argument is as a dilemma that Parfit poses for the nonanalytical naturalist, to suggest that their proposed identity between the normative facts
and natural facts cannot be both positive and substantive at the same time (Railton 2013
p. 3-5). On the first horn of the dilemma, naturalism has to concede that there are actually
two distinct properties, the normative property and the natural property, not one. This is
because of the condition that Parfit establishes that the identity must be positive in order
for it to count as a “true and informative” normative claim (Railton 2013 p. 4). Recall that
“normative claims are positive when they state or imply that, when something has certain
natural properties, this thing has some other, different normative property (Parfit 2011 p.
343). Thus any identity claim the naturalist makes will be self-defeating.
On the other horn of the dilemma, if naturalism gives a “referential reading of [the
identity claim], so that it reaches directly to the underlying natural property, with no
recourse to an intermediating normative property” this leads to the triviality of naturalistic
identity claim (Railton 2013 p. 6).
3.5 Responding to Parfit’s Triviality Objection

Naturalists respond to this objection in at least three ways. The first has to do
with the structure of the argument itself. The second, focuses on the nature of moral
concepts and scientific concepts. The third response has to do with an assumption
Parfit makes about the nature of identities. And the fourth response focuses on Parfit’s
characterization of a positive normative claim.
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Schroeder argues that as presented Parfit’s argument for the triviality objection is
not valid (Schroeder 2011 p. 6-7). This is because Parfit’s condition for normative claim
being positive says “when they state or imply that, when something has certain natural
properties, this thing has some other, different, normative property” (Schroeder 2011 p. 6).
The condition stipulates “some other, different, normative property” (Schroeder 2011 p. 7).
This property does not have to be same normative property that is being reduced.
Schroeder does not give an example, but I have tried to construct one here to clarify.
If the first normative property that we are trying to naturalize is “what we ought to do”
and the natural property is “maximizes happiness,” the only informative and positive
normative claim need not be one that says “whatever maximizes happiness has another
distinct normative property of being what we ought to do.” We could instead say that:
“whatever maximizes happiness is whatever we ought to do, and whatever maximizes
happiness has the other normative property of maximizing rightness.” This way the
normative claim will have met the condition of being both substantive and positive. The
property of maximizing right is another, different normative property, so it meets Parfit’s
condition of positivity.
A second way to respond to the triviality objection is to return to the property
identifications that naturalist find analogous to the moral case, the identity between
water and H20 and heat and molecular motion. These identities are not trivial; in fact
when scientists made these discoveries people acquired new information about the
nature of water and heat.
However, Parfit anticipates this response when he argues that scientific concepts
have gaps that are waiting to be filled, unlike normative concepts. Parfit’s sense that
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certain concepts like water and heat have gaps and that moral concepts do not,
however, is just a sense he has. Parfit is aware that some kinds of concepts used to be
thought to be in two “non-overlapping categories” (Parfit 2011 p. 324). But Parfit’s
assertion that moral concepts are not in need of a natural explanation is a way of
prejudging the outcome of our investigations. Methodologically, Railton argues, “it
seems better…not to restrict the possibility of finding an underlying explanation or
reduction of commonsensical categories by limiting this only to those concepts ‘readymade’ for such explanation or reduction” (Railton 2013 p. 18). As Parfit is aware, there
are historical examples of entities that at one time had “no preconceived ‘space’ for
realization by purely physical systems” that we now believe science can give us
reductive explanations of, like vital force (Railton 2013 p. 17).
Helpfully, Jackson’s distinction between a “role” and a “realizer” provides another
convincing response to Parfit’s “gap” response. Jackson observes that most moral
theories start with uncontroversial claims about the nature of right and wrong, good and
bad, etc., what Jackson calls “folk morality” (Jackson 2012 p. 12).
The most attractive approaches to ethics start by making rather general claims
that are urged to be self-evident, or a priori, or constitutive of the moral, or
justified by the way they make sense of our most firmly held moral convictions,
or….What’s right is what’s in accord with norms that no one could rationally
object to…[etc.]…They [the general claims] give naturalists their riding
instructions, as we might put it. The naturalists task, is then to find and
identification of, let’s say being right, in terms of a natural property that makes
true the general claim or claims in question…The implication of this picture is that
any identification of being right will be an unobvious one. It takes real work to
move from the general claim or claims to a thesis about which property fits the
bill…(Jackson 2012 p. 12).
This response shows that Parfit’s claim that naturalist’s identifications of moral
properties will not be trivial. This response is strengthened when we think about the
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claims of folk morality that we begin our ethical theory with as giving us “… a job
description that rightness…needs to satisfy” (Jackson 2012 p. 13). We do not know at
the outset which property or set of properties will fulfill or satisfy that job description.
Non-analtyical naturalists think that it is possible to find the natural properties that
satisfy the job description given to us by our starting assumptions (“folk morality”).
Jackson calls the job description the “role property”, and the kinds of properties that
non-analytical naturalists hope to discover the “realizer property.”
For example, if part of the job description gives a central place to what’s desired
in ideal circumstances, and allows that what’s desired in ideal circumstances is
contingent, then the property that fills the job description for rightness may vary
from possible world to possible world. We will need in this case, distinguish the
property that fits the bill-something that may vary from one world to another-from
the property of being the property that fits the bill-something that is constant
across worlds. The first is the realizer property, the second is the role property
(Jackson 2012 p. 13).
There are many analogous cases in the sciences. Jackson uses the example of what it
is to be a random sequence of numbers as being an important question in probability
theory and statistics. Discoveries in that area provide us with new information, are
controversial, and not trivial. Importantly, contra Parfit, a theory of what it is to be a
random sequence does not mean that “there are two properties, that of being a random
sequence and that of being so and so, where so and so is the account on offer-two
distinct properties that are somehow glued together…There’s one property” (Jackson
2012 p. 14).
Another way of responding to Parfit’s insistence that naturalist identification of
moral properties would be trivial, is to point out an assumption that Parfit makes about
the nature of identities (Setiya 2011).
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Parfit assumes, in effect, that when two concepts refer to a single property, and
the first is unanalyzed, the content of the second can be explained in other terms.
The challenge to the Naturalist is then to analyze normative concepts in a way
that reveals the informational content of the alleged identity (Setiya 2011 p. 3).
So Parfit takes it for granted that if there is an identity between concept A and property
X and there is also an identity between concept B and property X, this means that the
two concepts, A and B, can be used interchangeably. But this is false. The morning star
and the evening star are both Venus, but the concepts cannot be used interchangeably.
…the Naturalist … should deny that the concept should be analyzed in terms of
other concepts. It is informative to learn that what would satisfy one’s final
desires is what one should do, but not because one discovers that doing what
satisfies one’s final desires has a property distinct from that of being what one
should do. One learns, precisely, that it is what one should do, information that
cannot be expressed in any other way (Setiya 2011 p. 3).
If we are truly non-analytical naturalists, then we do not have not to accept Parfit’s
challenge in the first place, that normative concepts can be analyzed in terms of
naturalistic concepts.
More generally, we should question Parfit’s definitions of substantive and positive
moral claims (Railton 2013; Schroeder 2011). The condition that a normative claim must
be positive in the manner that Parfit uses it is blatantly prejudices the outcome of any
naturalist attempt at making identity statements between normative and natural facts. If
the naturalist accepts Parfit’s “positivity” condition, they have already given up the
game. The terms of the debate, Parfit’s conditions, do not seem to have an independent
force unless one already rejects naturalism.
Parfit’s arguments against non-analytical naturalism fail because he
mischaracterizes the naturalists’ position, the nature of the relationship between
concepts and properties, and assumes a view on the uninformativeness of the identities
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that naturalists take to be out there to be discovered. For these reasons, Parfit’s claim
that naturalism cannot do justice to normativity does not succeed. Parfit’s two major
objections to non-analytic naturalism that were assessed here both failed to persuade
that non-analytical naturalism is unequipped to handle the normative nature of moral
facts. As others have noted, much of Parfit’s discussion amounts to an insistence on his
own certainty that a normative fact just cannot be the same thing as a natural fact.
4. Blackburn’s Quasi-Realism
Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism is the final metaethical alternative to naturalist
realism that I will consider. The main purpose in discussing quasi-realism is to use it as
an illustration of the centrality of objectivity in explaining what a minimal account of the
authority of morality could look like. I argue that because quasi-realism is not able to
offer an adequate account of moral objectivity it certainly cannot capture the authority of
morality. Following this, in the final section of the chapter, I argue that with respect to
the concept of normativity or authority, many metaethical views are on equal footing
with each other, but realism is able to capture the most important feature of morality’s
authority, its objectivity.
Because Parfit, Korsgaard, and others have argued that naturalist moral realism
cannot capture the authority of morality in some sense, it is helpful to consider one more
metaethical position that is, at least superficially, close to naturalist moral realism, and
to consider whether that view can adequately capture the authority of morality.
Blackburn’s rejection of naturalist moral realism functions in a different way from
Parfit’s or Korsgaard’s. Blackburn is concerned with the excess metaphysical baggage
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that any realist brings to the table. He argues that his leaner and meaner version of
expressivism, quasi-realism, can capture the moral language and practice that realists
claim to capture, without making any questionable metaphysical commitments.
4.1 Why Quasi-Realism?
Quasi-realism is Blackburn’s attempt to make sense of certain aspects of moral
phenomenology while avoiding the “queerness” of realism and without resorting to
Mackie or Joyce style error-theory. According to Blackburn, the quasi-realist is
“someone who 'starting from an anti-realist position finds himself progressively able to
mimic the thoughts and practices supposedly definitive of realism” (Blackburn 1993 p.4).
The moral phenomenology that Blackburn is referring to are the facts of our everyday
moral practices, the way we speak about morality, and the role that morality plays in our
life. In this context, we seem to assume that there is a “moral reality.” For example,
when we make moral judgments, although we tend to think we are making judgments
that are correct, we admit the possibility that we could be mistaken in our judgment.
Nor do we believe that thinking that something is morally wrong is what makes it morally
wrong. Blackburn accepts that the moral phenomenology seems to assume some
version of moral realism.
Blackburn thinks that the theory of quasi-realism, as a kind of projectivism posits
the existence of fewer entities than moral realism, or than any version of cognitivism
does, and that this is a theoretical advantage. Projectivism, is “the philosophy of
evaluation which says that evaluative properties are projections of our own sentiments
(emotions, reactions, attitudes, commendations)”(Blackburn 1984 p. 180). He claims

223

that quasi-realism does not have to posit a unique way of knowing or gaining access to
moral facts, as a cognitivist may have to. Second, Blackburn argues that only
projectivist quasi-realism can give a plausible account of the supervenience of moral
properties on natural properties. Third, Blackburn argues that quasi-realism and
projectivism offer a better account of moral motivation; if one accepts the Humean
theory of motivation, which state that beliefs are inert and people only perform actions
when beliefs are coupled with desires. If our moral judgments are beliefs, then the fact
that they move us to act or refrain from acting in certain ways requires an appeal to a
further desire to do the right thing or to be virtuous (See Chapters 2 and 3). If on the
other hand, our moral judgments are expressions of non-cognitive states then they may
have motivational force in themselves.
The moral appearances, then need to be reconciled with what Blackburn takes to
be the only defensible account of the nature of moral judgments and moral thought.
Moral judgments express non-cognitive emotional reactions to the world. This is a
position about moral language, moral psychology, and the nature of moral properties.
But at the same time quasi-realism seeks to explain why we can still say things like “it is
true that stealing is immoral” and “whether something is right or wrong is not dependent
on what we think about it.” In order to reconcile these two positions, Blackburn’s view
relies on a deflationary account of truth and a projectivist metaethics.
4.2 Quasi-realist objectivity
The deflationary or minimalist account of truth that Blackburn relies on:
…allows us to end up saying ‘It is true that kindness is good.’ For this means no
more than that kindness is good, an attitude that we may properly want to
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express seems to let us end up saying, for instance, that ‘kindness is good’
represents the facts. For ‘represents the facts’ means no more than: ‘is
true’….we might even find ourselves saying that we know moral propositions to
be true. Or really true, or really factually true, or really in accord with the eternal
harmonies and verities that govern the universe, if we like that kind of talk
(Blackburn 1998 p. 79).
We can consistently say that ‘kicking dogs for fun is wrong’ is true, or is really true, or
represents the facts. We can speak this way without being committed to the existence
of moral properties or facts in the metaphysically loaded way that the realist is. A
deflationary or minimalist theory of truth is most easily understood in contrast to a
correspondence theory of truth, which says that the propositional contents of our
thoughts or sentences are true when they match the way the world is. The deflationary
position on the other hands, says that:
...sentences … express 'nondescriptive' propositional contents. These
contents...do not purport to represent the world but rather play grammatical or
logical roles very similar to those played by ordinary 'descriptive' propositions,
such as embedding in propositional attitude descriptions (e.g., 'I believe that p')
(Cuneo 2008 p. 179-180).
This means that the “nondescriptive propositional contents” of our sentences and beliefs
are “neither are true nor correspond to correlative facts in [a particular] domain” (Cuneo
2008 p. 180-181). When applied to moral sentences and beliefs, the theory is supposed
to leave the normal ways we speak about right and wrong untouched in their current
forms, this is part of Blackburn’s overall, quasi-realist strategy. He maintains that he is
able to capture our everyday ways of thinking and speaking about morality just as well
as the realist can. So on the deflationist view “…we can say that these contents are
true or correspond to the facts…to say 'It is true that killing is wrong' is simply to repeat
or endorse the (nondescriptive) proposition that killing is wrong" (Cuneo 2008 p. 180181).
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But if evaluative properties are “projections of our own sentiments (emotions,
reactions, attitudes, commendations)” as Blackburn claims they are, then he has to be
able to answer the person who says that if everyone felt differently than they currently
do, the moral facts would be entirely different than they currently are (Blackburn 1984 p.
180). What can Blackburn say to the person who endorses the claim, ‘If we felt
differently, then kicking dogs for fun would be morally right’ (Blackburn 1984 p. 218)?
The person making the statement is expressing an attitude of approval for the attitude
that 'the wrongness of kicking dogs is dependent on our sentiments' (Blackburn 1984 p.
218). That meta-attitude of approval is morally abhorrent, according to Blackburn.
For Blackburn, whether morality is objective or not is a first order normative
issue, just as whether or not abortion is wrong, or whether people are endowed with
universal human rights, are first order normative issues. This means that the question of
whether kicking dogs for would be wrong regardless of whether anyone ever thought it
was wrong, is a question from within morality rather than from without.
…on the construal of indirect contexts that I offer, it comes out as a perfectly
sensible first-order commitment to the effect that it is not our enjoyments or
approvals to which you should look in discovering whether bear-baiting is wrong
(it is at least mainly the effect on the bear)’ (Blackburn 1993 p. 153).
Blackburn explains that it would be morally objectionable to hold the position that
whether or not something is wrong depends on whether we think it is wrong. This is a
moral view, according to Blackburn, about which features of the dog-kicking are the
ones that make it wrong. The person who makes that statement is picking out our
feelings or attitudes about dog kicking as the thing that makes dog kicking wrong, when
what actually makes the dog kicking wrong is the pain it causes the dog (Blackburn
1984 p. 219). In other words, “…it is immoral to regard moral truths as mind226

dependent” (Rasmussen 1985 p. 187).
Blackburn takes his position to be justified because he understands the mind
independence of morality as simply the denial of the “following counterfactual: had our
sentiments been different, then the moral truth would have been different too”
(Rasmussen 1985 p. 187).
…what seems like a thought that embodies a particular second order metaphysic
of morals is seen instead as a kind of thought that expresses first order attitude
or need…on the construal of indirect contexts that I offer, it comes out as a
perfectly sensible first-order commitment to the effect that it is not our
enjoyments or approvals to which you should look in discovering whether bearbaiting is wrong…(Blackburn 1993 p. 153)
When faced with the question of what, other than the fact that I don’t like it, makes
kicking dogs wrong, “Blackburn …den[ies] that there is any way to ask the question …
without asking ‘a moral question, with an answer in which no mention of our responses
properly figures” (Brown 2008 p. 112). Blackburn relies here on Rudolph Carnap’s
distinction between internal and external questions, and claims that questions about the
justification of our moral views are internal to our “moral framework” (Brown 2008 p.
112). In attempting to step into the domain of external questions to get a justification for
a particular moral claim, according to Blackburn, “… we show that we are confused or
some kind of anti-naturalist” (Brown 2008 p. 112-3).
The upshot is that it is consistent with quasi-realism that there to be “many moral
frameworks” and if we try to determine which one of those frameworks is the correct (in
the sense that “which framework corresponds to the way things are?”) one is asking an
incoherent question (Brown 2008 p. 118).
Blackburn charges that if, as the realist would, one insists on getting an answer
to the external question, about which one of the moral frameworks captures reality, this
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shows that the realist must be relying on some version of a correspondence theory of
truth that cannot be defended. Blackburn argues that he prevents a slide into relativism
by pointing out that “there is no such thing a robust property of truth that would make
[the external] question intelligible (Brown 2008 p. 118).

4.3 The problem with quasi-realist objectivity
When reading Blackburn’s quasi-realist explanation of the objectivity of morality it
is easy to get the feeling that he is attempting to pull off some kind of a trick. This
section will try to diagnose exactly what the trick is and why Blackburn’s account is not a
satisfactory response to the person who claims that if everyone felt differently, kicking
dogs for fun would be morally good (Rasmussen 1985; Zangwill 1994, 1990; SinnottArmstrong 2007).
A preliminary point is that Blackburn’s account amounts to a denial of one central
aspects of metaethics. It denies that one of the central questions that have occupied
metaethics is simply a mistake-that is the question of whether or not morality is
fundamentally grounded in mind independent reality.
The first problem with Blackburn’s account is that there is a status difference
between substantive moral claims and metaethical claims, which Blackburn ignores
(Sinnott-Armstrong 2007; Zangwill 1994). Here I use the terms objectivity and mind
independence interchangeably. I think that what is importantly at stake in the debate
between quasi-realism and realism is objectivity, understood as the claim that moral
facts remain the same regardless of what human beings think, believe, or feel about
them. They are mind independent in this sense, not in the sense that if no minds were
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to exist, moral facts would continue to exist unchanged, and not in the sense that moral
facts have nothing to do with minds.
There is also a difference in status between the claims of morality at the level of
moral theory or moral truths and the metaethical level, which have to do with conceptual
and metaphysical truths (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007 p. 29). Claims about the rightness or
wrongness of kicking dogs have a different status than claims about whether or not
morality exists objectively in a mind independent way. Zangwill argues that analogously,
if someone held the position that whether or not 2+2=4 is dependent on our attitudes
about their sum, this would not count as a “mathematical attitude or belief,” akin to the
belief that 1x3=3. This would have to be stated at some other level of belief about the
nature of mathematics. And Zangwill wonders, if an “internal reading” of the metamathematical claim” does not seem correct then neither should Blackburn’s internal
reading of claims about moral objectivity and mind independence make sense either
(Zangwill 1994 p. 209-210).
Zangwill also offers an account of what is significantly different about the way
realists and quasi-realists like Blackburn talk about objectivity and mind independence.
One of the suggestions for why there is a difference in conceptual status between these
claims is the claim that mind independence has “generativity,” which means that:
…the principle of mind-independence can be instantiated by infinitely many
particular cases. Mind-independence is the principle that 'It is not the case that
the wrongness of anything depends on my attitudes'. Quasi-realism needs to
achieve such a general formulation and not merely a formulation in terms of
kicking dogs (Zangwill 1994 p. 210).
Part of Zangwill’s point here is that from a metaethical concept like mind independence,
we can infer that any case of wrongdoing is independent of our attitudes (Zangwill 1994
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p. 210). Quasi-realism’s mind independence has to be articulated on a case by case
basis.
The second problem with Blackburn’s account is that it does not really capture
our moral practice and everyday ways of moral thinking about objectivity in the same
way that realism can (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007 p. 29). This is a particular problem for
Blackburn because one of the virtues of quasi-realism is supposed to be that it can
capture all of the same practices that realism can. When we moralize, when we make
moral judgments, we are aiming at or aspiring to making moral judgments that are
correct. This also happens when we disagree about morality with other people. The
possibility of a moral judgment being incorrect is usually thought to have the status of a
conceptual truth. A system of moral judgments without the assumption of correctness
built into them would just be a set of judgments about the niceness of people, acts, and
desires, but not a system of moral judgments.
…Blackburn glosses the counterfactuals as claims about which patterns of
sensibilities are or are not acceptable, but people take themselves to be talking
about kicking dogs rather than about attitudes when they assert such claims or
counterfactuals. If some people fail to disapprove of kicking dogs but still do not
perform acts of kicking dogs, then I might think less of them, but at least they do
not do any of the acts that I am talking about that I call ‘when’ when I say,
‘Kicking dogs is wrong.’ The same point applies to the counterfactual, “Even if we
all approved of it, kicking dogs would still be wrong.’ The consequent is a
judgment about acts in another possible world, not about attitudes in this world or
that. Thus even if Blackburn does capture one kind of mind independence, it is
different from the kind of mind-independence that realists find implicit in common
moral thought and talk (Sinnott-Armstrong 2007 p. 29).
What is important for preserving what a realist thinks that we want from moral mind
independence is modal independence of some kind (Jenkins 2005). When we say that
right and wrong are independent of what we think about them, we mean that certain
acts remain right or wrong in other possible worlds, in which people have different
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beliefs about them. Whereas Blackburn’s version of mind independence is really about
the attitudes of other people, people who say things like, ‘right and wrong just depend
on what we think about them’.
There are good reasons to doubt that quasi-realism captures moral objectivity, in
the sense of mind independence, despite Blackburn’s reply that to think that moral
judgments are relative to what a particular person or society thinks about them is a
matter or first order ethics. 83
Blackburn’s quasi-realism does not seem to be able to give a reason to think that
any individual or group’s opinions, beliefs, or emotive reactions to states of affairs are
justified or even more justified than any others. Although Blackburn (and most others)
thinks that torturing dogs for fun is wrong, when pressed to give a justification for this
reaction, or one of the more fundamental reactions underlying it, he cannot. What
Blackburn fails to provide, Brown argues is, “an account…of why it is that we ought to
feel one way rather than another” about a particular moral issue (Brown 2008 p. 104).
The projectivist interpretation, therefore, is another attempt to represent the
rational criticism of attitudes by appealing to higher-order attitudes. But the
multiplication of attitudes does not capture the possibility of the criticism or
evaluation of attitudes; it always leaves some attitude beyond criticism that
apparently ought not to be beyond criticism (Irwin 2009 p. 834).
The problem here is essentially that Blackburn will either face an infinite regress of
attitudes or he will have to say that at some point, certain moral attitudes we have are
foundational, that is they are not justified in terms of another “higher-order attitude.” If
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It would be too far afield to go into a detailed discussion of why Blackburn’s reliance on a deflationary
account of truth fails to secure him the justification he needs. Briefly, Blackburn assumes not only a
“redundancy theory of truth” but also a “deflationary theory of truth”. The first is a theory about the
meaning of “is true”, that is, “to say that p is true is to say no more than p”; the deflationary theory of truth
“says that there is nothing more to the property of being true than the T-schema” (Brown 2008 p. 105).
And the deflationary theory of truth “cannot save Blackburn from the charge that quasi-realism collapses
into mere autobiography” (Brown 2008 p. 106).
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this is the case those attitudes that are foundational are either unjustified or arbitrary.
The alternative is, as a realist would contend, that they are justified in terms of their
relationship with some kind of moral reality that is independent of those attitudes.
Blackburn’s interpretation of mind independence means that it is only possible to
“…disapprove of some attitudes by reference to other attitudes” but, “this is not how we
normally understand the fallibility of attitudes” (Irwin 2009 p. 834).
5. Moral Realism and a Minimal Understanding of the Authority of Morality
The objection to naturalist moral realism based on the authority of morality says
the authority that morality has over us is incompatible with some element of naturalist
moral realism, either the element of the theory that makes it realism, or the element of
the theory that makes it naturalist.
I have responded to this objection in several steps. First I have considered some
of the most frequently discussed accounts of what the authority of morality could consist
in inescapability, overridingness, categoricity, bindingness, or normativity. A recurring
theme of this work is to distinguish these accounts of the authority of morality from the
motivational nature of our moral judgments. The way that our moral judgments motivate
us are psychological facts about human beings. No matter how motivational our moral
judgments turn out to be, it is always appropriate to ask whether or not we should be
motivated to act on them. This is the case with any kind of consideration that may
provide us with motivation. A lot of confusion regarding the nature of morality’s authority
can be avoided once the difference between authority and motivation is appreciated.
One of the positive preliminary claims that naturalist moral realism can make about the
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authority of morality is that authority is a feature of morality itself, rather than a feature of
human beings. Authority does not have to do with our motivational system, whether that
is construed in terms of reasons or desires.
After the motivational issue has been tabled, it becomes more difficult to see why
naturalist realism would have a harder time than other metaethical theories accounting
for any of the various plausible interpretations of the authority if morality. What kind of
authority does morality then have on the naturalist moral realists view? If you ignore the
demands of morality, you are probably morally bad. Morality applies to you whether you
care about it or not, in the same way gravity applies to you whether you care about it or
not. It seems like this is a striking dissimilarity. You cannot bump into moral properties
in the way that you can bump into walls. Of course, if you ignore the laws of gravity you
might fall down and get hurt. If you ignore the laws of morality, the moral facts and
properties, you will not fall down. But you will be a bad person, and other people will
probably notice. The world and your identity change when you ignore moral facts and
properties, the properties that we can ascribe to you also change. Of course, what
makes a property or fact respectably real is not the fact that if you ignore it something
bad will happen to you.
Naturalist moral realism by itself will probably not be able to provide an answer to
the normative moral skeptic who demands to know why they should do what they are
morally required to do and is not satisfied by the reasons provided by the appropriate
first order normative theory. But no other metaethical theory can secure this answer
either. What naturalist moral realism can provide that brings it closer to accounting for
the authority of morality that other metaethical positions cannot is the objectivity or mind
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independence of morality. Presumably, for a set of considerations to be authoritative, it
is at least required that they be true, real, or objective (FitzPatrick 2005). This is the
minimal account of the authority of morality, authority as objectivity.
A prominent realist strategy for understanding the authority of morality is shifting
this discussion to one about practical reason or rationality. Realists then argue that in
order to reason well, one has to recognize moral reasons as paramount. Or they may
argue that moral considerations necessarily give us reasons for acting, even if they do
not necessarily motivate us to act on them. I have chosen not to directly engage in a
debate about reasons or rationality in this chapter because I do not think that talk of
reasons can secure the authority of morality for realism. In part, this is because talking
about reasons has the drawback of either being understood as another purely
normative discourse or a folk psychological one.
On the one hand, many acknowledge that theories of practical reason and
rationality are, like theories of morality, also a normative enterprise. If the issue of where
the authority of morality comes from and what the authority of morality is gets translated
into talk about reasons, then the question of the authority is merely being postponed,
passed off to another normative domain. The issue will inevitably resurface in the form
of a question about the authority of practical reason. Alternatively, rationality and
practical reason can be understood as purely descriptive theories of either folk
psychology or to be investigated by psychology and cognitive science proper. But if that
is the case, it is unlikely that those theories will be of any help in securing the authority
of morality. Psychological theories, whether folk or scientific, can tell us about
ourselves; they can give us insight into the truth of cognitivism or non-cognitivism, and
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the nature of moral motivation. But it is not clear how these theories will help to tell us
anything new about the authority of morality itself.
Korsgaard and Parfit write about the authority of morality in terms of the
normativity of morality. Korsgaard argues that it is realism that cannot secure the
normative force of morality essentially because it is a metaphysical rather than a
practical project. Many of her objections to realism fail on their own grounds. But more
importantly, she sets a standard for being able to answer the normative question that
her theory fails to meet. At the same time, Korsgaard’s Kantian constructivism is unable
to secure an objective status for morality.
Korsgaard forcefully posed the normative force objection by saying that a
metaethical theory that deals with the objection must be able to give an answer to the
skeptical question ‘why should I do what I am morally required to do?’ Although
Korsgaard’s own theory does not provide an adequate answer to this question, it might
still be that an answer is in fact a requirement of any metaethical theory. Parfit’s theory
of normativity cannot answer this question either. His answer is that we must do what
we have reason to do. But as with Korsgaard’s theory, there is always the possibility for
a regress here, why should I do what I have most reason to do?
Parfit uses normativity in a different way than Korsgaard does and focuses on
naturalism’s inability to explain ultimate normative reasons. However, Parfit’s arguments
against non-analytic naturalism fail because they either misunderstand what a nonanalytic naturalist is really committed to or they simply beg the question, asserting that
no identity could ever be discovered between natural facts and moral facts that could
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preserve the reason giving force of the moral facts. Parfit’s theory is further complicated
by the fact that moral reasons themselves are sui generis and unanalyzable.
The last theory considered was Blackburn’s quasi-realism. Some may have been
convinced with the responses given to Korsgaard and Parfit and yet still suspicious of
realism’s ability to deal with the authority or normativity of morality. If these suspicions
stem from a general suspicion of the ontology of realism, they may be sympathetic to a
theory like Blackburn’s because it seems to get all of the authority, objectivity, and truth
we are looking for in a metaethical theory, without any unsightly metaphysical baggage.
The discussion of quasi-realism in this chapter was by no means a full analysis of the
assets and liabilities of that theory. Instead, it focused on quasi-realism’s ability to
secure moral objectivity and justification because they are preconditions for the ability to
secure the authority or normativity of morality. As we saw quasi-realism falls short on
these grounds.
Quasi-realism cannot adequately answer the skeptical question. And as Zangwill
and Brown argue, Blackburn cannot justify one set of emotional reactions to an action or
state of affairs over another. Although Blackburn does not address moral skepticism
directly, we can imagine what he might say to the skeptic based on his response to the
relativist who claims that whether or not kicking dogs is wrong or not depends on what
an individual or some group of people thinks about it. So when asked by the skeptic
why I should do what I am morally required to do? Blackburn can only tell him that the
question only makes sense from within a moral framework, and that if he does not think
he should do what he is morally required to do he is a morally deplorable person.
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Conclusion
Moral realism is the view that moral judgments either succeed or fail in
corresponding to a mind independent moral reality. The moral facts about people,
actions, states of affairs, and so on and the moral properties of these people, actions,
states of affairs, exist regardless of what we think of them or whether or not we are even
aware of them. Moral realism has strong common sense appeal, so much so that it can
be assumed to be the default metaethical position. This project has been primarily a
defense, rather than a positive account of moral realism.
In contemporary metaethics one of the central worries about moral realism is that
unless realism can be reconciled with naturalism, realism is left open to the charge that
talk of objective moral facts and properties should go the way of talk about phlogiston
and witches, which seemed to be common sense at one point, but have since been
abandoned as metaphysically and epistemologically indefensible.
A commitment to naturalism, whether methodological, epistemological, or
metaphysical, may seem incompatible with moral realism because moral realism might
be thought to embrace a realm of sui generis or mysterious moral facts and properties
and a corresponding faculty with which to perceive them.
The position I have defended is a version of Cornell realism. Cornell realism is
the view that moral properties and facts exist objectively; this means that they are not
dependent on or constituted by what we think about them. At the same time, these
moral properties and facts are constituted by basic physical properties and facts (See
Introduction and Chapter 1, Section1). Cornell realism directly addresses some of the
perpetual worries about the incompatibility of realism and naturalism by characterizing
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moral facts and properties as being identical with, constituted by, or supervening on
basic physical facts and properties, in an analogous way to the relationship between the
psychological or historical facts and properties and basic physical facts and properties.
Another virtue of Cornell realism is that it posits non-analytic identities between
moral properties and natural properties. Rather than having to do with truths of
meaning, these identities are to be understood along the same lines as the scientific
property identities that we have discovered between things like water and H 20.
The version of Cornell realism I have defended is neutral on whether or not the
identities between moral properties and facts and natural properties and facts are
reductive or nonreductive. Nonreducutive realism says that that moral properties and
facts are constituted by natural properties and facts, rather than being reduced to
natural properties and facts. While I favor nonreductive realism, that debate has been
largely avoided in this essay.
Despite the plausibility of Cornell realism, queerness objections, articulated
influentially by J.L. Mackie to realism itself and naturalistic realism, specifically the
existence of moral facts and properties have remained. Mackie’s set of queerness
objections to the existence of objective values continue to be cited and contemporary
challenges to realism grounded in the queerness or moral facts and properties abound.
The two versions of queerness objections that I have spent the most time addressing
are objections based on moral motivation (the internalism objection) and objections
based on the authority or normativity of morality.
I have argued that Cornell Realism can withstand these two central objections. A
theme throughout this work has been pointing out arguments and positions that depend
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for their plausibility on either subtly or blatantly conflating questions of how morality
motivates with questions about the nature of the authority that morality has over us.
When these two objections are properly distinguished from each other and other sorts
of queerness objections, moral realism is well positioned to account for the nature of
moral motivation, especially if it embraces a pluralistic externalism about motivation.
In Chapter 1, I introduced Mackie’s classic queerness objections to the existence
of objective values and I cataloged his several sub-arguments (Chapter 1, Section 1).
Mackie argues that if objective values were to exist, they would be a kind of thing like
nothing else that exists. Cornell realism succeeds in addressing one element of
Mackie’s worry. It addresses the assumption that moral properties and facts (objective
values, in Mackie’s language) cannot be reconciled with a world of natural properties
and facts. However, even if Cornell realism succeeds in this capacity, I argue that the
view must still contend with a set of challenges derived from Mackie’s queerness
objections.
After presenting some of the central ways that the queerness objection can be
understood, I focused on the strain of the argument having to do with metaphysical
queerness (Chapter 1, Section 2). Metaphysical queerness itself can be understood in
several different ways. The metaphysical queerness of moral properties and facts might
have to do with explaining the contentious relationship of supervenience which is said to
hold between moral properties and facts and natural properties and facts. Or it may
have to do with the concern that objective values (moral properties and facts) do not
seem to be causally efficacious in the way other properties and facts may be. Finally, it
can be understood to have to do with the normative force of objective values. In the
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remainder of the essay I focused on the normative force strain of Mackie’s argument.
Mackie’s objections that center on normative force contain at least two sub objections. I
further parse the objection into an objection having to do with the nature of moral
motivation and an objection having to do with the authority of morality.
I argued that these objections are often conflated. But, in fact objections to
realism based on concerns about the nature of moral motivation are distinct from
objections to realism based on the worry that it cannot capture the authority of morality.
Both objections claim that there is something about realism (natural or non-natural) that
makes it unable to easily accommodate or be consistent with an important belief that we
have about the way morality works or an important fact about morality. A central aim of
this essay has been to distinguish these two objections from each other and to provide
a plausible way of understanding each objection as a problem that realism must face.
The objection based on the nature of moral motivation says that because realism
is committed to cognitivism it has to construe moral judgments, either the sentences we
utter with moral content or the mental states we have with moral content, primarily as
beliefs. The objection claims that beliefs, however, are motivationally inert; they cannot
motivate us to act on them all by themselves. But moral judgments do motivate us to act
all by themselves, the objection continues. So cognitivism is incompatible with a
significant piece of moral psychology and phenomenology. The view that the objection
relies on here is motivational judgment internalism (internalism for short). Realism is
therefore probably not true because the cognitivism it is committed to it is incompatible
with internalism. A more plausible metaethical view, the argument continues, can allow
for motivation to be built into moral judgments themselves, candidates include
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expressivism, projectivism, emotivism, Smith’s unique rationalism, and so on (Chapter
1, Section 3).
The second queerness objection that I contend with in the essay has to do with
the authority of morality. It says that realism (whether naturalistic or not) cannot capture,
or is incompatible with, the unique way that morality has authority over us. What this
kind of authority comes down to is something that I explore in Chapter 4. Initially it
seems that morality is not the sort of thing one can opt out of; it binds us all regardless
of our wishes to the contrary. On a realist view, the objection claims, the “ought-ness”
of morality, even morality’s normativity disappears or becomes incoherent. Korsgaard’s
formulation of this objection identifies realism itself as the problem, whereas Parfit’s
formulation of the objection identifies naturalism as the source of the problem (Chapter
2, Section 4).
Chapter 1 included a review of and responses to several of the most historically
significant objections to moral naturalism which have a continued influence on
contemporary metaethics. I presented the problems for naturalism posed by David
Hume’s alleged is-ought gap and G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. I made several
arguments against these classic objections to moral naturalism (Chapter 1, Sects. 5 and
6).
Chapter 1 concluded with a brief discussion of a final argument that Mackie
makes against objective values, the objection from disagreement. Mackie distinguishes
from the queerness objection, but the objection is often raised against realism in
conjunction with the queerness objections, so it merits addressing (Chapter 1, Section
7).
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In Chapter 2 I addressed the internalism objection to realism; this is the
objection that has to do with moral motivation. Internalism is the view that moral
judgments necessarily, inherently, or essentially motivate the agents who make them to
act on them. The competing view is externalism, which says that moral judgments do
not necessarily, inherently, or essentially motivate the agents who make them to act on
them. According to externalism, there is a contingent connection between making a
moral judgment and having a moral motivation. I began by giving a positive case for
internalism and outlining several different types of internalism (Chapter 2, Sections 1
and 2).
I considered the positive arguments in favor of internalism, the argument from
phenomenology, the argument from oddness, and the argument from connection. I
argued that all of these arguments face serious challenges. I gave particular attention to
the connection argument and a particularly plausible version of it put forward by Smith.
In addition to responding to the arguments in favor of internalism I argued that there are
independent reasons to doubt internalism.
Finally, I developed a plausible alternative to internalism which I call a pluralistic
externalist account of moral motivation. At times, we are motivated to act on our moral
judgments by sources like compassion and sympathy. We are also motivated to act on
our moral judgments by conative states like desires, which have content related to the
moral judgment we make. For example, I might desire to do the right thing. Another
person or at another time, someone may desire that their friend be happy. Another time
a person may act out of a mostly or purely non-cognitive affective state like sympathy
for the suffering person (Chapter 2, Section 3).
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I argue that pluralistic externalism satisfies three important conditions that any
theory of moral motivation should meet, the conditions of flexibility condition, the
neutrality condition, and consistency with empirical evidence.
One of the most attractive features of pluralistic externalism is that it can easily
accommodate the conceivability and existence of amoralists and other forms of moral
indifference. Pluralistic externalism is a theory of moral motivation that is flexible
enough to be compatible with the wide range of variability that we find in moral
motivation between individuals and within a single individual across times and
situations. Pluralistic externalism can embrace a wide range of types of motivation and
can thus also easily explain a wide range of ways in which one can fail to be motivated
as well.
A theory of moral motivation should also be impartial with respect to ethical
theories about what kind of motivation is morally praiseworthy; it should be as
normatively neutral as possible. Thus the third condition is the neutrality condition.
Pluralistic externalism is agnostic on which type of motivation represents the most
morally, or the only morally praiseworthy type of motivation. Further, it is neutral about
whether or not motivation is something that can be or should be morally assessed at all
or whether it is rather the action that comes out of our deliberative process that truly
matters morally. Neutrality on this issue is important even if one does not accept a strict
division between metaethics and normative ethics. I do not embrace such a strict
division but I take the truth and nature of a theory of moral motivation to be an empirical
theory of moral psychology. The way that our motivational system actually works is
likely relevant to what should be counted as morally praiseworthy or worthwhile. But this
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does not mean that moral psychology should build normative views into the theories of
moral motivation themselves.
Finally, a theory of moral motivation should be consistent with the existing
psychological and neuroscientific evidence about how the human motivational system
works in general (the empirical evidence condition). Although in this essay I have not
presented empirical evidence in any detail, I argue that because pluralistic externalism
is an a posteriori theory, as opposed to most versions of internalism, which are a priori,
pluralistic externalism is open to being amended based on scientific evidence.
In Chapter 3 I delved in the phenomenon of moral indifference in detail. I
presented some of the most important and widely discussed forms of moral indifference
and amoralism. The morally indifferent, like amoralists, are people who appear to be
able to make moral judgments without being motivated to act on those moral judgments.
The mere conceivability of such people is a serious counterexample to a priori
internalism. Their conceivability does not affect the less common a posteriori forms of
internalism. If the morally indifferent exist and if the externalist characterization of them
can be defended, then the counter example touches a posteriori forms of internalism as
well (Chapter 3, Section 1).
I argued that moral indifference is common. This becomes clear when we stop
considering only the monstrous figure of the amoralist and broaden our scope to
consider the variability in levels of moral motivation between individuals and across an
individual over time. I addressed the ways that internalists attempt to respond to the
conceivability and existence of moral indifference. I especially considered the internalist
strategy of reinterpreting what the morally indifferent person says to show that they do
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not really make a moral judgment at all. The internalist responses to moral indifference
were all found lacking and concluded that the phenomenon of moral indifference is
something that the best theory of moral motivation must be able to account for and
argued that pluralistic externalism can do just that (Chapter 3, Sects. 2 and 3).
The authority objection to realism was addressed in Chapter 4. When we try to
understand what the authority objection is really about we find several different strains
of thought, inescapability, overidingness, bindingness, and normativity, none of which is
incompatible with a realist picture of the nature of moral facts and properties. A realist
account of morality’s authority is able to uniquely capture the objective nature of
morality in a way that many other metaethical theories cannot. Since naturalism can at
the same time resist positing a sui generis realm of moral properties it is a more
convincing metaethical position (Chapter 4, Section 1).
The authority objection to naturalist moral realism is motivated by several distinct
metaethical positions. One way of understanding the objection is that if we claim that
moral properties are mind independent features of the world, we lose the central
connection that morality has to guiding our decision making. Although this authority
objection comes close to the motivation objection, the objection is not meant to be
understood in a psychological or motivational sense. Since there are several different
ways the authority of morality has been interpreted, I considered two specific objections
to naturalist moral realism based on the claim that it cannot capture the authority of
morality.
I first considered an objection from Korsgaard, who focuses on realism as a
metaphysical theory. She argues that realism does not have the resources to answer

245

what she calls the normative question; it cannot explain why an objective realm of mind
independent facts should have any implications for how we should reason or behave. I
offered independent reasons against Korsgaard’s objection to realism. I also argue that
her theory, Kantian constructivism, cannot meet the standard that requires that realism
meet (Chapter 4, Section 2).
Chapter 4 explained that, for Korsgaard, every metaethical theory must be able
to explain, in a first person context, why someone should do what is morally required of
them. Korsgaard claims that while realism fails to sufficiently answer the normative
question, her metaethical position, Kantian constructivism succeeds. I responded to
Korsgaard’s objection to realism. First, Korsgaard does not consider or unfairly
dismisses the kinds of answers that a realist can give to the normative question.
Second, Korsgaard’s argument from the normative question sometimes conflates
justification and motivation; that is, it combines the internalism objection and the
authority objection in subtle ways. I also argued that Korsgaard’s normative question
challenge to moral realism is equally problematic for her own Kantian constructivism.
More broadly, I claimed that we have reason to suppose that the way she frames the
challenge all metaethical theories will face difficulties answering her normative question.
However, realism, however, fares better than many others on the grounds that it
captures objectivity in a unique way.
Second, I discussed Parfit’s version of the authority objection to naturalist
versions of realism, specifically, non-analytical naturalism. I presented several
responses to Parfit’s objection to naturalism. Parfit’s objection to all naturalistic
metaethical theories, including what he calls non-analytical naturalism, is that
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naturalistic views eliminate the reason giving sense of normativity. The only metaethical
view that can capture the reason giving sense of normativity, Parfit argues is a
nonnatural realism that includes a sui generis realm of nonnatural normative facts. Parfit
provides three arguments against non-analytical naturalism, “the normativity objection,”
“the triviality objection,” and “the fact-stating argument.” The goal these three arguments
share is that they attempt to show how that natural facts by themselves cannot be
normative. Parfit’s arguments against non-analytical naturalism fail for several reasons.
Simply, Parfit’s arguments beg the question against non-analytical naturalism. They
persuade only if one begins by assuming that normativity has to be non-natural
(Chapter 4, Section 3).
Finally I discussed Blackburn’s metaethical theory quasi-realism, which he
presents as a view that can capture the desirable features of moral realism, such as the
objectivity of morality and the phenomenology of moral disagreement and reasoning
without expanding his ontology to include objective moral properties or facts. I do not
give a full account of Blackburn’s view. Instead I sketched the view as a way of
highlighting the importance of the objectivity of morality for a minimal account of the
authority of morality by contrasting the kind of objectivity that moral realism can secure,
with the kind of pseudo-objectivity that non-realist theories, like Blackburn’s can secure
(Chapter 4, Section 4).
Having argued that neither Korsgaard’s or Parfit’s paradigmatic cases of the
authority objection to naturalist moral realism succeed, I closed Chapter 4 with a
discussion of the kind of authority that naturalist moral realism does have. The authority
of morality is not the same as objectivity. But in reviewing Blackburn’s position, it

247

becomes easier to see the kind of authority that realism can capture that non-realist
views, like constructivism or quasi-realist expressivism cannot. I end the chapter by
discussing what kind of authority is the best we can hope for, that is objectivity. This is
something the realist can secure. This is a particular success for naturalist moral
realism if at the same time it is able to do all of this without positing the existence of sui
generis moral properties or facts (Chapter 4, Section 5).
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